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 This thesis focuses on the origins of the modern Tongan Military from the establishment 
of the Tongan monarchy in 1875 to the Military’s most recent engagements into the 21st Century. 
This thesis offers an overview of the existing literature on Tongan history and military as well as 
an overview of contemporary literature that critiques militarization in the Pacific. Through a 
historical and critical lens, I examine the Tongan Military’s participation in WWI, WWII, the 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), the U.S. invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and the quelling of the 2006 Democracy Riots. Chapter one focuses on the 
establishment of Tonga as a British Protectorate, chapter two offers an account of Tonga’s 
involvement in WWI, chapter three extends this account with an exploration of WWII, and 
chapter four offers a look at more contemporary engagements of the Tongan Military.  
By tracing the country’s military, this thesis centers on exploring two main questions: for whom 
is the Tongan military fighting, and what impacts does Tongan participation in foreign military 
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With Our Eyes on the Past 
 
The trip between Tongatapu and ‘Eua is notoriously rough. The strait between the two 
islands is short, but the depth of the channel causes a powerful and stomach curling current. The 
‘Onemato ferry travels this route daily. It is a three-story passenger ship, with a long front deck 
and a smaller tower of passenger seating. Most passengers are families and workers who 
frequently ride on the rocky ‘Onemato. Those who are especially prepared bring sugar cane to 
sweeten the trip. However, I was entirely unprepared. Much to the amusement of the older men 
on the ship, I could barely manage to sit up straight as we swayed back and forth and up and 
down.1 
They say you should watch the horizon if you are seasick. To the best of my abilities, I 
fixed my eyes on the horizon and watched the bow roll in circles as the current whipped back 
and forth. An hour into our journey, I noticed a large gray ship in the distance. Next to the ship 
was a helicopter dipping towards the water. It was an Australian naval ship on a training mission 
with the Tongan military, currently named His Majesty’s Armed Forces. I was too paralyzed 
with nausea to run to the rail and take a closer look. Instead, I stayed seated on the damp floor of 
the old ferry, leaning against a cage of taro watching as our tiny, shaky, rusty boat, passed by the 
pristine Australian naval ship sitting firmly on the water’s surface. It stuck me how sturdily the 
naval ship sat, unmoving and massive in the great current, and it struck me how a ship like the 
‘Onemato, one that is used every day by Tonga families and workers was in such poor condition 
compared to the gray behemoth sitting in the water.  
Being confronted so vividly with the increased military presence in Tonga, in the waters 
of my ancestors, I thought back to when I first visited Tonga in 2004 as a teenager. I do not 
remember military personnel walking around like they were in the summer of 2018 when I most 
recently visited. As I observed the soldiers in full uniform, strolling along streets of Nuku’alofa 
in the 80 ° degree heat, I tried desperately to remember if they had been there before.2 The school 
                                               
1 This reflection is from my trip to Tongatapu in July of 2018. 
2 I asked my family if they remembered seeing many soldiers in Nuku’alofa in 2004, and they 
agreed that there weren’t any. The increased presence was most likely due to the training session 
I describe, and the fact that Tonga has expanded its military efforts since 2004. In 2004 Tonga 
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children in their uniforms rushed swiftly across the busy streets and shopkeepers fanned 
themselves without flinching as the soldiers walked by. Seeing the military training exercise that 
day reminded me of the entanglements of empire at play in the Pacific. Many are unaware of 
and/or indifferent to Tonga’s participation in the militarization of the region. While my thesis 
asks how Tonga’s participation in U.S., UK, and Australian military campaigns further enfolds 
them into the arms of empire, Tonga’s occlusions from military discourse underwrites this 
enquiry. As Tonga has long been excluded from de-colonial and anti-militarization discourse due 
to its perceived contiguous sovereignty, I argue that Tonga is not disjointed and cannot be easily 
disarticulated from the tides of imperialism and militarization that have stormed the Pacific for 
over a century.3 Exploring the ways in which the Tongan military contributes to the campaigns 
of the U.S., U.K., and Australia demonstrates how Tonga has become involved in the most 
violent and colonial aspects of empire. This incorporation did not happen overnight but took over 
a century to solidify. A brief history of Tonga’s military from the establishment of the monarchy 
to the present shows that Tonga has been affected by militarism and offers insights into 
militarism’s ramification in Tonga; this history also illuminates the potential risks Tonga faces if 
the country continues to contract its military out to foreign powers.  
Throughout my thesis I explore the creation of the modern Tongan nation-state under the 
Tupou dynasty, Tongan participation in World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII,) 
and the Tongan military’s contemporary engagements. Beyond Tonga’s geographic and 
genealogical connection with the broader Pacific, historical evidence shows that Tonga has not 
entirely escaped militarization’s edge as many have assumed. My critiques are engaged in 
understanding the macro-politics of militarization and imperialism, which are not intended to 
dismiss, mask, or castigate the agency of individual Tongan soldiers or politicians who have 
chosen of their own volition to participate in the Tongan military. However, I do question how 
these individual’s decisions and accomplishments would have manifested otherwise if the 
current frameworks of imperialism and militarization did not exist.   
 
                                               
sent its first security force to Iraq in support of the U.S. invasion. The Democracy Riots that 
required military intervention did not occur until 2006.  
3 Teresia Teaiwa, "The Articulated Limb: Theorizing indigenous Pacific participation in the 
Military Industrial Complex," Pacific Dynamics: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 1, no.1 
(2017): 1-20, 16.  
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Positionality  
 Before delving into the historical context of Tonga’s military, I would first like to address 
the vantage point from which I am writing. I am a half-white (palangi) half-Tongan, hafekasi, 
woman living and writing in the U.S. My particular perspective has been deeply informed by my 
experiences. My interest is peaked by militarism in Tonga, in part because I am an outsider 
looking in. Although I am ethnically Tongan, I have never lived in the kingdom, and I have 
never personally experienced the economic, patriotic, and cultural conditions that compel the 
Tongan soldiers who enlist. Inevitably, some of my questions and conclusions are Americentric, 
or, at the very least, focused on how external and larger powers have affected Tongan politics 
rather than vice versa. Originally, I intended to write a thesis historicizing the contemporary 
Tongan diaspora to the U.S., but during my research I learned about the U.S. occupation of 
Tonga during WWII and the dramatic and transformative impact the occupation had on the 
Tongan economy and global perspective. Additionally, after learning that the Tongan diaspora 
began after WWII, I could not ignore that Tonga, too, was part of the larger process of Pacific 
militarization.  Further, I learned that Tongans not only participated in WWII, but in WWI as 
well. This information surprised me, because Tonga is often excluded from discussions of 
militarization in the Pacific due to its continued domestic sovereignty. Living and studying in 
Hawai‘i, I am in constant contact with the realities of U.S. militarization and colonialism in the 
Pacific, and I could not un-see the negative cultural and environmental ramifications caused by 
the U.S. military here in Hawai‘i. As a settler, I acknowledge that I am a participant in 
legitimizing this militarism by living and benefitting from the U.S. settler colonial system. In his 
foundational text on critiques of settler colonialism, Patrick Wolfe explains that “settler 
colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event.”4 Part of such a structure is 
maintained by the complicit actions of Tonga’s militarized relationship with the U.S., New 
Zealand, and Australia. Therefore, from this position, I am interested in critiquing the 
mechanism of militarism in the Pacific, specifically in Tonga, and Tonga’s complicity in foreign 
military campaigns.  
Despite my dislocation from Tonga, I am immensely proud of my heritage and Tonga’s 
independence, and I am weary of foreign policy that could jeopardize the independence that my 
                                               
4 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387-409, 388. 
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ancestors worked so hard to protect. Moreover, I do not believe that the sovereignty of Pacific 
nations can be disarticulated from one another.5 By forming military alliances with the U.S., 
Australia, and New Zealand, the Tongan government is complicit in undermining indigenous 
sovereignty by supporting settler states and validating their militaries.6 Not only is this 
problematic in itself, but by formally, or tacitly, condoning imperialism in the Pacific, via these 
militarized relationships, the Tongan government limits its own sovereignty. This is because they 
are supporting powers that oppress Tonga’s historical allies.7 Additionally, the aid Tonga 
receives from foreign governments in exchange for military service affects Tongan foreign 
policy in a way that favors militarized and monetarily dependent relationships with colonial 
powers.   
While the full depth and breadth of the critical militarism-settler-colonial discourse is not 
the focus of this paper, I hope that my findings and analyses can contribute to this larger 
conversation.   The primary sources I have gathered and have had access to are all in English; the 
Tongan Government Gazette, the various Tongan law codes, and the letters between Tupou II 
and the Western Pacific High Commission were written in both Tongan and English. I reviewed 
both versions of texts to the best of my ability but based my analyses on the English scripts. 
Beyond the Government Gazette and the Tongan law codes, I also had the privilege of being able 
to visit the Western Pacific Archive at the University of Auckland. With the help of the 
wonderful archivist Kathrine Pawley, I was able to view important correspondences between the 
Western Pacific High Commission and Tupou II, as well as documents on the status of German 
residents in Tonga during WWI. The wealth of primary sources concerning Tonga’s military are 
not at the University of Hawai‘i, but rather reside in Auckland, Wellington, and Canberra. Due to 
my limited access to primary sources on the subject, much of my thesis utilizes secondary 
sources. I have used a varied selection of secondary sources to construct the broader narrative of 
the creation of the Tongan monarchy, military, and Tonga’s political state during WWI and 
WWII. I incorporate primary sources such as speeches and correspondences by the reigning 
                                               
5 Teaiwa,"The Articulated Limb,” 16. 
6 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 390. Settler states are founded 
upon the displacement and disempowerment of indigenous people, so that settler colonies have 
access to indigenous land which allows them to thrive and “replace” the existing indigenous 
society.  
7 Epeli Hau’ofa, “Our Sea of Islands,” The Contemporary Pacific 6, no.1 (1994):148-161, 154. 
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monarch, personal military files, and newspaper articles to enhance my own analysis of the 
context in which the Tongan military and government was functioning.  
While I employ many secondary sources, there are no existing texts that specifically 
address the Tongan military and its involvement in both the World Wars and Tonga’s 
contemporary military engagements. Therefore, the information I am presenting, and interpreting 
is not new, but the compilation of it into one cohesive narrative and a close look at the Tongan 
military is unique. My thesis has a basic structure of six parts. This introduction includes my 
positionality and historiography. Chapter 1 addresses the creation of the monarchy and events 
that led up to Tonga becoming a British protectorate. Chapter 2 explores the political climate of 
Tonga on the verge of WWI and Tongan participation in the conflict. Chapter 3 houses a 
discussion on WWII which includes Tongan soldiers and fundraising efforts, and Chapter 4 
explores contemporary military engagements after Tongan independence in 1970. Finally, I 
provide a brief conclusion that summarizes the chapters and provides a personal reflection on my 
findings. The following is an account of the most informative and influential secondary sources 
that have shaped my thesis.  
 
Historiography  
Academic interest in Tonga is frequently limited to anthropological accounts of island 
culture, and fiscal analyses of small island economies. However, there are a few historical texts 
on Tonga that dominate the field. First and foremost, there is Sione Lātūkefu’s Church and State 
in Tonga: The Wesleyan Methodist Missionaries and Political Development; then there is Island 
Kingdom: Tonga Ancient and Modern by Ian Campbell, and Friendly Islands: A history of 
Tonga which is an anthology edited by Noel Rutherford. Each work offers a different look into 
Tonga’s past, but none offers a critical analysis on the role of European imperialism’s lasting 
impact on the role of the Tongan military. Another relevant text is Shirley Baker and the King of 
Tonga, by Noel Rutherford. Shirley Baker closely follows the life and influence of one of Tupou 
I’s most powerful advisors and the early political relationship between Britain and Tonga. Along 
the same vein, Imperial Benevolence by Jane Samson tracks the changing attitudes of British 
imperialism in the Pacific from the late 18th century up to the creation of the Western Pacific 
High Commission in 1877. Lastly, Elizabeth Wood-Ellem’s biography Queen Sālote of Tonga: 
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The Story of an Era 1900-1965, beautifully recounts the late queen’s life and the various political 
and personal challenges she faced.  
 There are a fair number of books on Pacific militarization, but few of them address Tonga 
specifically. The three most influential books on militarization that inform this thesis are: Teresia  
Teaiwa’s dissertation “Militarism, Tourism, and the Native: Articulations in Oceania,,” 
Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and in the Pacific edited by Setsu 
Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, , and lastly Shasha Davis’ Empires’ Edge: Militarization, 
Resistance and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific. In addition to these texts, Teaiwa’s 
article, "The Articulated Limb: Theorizing indigenous Pacific participation in the Military 
Industrial Complex," has deeply impacted my understanding of Tongan motivations for 
participating in foreign military campaigns. None of the above titles specifically address Tonga’s 
place in the militarization of the Pacific, but rather they provide a theoretical framework from 
which to understand why Tonga’s participation in foreign sponsored global military 
engagements is problematic.  
 Finally, the third, and rarest, category are books and articles that directly address the 
Tongan military. Neither Valiant Volunteers: Soldiers from Tonga in the Great War by Christine 
Liava‘a nor Judith Hornabrook’s dissertation “New Zealand and the Tonga Defence Force, 1939-
1945” provide critical analysis on the significance of Tongan participation in WWI or WWII, 
but they both include detailed information on Tonga during these periods that is not available 
elsewhere. “The United States Occupation of Tonga, 1942-1945” by Charles Weeks and Echoes 
of Pacific War edited by Deryck Scarr, Niel Gunson, and Jennifer Terrell are much more 
forthcoming in their critiques of the positive and negatives impacts WWII had on Tonga. My 
work can be distinguished from these previous pieces, in that I discuss how the Tongan 
government responded differently in WWI compared to WWII. Additionally, I explore 
contemporary Tongan military engagements and their relationship to Tonga’s past and question 
the impact these campaigns could have on Tonga’s future.  
 
i.   Tonga 
As aforementioned, Church and State in Tonga: The Wesleyan Methodist Missionaries 
and political development, 1822-1875, by Sione Lātūkefu, a celebrated Tongan scholar and 
Methodist pastor, is an incredibly important text on Tongan history. Lātūkefu gives a detailed 
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account of early Wesleyan Missionary influence in Tonga and of the consolidation of Tonga 
under Tāufa‘āhau (Siaosi/George) Tupou I. Church and State in Tonga does not cover the war 
years, which are the general focus of my thesis, but provides vital background to Tongan politics. 
The chapters are organized chronologically, and Lātūkefu uses a variety of sources; however, the 
majority of them are missionary accounts. Lātūkefu portrays Wesleyan missionaries exceedingly 
favorably. He describes Siaosi Tupou I’s destruction of indigenous religion remorselessly, and he 
praises the collapse of traditional Tongan governance. Despite his support of the missionaries’ 
and Tupou I’s destructive practices, Lātūkefu’s work is undoubtedly insightful and an invaluable 
examination of the Tongan Monarchy and its relationship to the Wesleyan Church. 
Chapter One and Two describe the traditional religion and system of governance in 
Tonga, and the initial failed missionary attempt in the late 1700s. Lātūkefu gives careful 
descriptions of the more violent aspects of indigenous polity in Tonga, including finger 
amputation, human sacrifice, war, and the absolute power of chiefs over their subjects.8 The late 
1700s proved to be a time of great civil unrest in Tonga and the introduction of guns escalated 
warfare rapidly.9 Lātūkefu attributes the early missionaries’ failure to their lack of skill and tact 
as well as chiefly greed that was invested in maintaining traditional order.10 There is no 
discussion of the benefits of communal modes of production or the advantageous intimacy 
between traditional Tongan religion and the environment. From Lātūkefu’s focus on the more 
violent and draconian aspects of Tongan culture, it is clear that he does not view pre-Christian 
Tonga positively. Lātūkefu’s praise of the early missionaries to Tonga belies the detrimental 
ramifications of adopting Christianity and creating a government modeled from European values 
and the impacts that it had on Tongan culture. There were both positive and negative 
consequences to supplementing Tongan traditional sovereignty with a European form.  
The first king of Tonga, Tāufa‘āhau Tupou I, converted to Christianity in 1828, and used 
his newfound faith to dismantle traditional religion and undermine the chiefly powers supported 
by indigenous religion in order to consolidate Tonga under his rule.11 Lātūkefu presents 
Tāufa‘āhau’s conversion and subsequent rampage against traditional Tongan religion as part of 
                                               
8 Sione Lātūkefu, Church and State in Tonga: The Wesleyan Methodist Missionaries and 
Political Development, 1822-1875 (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1974), 26-29. 




an inevitable progression embedded in a longstanding power struggle between various chiefly 
lines.12 Tāufa‘āhau and his followers burned temples, deposed priests and priestesses, and killed 
many who opposed him and his new religion.13 Lātūkefu himself describes Tāufa‘āhau’s efforts 
as fighting against “heathens.” Simply because Tāufa‘āhua was Tongan does not mean that his 
violence against Tongan culture was not at least partially a product of European imperialism in 
the Pacific.  
Wesleyan excitement for Tāufa‘āhau’s war of attrition is evident in their enthusiastic 
allusions to crusades in their descriptions.14 Any doubts as to how much influence missionaries 
had on Tāufa‘āhau’s methods should be disabused by the code of laws erected by him in 1839 
which disrupted many aspects of traditional Tongan culture, but most egregiously made dancing 
and traditional games illegal.15 European faith and polity was forcibly impressed on Tonga, 
which is evident in the brutality to which Tāufa‘āhau carried out his conquest and evident in the 
widespread dissatisfaction exhibited in the rebellions that ardently opposed these changes.16 
Once the rebellions were suppressed, and the majority of Tongans accepted Methodism 
or Catholicism, Tāufa‘āhau focused his efforts on securing Tongan independence by adopting a 
constitution that would be internationally recognized.17 Despite Tāufa‘āhau’s violence against 
Tongan tradition, and his willingness to convert to European religion and governance, he was 
unwilling to sell outsiders land.18 This protected Tonga from the insidious planters that plagued 
other island nations. Additionally, Tāufa‘āhau assumed a constitutional monarchy, similar to that 
of Hawai’i, which gained recognition of foreign governments and ultimately shielded Tonga 
from growing imperial powers.19 The protection of Tongan sovereignty should be celebrated, but 
                                               
12 Ibid., 105. 
13 Ibid., 104. 
14 Ibid.,164. 
15 Ibid.,195. 
16 Ibid., 224. 
17 Ibid., 231; Jane Samson, Imperial Benevolence: Making British Authority in the Pacific 
Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 70. Those who supported the Tu‘i Tonga, 
Laufilitonga, adopted Catholicism. Additionally, while Tupou I gained the support of Wesleyan 
British missionaries, those who opposed Tupou I and converted to Catholicism gained the 
support of Catholic French missionaries. In this way Tongans used the competition between 
imperial powers to their own political advantages.  
18 Lātūkefu, Church and State, 253. 
19 Ibid., 312 
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continued independence came at a cost that cannot be ignored or justified as part of a natural 
progression. The irony of Tongan sovereignty is that in order to maintain their self-
determination, Tongans still had to adopt European standards of government, education, and 
cosmology. Church and State in Tonga continues to be the best existing history on the creation 
of the Tongan monarchy, and the role of missionaries in Tongan state formation. However, 
Lātūkefu does not adequately critique Tāufa‘āhau’s decisions to eradicate traditional Tongan 
religion, and the longer-term ramifications that the decision has had on Tongan culture.  
 Lātūkefu’s work is concentrated on a narrow time frame, 1822-1875, which allows him 
to be detailed and nuanced, but the standard text on Tongan history is Island Kingdom: Tonga 
Ancient and Modern by Ian Campbell. Campbell provides a general overview of Tongan history 
from its first settlement to 1990. The first six chapters cover the same time periods and events as 
Church and State in Tonga and come to the same conclusions as Sione Lātūkefu. However, the 
chapters provide less detail since ancient Tongan polity and the foundation of the monarchy are 
only part of the book’s focus. While Lātūkefu is complimentary towards British missionaries and 
influence, he also vehemently touts the political genius of Tongan leaders, but Campbell is more 
focused on the importance of external influence. Campbell praises British interference in Tonga 
and hypothesizes that “without the periodic intervention and advice of the British consul, it is 
doubtful that the Tupou dynasty would have survived the troubled early decades of the twentieth 
century.”20 However, Campbell cites no sources to corroborate his supposition. He also freely 
expresses his disapproval of Tupou II. In one instance he explains that the 1905 Supplementary 
Agreement was necessary and that “the king had brought humiliation on himself by his own 
carelessness of the need for good government and disregard for the constitution.”21 
 In later chapters, he continues to focus on the relationship between Britain and Tonga and 
on the broad economic and political changes of each decade. Since Campbell is not specifically 
concerned with the Tongan military, Island Kingdom only minimally addresses Tongan 
involvement in WWI and WWII. Campbell spends more time castigating Tupou II than 
addressing the kingdom’s response to WWI. He does not discuss how WWI forced Tonga to 
                                               
20Ian Campbell, Island Kingdom: Tonga Ancient and Modern (Christchurch: University of 
Canterbury Press, 1992), 113. 
21Ibid., 116. In 1901 Tonga became a protectorate of Britain, against Tupou II’s wishes (see 
Chapter 2.) The 1905 Supplementary Agreement even further increased the power of British 
officials in the Tongan government. 
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fully shift its alliance away from Germany and toward Britain. During the early period of Tongan 
independence, 1875 to 1900, Germany had been one of Tonga’s primary allies. Instead he 
focuses on the economic ramification WWI had on Tonga. While the price of copra was high due 
to increased demand, the war stifled shipping in the Pacific, so the Tongan economy did not 
benefit from the elevated price.22 Campbell skims over WWI, but he provides a slightly deeper 
look into WWII. Campbell emphasizes the importance of the U.S. occupation of Tonga during 
the war, and the cultural and economic ramifications of the occupation rather than the 
contributions of Tongan soldiers.23 Despite some of Campbell’s analyses that favor British 
intervention, Island Kingdom continues to be a vital text in the historiography of Tongan. 
So too is Friendly Islands: A history of Tonga which is an anthology edited by Noel 
Rutherford, which covers similar time frames as Lātūkefu and Campbell, but offers 
interpretations of the Tongan past from a variety of scholars. Friendly Islands includes a chapter 
by Lātūkefu titled “The Wesleyan Mission,” which concisely summarizes his main points in his 
book Church and State in Tonga.  While the collection does not directly address the Tongan 
military, it is worth noting, especially for what it offers in terms of early Tongan history. An 
especially useful chapter is “Oral Traditions and Prehistory,” as told to Noel Rutherford by 
Ve’ehala and Tupou Posesi Fanua, that offers a better and more narrative-driven account of 
ancient Tongan polity than Church and State and Friendly Islands. Additionally, the collection 
includes chapters written by Elizabeth Wood-Ellem and Noel Rutherford, on topics that they 
have each written books about- Queen Sālote and Shirley Baker, respectively.  
One of the most important arguments Lātūkefu makes is that missionaries had a 
significant influence on Tongan politics, but there was a limit to the missionaries’ power. One 
missionary who is often credited for ensuring Tongan independence is Shirley Baker, who is the 
focus of Noel Rutherford’s book Shirley Baker and the King of Tonga (1996.) Baker was 
originally sent to Tonga as a Wesleyan missionary 1860 and remained in Tonga until he was 
deported by the Western Pacific High Commission in 1890.24 During his time in Tonga, Baker 
became a close ally and political advisor to Tupou I, much to the ire of the Wesleyan mission. 
                                               
22 Ibid., 122. 
23 Ibid., 156-167. 
24 Noel Rutherford, Shirley Baker and The King of Tonga (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1996), 89. 
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Baker helped the King construct various law codes and prompted the establishment of the Free 
Church of Tonga, which is still the official religion of Tonga to this day. Rutherford decided to 
take a closer look at the role of Shirley Baker in the formation of the Tongan nation-state, after 
most historical pieces had based their interpretations of Baker on the writings of Basil Thomson. 
Thomson was a British official who despised Baker and depicted him as a zealous lunatic, 
interested in manipulating Tupou I in order to aggrandize himself.25 However, according to 
Rutherford and Lātūkefu he was not as selfish as Thomson portrayed him to be. Additionally, his 
influence on Tupou I was more limited than Thomson claimed. Shirley Baker and the King of 
Tonga is an important piece for understanding the formation of the Tongan monarchy and the 
early relationship between Britain and Tonga. Many of the early conflicts between the two 
nations arose, because of Baker’s influence and mis/guidance.  
Another useful text for conceptualizing British influence during the early years of the 
Tongan Monarchy is Imperial Benevolence (1998) by Jane Samson. It is less focused on 
missionary involvement and more concerned with British naval motives in the Pacific. Samson 
argues that in the early-to mid-19th century the ideology behind British involvement in the 
Pacific was informed by Christian, liberal, and paternalistic ideals that were part of the abolition 
movement and evangelical revivalism.26 Although the text is not solely focused on Tonga, 
Samson’s chapter “Kingmaking,” explores the British navy and missionaries’ influence in 
Tonga. While some of Samson’s conclusions pay too much credence to the power of the British 
navy, her arguments align with my analysis that European notions of sovereignty and legitimacy 
of power deeply informed the creation of the monarchy.  
Samson illuminates the close relationship between the British Navy and Wesleyan 
missionaries during this period. One particularly notable instance that illustrates the close 
association between Tāufa‘āhau, British missionaries, and the British Navy, was the battle of 
1840 at Pea. The British Naval officer, Walter Croker joined forces with Tāufa‘āhau against the 
Ha‘a Havea Chiefs (very briefly; who were the Ha`a havea Chiefs?). The attack was 
unsuccessful, and Croker died during battle. However, his reckless support of Tāufa‘āhau 
represented the British Navy’s commitment to assisting and protecting the missionaries, and by 
association Tāufa‘āhau.  Although Croker’s actions were an exception to the norm, 
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correspondences between missionaries, naval officers, and the British government regularly 
referenced Tāufa‘āhau as the king of Tonga well before he had officially consolidated monarchal 
power in 1875.27 The alliance between missionaries, the monarchy, and the British Navy show 
how entrenched militarism has been in Tonga and its links to Tongan sovereignty. While 
Samson’s work is useful for understanding British reasoning behind imperialism in the Pacific, 
she ultimately minimizes the negative impact that British imperialism had in the Pacific. 
 While Shirley Baker and the King of Tonga and Imperial Benevolence emphasize the 
significance of British influence, Elizabeth Wood-Ellem’s book Queen Sālote of Tonga: The 
Story of an Era 1900-1965 (1999), focuses on one of Tonga’s most celebrated historical figures. 
Wood-Ellem wrote Queen Sālote of Tonga with permission and assistance from the royal family 
after the queen passed away. The monograph reflects Wood-Ellem’s respect and admiration for 
Queen Sālote and provides a detailed account of both her personal and political triumphs and 
challenges. In addition, the biography includes descriptions of the Queen’s reaction to WWII. On 
September 3, 1939, Tonga declared war on Germany. Queen Sālote called on her people to 
volunteer in support of the British and initiated the creation of the Tongan Defence Force 
(TDF).28 The wartime was also a traumatic period in the Queen’s personal life.  The Queen’s 
consort and Tonga’s Premier, Prince Tungī Mailefihi was made colonel-in-chief of the TDF, but 
Tungī suddenly died in 1941. The Queen was left to face the war as well as the American 
occupation of Tonga without her husband and closest political ally.  Still, she and the Tongan 
people continued to be generous with their time, land, and resources. 29 For example, much of the 
Fua‘amotu airfield was built by hand and by volunteers. This airbase was highly desirable and 
remained in use throughout the war.30 Queen Sālote’s firm commitment to the war effort starkly 
contrasted her father’s reaction to WWI. The difference in Tongan action between WWI and 
WWII reflects the changed political relationship between Tonga and Britain.  
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ii.   Militarization  
Examining the motivations for Tongan participation in international military campaigns, 
especially those that, from a geopolitical standpoint, do not threaten Tonga, is very complex. 
Those who choose to enlist do so for a variety of reasons including passion, patriotism, and 
economic gain. However, from a macro-perspective, the commitment of Tonga in such distant 
and dangerous affairs reveals the insidious nature of militarization and its particular articulations 
in a nation that was never formally colonized. Teaiwa’s dissertation and body of work on 
militarization has profoundly impacted Pacific Island Studies, militarism studies, and the 
discourse of decolonization. Teaiwa’s dissertation “Militarism, Tourism, and the Native: 
Articulations in Oceania” examines the intersections of culture, gender, militarism and tourism. 
Teaiwa critiques militarization without negating the “attraction and usefulness to indigenous 
peoples.”31 Further, Teaiwa uses the framework of articulation in order to better represent the 
ways in which militarism affects indigenous communities as well as how militarism is shaped by 
indigenous practices and perceptions.32 Teaiwa uses the idea of articulation, based on Stuart 
Hall’s analysis of societal power structures that are formed and informed by multiple forces 
including politics and culture, because it allows for “layers upon layers of 
contextualization…and of more accurately representing cultural and political complexity.”33 
Tonga’s unique politics and culture shape militarisms impact on Tonga and, in turn shape the 
militarized relationships between Tonga and the U.S., the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand.  
Although “Militarism, Tourism, and the Native” is predominately concerned with Fiji, as 
Teaiwa notes, her approaches and analyses are relevant to Tonga as well. Tonga’s military is 
similar to Fiji’s in that it is funded by external powers and is used to serve U.S., British, and 
Australian agendas despite the fact that Tonga is independent. While the military provides a 
means of economic and social mobility and has cultural appeal in Fiji and Tonga, indigenous 
participation in imperial agendas is no less destructive. Teaiwa argues that overseas funding of 
the Fijian military “privilege[s] state-to-state relationships with Indonesia, France, New Zealand, 
and Australia, [thus] Fiji foregoes an opportunity to build meaningful relationships directly with 
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the indigenous people of West Papua, East Timor, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Australia, 
and New Zealand.”34 The same conclusions can be made concerning Tonga’s continued 
participation in global military campaigns, which I will argue in my thesis by discussing Tonga’s 
involvement in WWI, WWII, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI,) 
and the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and in the Pacific edited by 
Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho is a collection of radical anti-imperial scholarship, 
focused on militarization’s impacts on gender, politics, and culture in the Pacific and the Pacific 
Rim. The purpose of the authors’ critiques is to address militarism as an extension of colonialism 
and a continuation of imperial trauma. Along with militarism’s impacts, Militarized Currents 
also questions the motivations behind indigenous participation in the U.S. military. The authors’ 
investigations into indigenous complicity reflect my interest in why Tonga chooses to support 
Australian, U.S. and British military campaigns.  
The personal and cultural trauma of militarization is explored in Jon Osorio’s opening 
chapter “Memorializing Pu‘uloa and Remembering Pearl Harbor.” He demonstrates how U.S. 
militarization and glorification of WWII has masked the indigenous histories of spaces such as 
Pu‘uloa (the indigenous name for Pearl Harbor). Osorio explains the changing sentiments 
towards Pu‘uloa across four generations and explains the effects that militarism and U.S. 
patriotism have had on Hawaiian culture and perspective. Osorio also argues that the extensive 
military buildup of Hawai‘i is a strategic act by the U.S. government to divert attacks from the 
continental U.S. and towards Hawai‘i.35  WWII also significantly altered the geographies of 
Tonga, with bases and airfields constructed on previously sacred land. War’s impact on 
geographies and memory is a hallmark of militarization.  
Similarly, “The Exceptional Life and Death of a Chamorro Soldier,” by Michael Lujan 
Bevacqua pushes back against increased U.S. militarization of Guam post 9/11, and against his 
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community’s popular belief that the military is a positive influence in Guam.36 Bevacqua also 
discusses the widespread feelings of indebtedness to the U.S. and the U.S. infantilizing of 
Chamorros. He shows how these imposed feelings of indebtedness and inferiority play into 
Guam’s record high recruitment rates.37 Bevacqua offers a few solutions: to rethink Chamorro 
notions of indebtedness and instead celebrate Chamorros who refused to fight alongside the U.S. 
during WWII and to encourage families to stop their children from joining the military.38  
Notions of indebtedness and vulnerability strongly influenced the creation of the Tongan military 
in WWII, when Tongans enlisted in mass to support Great Britain. 39 
Vernadette Gonzales also addresses the effects of militarism on culture in her chapter, 
“Touring Military Masculinities,” where she explores mili-tourism in the Philippines at 
Corregidor, Bataan, Subic Bay, and Clark.40  She explains how the celebratory military tours of 
Corregidor and Bataan focus on American valor and bravery, and represent the U.S. military as 
saviors while completely neglecting the atrocities of the U.S.-Philippine war and the brutality of 
the nearly 50 years of U.S. imperialism that followed.41 This distortion of history humors 
“imperial nostalgia” and justifies the continued and unequal relationship between the U.S. and 
the Philippines.42 Militarism’s manipulations of memory and the lucrativeness of service create a 
toxic and unequal relationship between indigenous soldiers and imperial powers. Critiquing 
Tongan involvement in foreign military campaigns is essential in combatting empiricist 
narratives that fuel “imperial nostalgia” by not questioning the impact that militarism has had on 
the political health of Tonga and the broader Pacific.  
Empires’ Edge: Militarization Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific 
(2010) by Sasha Davis focuses on American Empire in the Pacific, and the means by which the 
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U.S. maintains hegemony in the region via militarization. Much of Davis’ analyses rely upon his 
understanding of the relationship between China and the United States. China is both the U.S.’s 
largest trading partner and the U.S.’s main competitor in global hegemony. He argues that to 
conceptualize U.S. military posturing in the Pacific, it is best to understand it as a means to 
defend “vital systems” rather than “defending territory and perpetuating the state against 
opposition.”43 Since the Pacific is a “critical space of a transnational economic system,” the U.S. 
is compelled to protect it due to the state’s reliance on “capitalist accumulation and neoliberal 
trade policies.”44 Having a strong military presence in the region allows the U.S. to dictate trade 
and defend “ ‘the system’ from all threats, environmental, military, and political.”45  
The U.S.  is not the main military influence in Tonga, although the U.S. military did 
occupy Tonga during WWII. The primary foreign military presence in Tonga is Australia, which 
Davis categorizes as one of many U.S. allies that value U.S. hegemony.46 Understanding U.S., 
Australian, and British alliances in this way explains why Tonga has seamlessly gone from 
supporting each state in various military engagements. It also helps rationalize why part of 
Australia’s response to post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy resulted in increased military presence in 
the Pacific, which the Tongan military supported. Tonga’s role in contemporary military 
engagements and Tonga’s strong relationship with China will be explored later in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 in Empire’s Edge, “Seeing like an Empire: Islands as Wastelands,” is also 
valuable when considering British policy towards Tonga. Davis outlines America’s 
rationalization of the bombing of Bikini Atoll. He explores the colonial rhetoric of 
“disposability” which is constructed around “place-myths” which represent a space in a way that 
aligns with colonial state interests rather than on the lived experience of the people who call the 
area home.47 This practice is relevant to the Pacific more broadly, since the dominant 
representations of Pacific islands are as travel destinations with little to offer beyond vacation 
oases for elites. The second common representation of the Pacific is as a blank space and only of 
interest for trade between Asia and America. This representational erasure allows the U.S. and 
                                               
43 Sasha Davis, Empires’ Edge: Militarization Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the 
Pacific, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2015), 14. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 15. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid., 59. 
 17 
Australia to continue to militarize the Pacific without external critique. “Place-myth” is directly 
relevant to Tonga, in that colonial powers have continuously characterized Tonga as irrelevant 
and resource poor while simultaneously insisting on having control over Tongan foreign policy. 
This narrative and consequence were especially prevalent during Tonga’s protectorate period 
from 1901-1970. 
Davis’ insights complement Teaiwa’s critiques of the Global Military Industrial Complex 
in her 2017 article, "The Articulated Limb: Theorizing Indigenous Pacific Participation in the 
Military Industrial Complex." Their analyses illuminate the ways in which Tonga’s current 
military strategy acts as an extension empire. She positions militarized Pacific nations as being 
attached to the limbs of empire with militarization acting as the connecting joints. She questions 
how to disarticulate them and explores the motivations behind Fijian and Chamorro participation 
in U.S., British, and UN military and peacekeeping campaigns. She argues that in both instances 
notions of bravery, masculinity, and duty compel indigenous soldiers to support colonial 
powers.48 The emotional and identity driven aspects of indigenous enlistment are further 
perpetuated by the profitability of service. Another important contribution Teaiwa’s article 
makes is that she continuously refers to militarization as part of the Global Military Industrial 
Complex or MIC. This title better connotes the amorphous and self-perpetuating mixture of 
violent foreign policy and the self-serving economics of war that causes the Pacific to be 
entrenched in the military strategies of Europe and the U.S. This characterization most closely 
matches my approach to militarism in Tonga, because it allows for conceptualizing how Tongan 
participation in foreign military campaigns is part of an imperial process despite Tonga’s 
political independence. Teaiwa’s usage of Hall’s “articulation” to also allude to physical joints 
even further portrays the intimacy and complexity of Pacific Islander soldier’s connection to 
militarization and how difficult disarticulation from the MIC would be. It also centers the 
physical and dangerous nature of combat. This complicated connectivity also explains how 
Tongan and other indigenous Pacific soldiers can willingly and pridefully participate in foreign 
military campaigns that are imperial in nature.  
Militarized Currents, "The Articulated Limb,” and Militarism, Tourism, and the Native 
are part of an exceptional branch of scholarship on militarization that both considers the value of 
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military service for indigenous persons while simultaneously highlighting the problematics of 
indigenous participation and the corrosive effects of militarism on indigenous sovereignty and 
culture. These works differ starkly from empirical military histories that fail to critique the 
violence of militarization and valorize indigenous participation and complicity with imperial 
militaries. Two texts specifically related to the Tongan military represent this type of 
scholarship: Valiant Volunteers: Soldiers from Tonga in the Great War by Christine Liava‘a and 
Judith Hornabrook’s dissertation “New Zealand and the Tonga Defence Force, 1939-1945.”  
They are profoundly useful for the sources they utilize and the extent to which they acknowledge 
Tongan sacrifice. However, their lack of critique towards the Global Military Industrial Complex 
tacitly condones the origins and growth of militarization in the Pacific.  
 
iii.   The Tongan Military  
Valiant Volunteers is not concerned with the political implications of Tonga’s 
participation during WWI. Instead, Liava‘a meticulously lists the 91 Tongan born volunteers 
who joined the British, New Zealand, and French forces; she also provides bibliographic 
excerpts for each volunteer. Liava‘a’s intentions are simply to bring attention to the individual 
volunteers from Tonga. She does provide fascinating information on the various soldiers. For 
example, she provides a detailed account of Sione Taliauli, who was a doctor in training in New 
Zealand when he decided to enlist in 1915. Taliauli served and died in Palestine and is buried in 
a cemetery near Jaffa.49 Valiant Volunteers is not only useful from a research perspective, but 
relevant to family members of those who served. It also mentions British anxieties about German 
citizens living in Tonga but fails to discuss the deeper historical context of the two powers 
previously vying for control of Tonga. The book also ignores the political tensions that had been 
rising between Tonga and Britain in the decade prior to WWI. This is most likely due to the fact 
that it is not an academic text published through a university press.  
In 1900 Britain pressured Tupou II into signing a protectorate agreement after his 
government had amassed significant debt to a major German trading firm. Britain felt that if 
Germany were to control the valuable Vava‘u port, it would challenge British hegemony in the 
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region. 50  Again in 1905, Britain added the Supplementary Agreement that required the Tongan 
government to receive British approval for major financial decisions and significant government 
appointments.51 As detailed in Noel Rutherford’s article “Tonga Ma’a Tonga Kautaha: A Proto-
Co-operative in Tonga,” in 1911 the British consul William Telfer Campbell, with assistance 
from the British backed Premier Mateialona, significantly overreached his authority.52 Campbell 
and Mateialona disbanded and liquidated a Tongan copra co-operative, the Tonga Ma’a Tonga 
Kautaha, which was designed to ensure Tongan growers received the same profit for their 
exports as Europeans. The controversy stoked animosity among Tongans against the British and 
Britain’s growing influence in the Tongan government.  
Although the final outcome of the Kautaha controversy actually tempered British power 
in Tonga, the tensions between the two countries lingered up to the advent of WWI, which came 
just four years after the scandal. My thesis will account for British and German encroachments 
on Tongan sovereignty and Tonga’s reluctance to participate in WWI. It is in these intersections 
of struggles for self-determination and pressures to participate in global military campaigns the 
tension between Tongan sovereignty and militarism is most apparent.  
Similar to Valiant Volunteers, New Zealand and the Tonga Defence Force does not 
address the political motivations for Tonga’s enthusiastic participation in WWII. Hornabrook’s 
dissertation tracks the creation of the Tonga Defence Force under Queen Sālote, the 
infrastructure projects facilitated by the New Zealand Public Works Department, Tongan 
fundraising campaigns, and the U.S. occupation of Tonga. However, the text does not explain the 
differences in response to WWII compared to WWI or the implications of Tonga 
unquestioningly supporting the British. Although Hornabrook does not press strong political 
critiques, Hornabrook’s work is still a valuable resource, and is a reference that Teaiwa cites in 
her dissertation. Additionally, it is the most extensive text solely dedicated to Tonga’s military 
participation during WWII. As Hornabrook states in her introduction, her primary goal is to 
bring attention to the much-neglected efforts of Tonga and Tongan soldiers during WWII. She 
does so very successfully and in great detail; it is unfortunate that a text like New Zealand and 
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the Tonga Defence Force has not been formally published. I believe that part of Tonga’s relative 
exclusion from the discourse of de-colonization and anti-militarization partly stems from the 
politics of publishing that has disregarded the importance of published and widely accessible 
materials on Tonga and the Tongan military.  
However, there are a few publications that both address the Tongan military and have a 
critical analysis of its functions and the effects of militarism in Tonga. An article that takes a 
more critical approach to WWII Tonga is “The United States Occupation of Tonga, 1942-1945,” 
by Charles Weeks. The article describes the massive number of U.S. soldiers that poured into 
Tonga during WWII and acknowledges both the positive and negative aspects of the occupation. 
Weeks explains that the extensive investment the U.S. made in developing the Fua‘amotu 
Airbase and the dramatic effects American cash had on the Tongan economy.53 U.S. spending 
was advantageous to many, but it also caused shortages and in some cases U.S. soldiers used 
their wealth to encourage prostitution.54 Weeks also thoroughly recounts the “Great Cigarette 
Raid,” in which U.S. soldiers arrested forty Tongan men and accused them of stealing from the 
base.55 The U.S. military clearly overstepped their authority, and even threatened declaring 
martial law due to the ordeal. The British consul reminded the U.S. that it would be beyond their 
jurisdiction to do so, but the incident demonstrated the U.S.’s disregard for Tongan rights and 
sovereignty.56   
Another collection, focused on WWII Tonga is Echoes of Pacific War edited by Deryck 
Scarr, Niel Gunson, and Jennifer Terrell. It is a compilation of papers presented at the 7th Tongan 
History Conference in 1997 and features a diverse array of papers concerning WWII and post-
WWII Tonga that are mostly anthropological in nature. The first half of the collection is related 
to Tonga during and shortly after WWII while the second half is more concerned with 
contemporary Tonga and migration. The most conventionally historical essay is Elizabeth Wood-
Ellem’s “Behind the Battle Lines: Tonga in World War II,” which summarizes Tongan actions at 
home and abroad during the war. The essay mirrors her chapter on WWII in her book, Queen 
Sālote of Tonga: The Story of an Era 1900-1965.  
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Another important essay is “Changing Values and Changed Psychology” by Futa Helu. 
He argues the war fundamentally altered Tongan psyche towards a “capitalist psychology.”57 He 
also credits the war with spurring Tongan emigration and the shift in Tongan education towards 
Euro-American curricula. 58 For example, in 1947 Prince Tungī banned Tongan language during 
school hours and schools no longer taught traditional gardening or handcrafts.59 Helu views these 
changes as essential and positive, but I view these changes brought on by WWII as evidence of 
militarism’s imperial nature. Helu ascribes to the notion that a capitalist democracy is the 
teleological end of every nation’s political development. However, there are advantages to 
maintaining Tongan tradition especially in regard to language, crafts, gardening, and familial 
structure.  
 “Tonga and Australia Since World War II,” by Gareth Grainger notes that prior to WWII 
Tonga’s primary foreign relations were with New Zealand and Britain, but after WWII Australia 
has become one of Tonga’s premier allies.60 Australian aid largely motivates the Tonga-Australia 
relationship; direct government to Tonga aid from Australia commenced in 1970, and eclipsed 
Britain and New Zealand in the early 1990s.61  Along with aid towards economic development, 
Australia has also become increasingly invested in the Tongan military. In 1988 Australia began 
training Tongan soldiers and supplying weaponry through the Defence Cooperation.62 Australia 
has also invested millions of dollars in developing Tonga’s harbors and its navy.63 Tonga’s 
economic fragility and the lucrativeness of service in alignment with Australia’s tightly binds the 
two nations and their militaries together.  
Economic dependence on foreign defense partnerships further incorporates Tonga into 
the Global Military Industrial Complex, which is essentially an investment in violence and 
imperialism. As discussed earlier, it also privileges state-to-state relationships that undermine 
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indigenous claims to sovereignty. As an example, Teaiwa cites the Tongan military’s 
participation in peacekeeping missions to Bougainville without consulting the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA.)64 The Tongan military favored Papua New Guinea and Australia’s 
arguments against the Bougainville uprising, without acknowledging the inequities and pollution 
created by the Rio Tinto mining corporation that served as the catalyst to the rebellion.65  Using 
Teaiwa’s frameworks on militarization, I explore Tongan involvement in the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which was an Australian backed “peace 
keeping mission” to the Solomon Islands from 2003-2017. I also question Tonga’s involvement 
with the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. I am interested in understanding the continuing 
effects of militarism in Tonga and its implications for Tongan sovereignty as well as broader 
indigenous Pacific sovereignty.  
A century prior to WWII, imperialism in the Pacific was partially motivated by naval 
interests, but WWII and the Cold War accelerated foreign militarization of the Pacific.  It 
intensified Euro-American investment in Pacific bases and indigenous armed forces. The Tongan 
military was originally intended to benefit foreign interests by participating in foreign wars, and 
its function has not changed. Every war the Tongan military has participated in has been in 
support of a foreign power. If a core tenet of sovereignty is having the sole authority to declare 





                                               




A Fraught Friendship:  
The Rise of the Monarchy and The Treaty of Friendship 
 
It is strange to discuss Tonga as a new nation in the late 19th century, because although 
the political structure established under Tupou I was new and Tonga’s place in the global 
political theater was new, Tonga itself was not new. The nascent monarchical structure of the 
government did not suppress or fully transform the importance of indigenous hierarchies and 
socio-political relationships. Although Tonga did experience a time of disunity leading up to 
Tupou I’s takeover, the consolidation of the nation under King Tupou I was not the first time 
Tonga had been a politically cohesive unit. The Tongan Empire that existed from the 10th to 16th 
century is well beyond the scope of this paper, but it deserves to be acknowledged at least 
briefly, to dissuade any readers who are unfamiliar with Tonga’s history from concluding that 
the unification of Tonga was purely a reaction to European colonialism in the Pacific. This 
matter and a detailed description of the creation of the Tongan nation state is better discussed in 
Sione Lātūkefu’s Church and State in Tonga. My intentions are to analyze the modern Tongan 
military from its beginnings to the present, and the global political factors that may or may not 
have influenced Tonga’s military decisions. In doing so I seek to question the boundaries of 
Tongan sovereignty, and the extent foreign powers have influenced and continue to influence 
Tongan independence. In this chapter I look specifically at how Tonga became a British 
protectorate and how this affected Tonga’s participation in WWI. 
 
Traditional Tongan Polity and Tupou I’s Rise to Power 
The creation of the Tongan nation-state took nearly a century, and greatly altered the 
power lines that were once the life force of the Tongan Empire. As aforementioned, this text is 
not a comprehensive look at all of Tongan history, but to understand the political climate in 
Tonga at the turn of the century, I will offer a brief and greatly simplified picture of Tupou I’s 
rise to power and the structure of the traditional Tongan polity. Traditional Tongan polity was 
bound by tightly woven socio-religious ties between Tu‘is, chiefs, and commoners. While there 
are many powerful and sacred titles, some of which continue to have power today, there are three 
lineages which had the most power in Tonga prior to the creation of the Monarchy. The oldest 
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and most sacred central unit of power was the Tu‘i Tonga. This position has existed at least since 
950 CE, according to genealogic records. The source of the Tu‘i Tonga’s power, or his right to 
rule in sovereignty terms, is that he is a direct descendent of the premier Tongan deity Tangaloa 
‘Eiki.1 The second Tu‘i title was created in the 1400s; the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua served as the 
secular (hau) ruler, while the Tu‘i Tonga remained the spiritual leader. Despite the loss of power 
for the Tu‘i Tonga title, its lineage continued to outrank that of the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua. The right 
to rule for the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua was derived from the person’s genealogic connections to the 
first Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua, Mo’ungamotu’a, who was the brother of Kau‘ulufonua Fekai, the 24th 
Tu‘i Tonga.  In the early 1600s, the third Tu‘i title was created by the sixth Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua. 
This title was the Tu‘i Kanokupolu and it too was a temporal power. The Tu‘i Tonga title still 
outranked both hau titles. Traditional Tongan political power was both religious and hereditary. 
However, genealogy was not the only determinant of the person’s right to rule, especially as the 
generations of Tu‘is became further removed from the original ancestor. The sacredness of a 
person or their tapu status was entirely hereditary and immutable, but a person’s power or mana 
could be enhanced or diminished based on a person’s actions and their leadership abilities.2 
Therefore, to a limited extent, there was some flexibility to the succession of power, and the 
acquisition of chiefly titles was partially merit-based. While this flexibility helped ensure that the 
most qualified and highest-ranking person possessed the most power, it also allowed for 
ambiguities in succession lines, leaving the system vulnerable to chronic infighting over chiefly 
titles.  
Such was the case in 1777 when an argument began between the Tu‘i Kanokupolu and 
Tu‘i Tonga lineage over who the successor for the Tu‘i Kanokupolu title should be. Tuku‘aho, of 
the Tu‘i Kanokupolu lineage and the leading chief of ‘Eua, triumphed over his cousins for the 
right to the Tu‘i Kanokupolu title. Unfortunately, Tuku‘aho proved to be a harsh and ineffective 
leader with many enemies.3 In 1799 i‘Ulukālala II, also of the Tu‘i Kanokupolu lineage, and his 
men assassinated Tuku‘aho, sparking a civil war that lasted until 1820.4 After the assassination 
of Tuku‘aho, Fīnau ‘Ulukālala fought a series of battles in Tongatapu, but ultimately was unable 
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to conquer the entire island. Instead he focused his campaigns in Ha‘apai and Vava‘u.5  There 
was no centralized body of power in Tonga at this time, and the Tu‘i Kanokupolu and Tu‘i 
Ha‘atakalaua titles remained vacant. The Tu‘i Tonga, Fuanunuiava, left for Samoa to be tattooed. 
This was something the Tu‘i Tonga did not usually do and was seen as disgraceful.6  
 During the civil war, Tongans were increasingly hostile to Europeans; they regularly 
killed those who came ashore, and plundered ships for guns and other material goods. Tonga was 
described as “a nation of wreckers,” and ships were advised to avoid landing there.7 This 
depiction of Tonga was a stark contrast to the “friendly island” image promoted by Captain 
Cook.8 Two key developments resulted from these hostilities towards Europeans: it slowed the 
influx of foreign settlers in Tonga, and firearms were incorporated into Tongan warfare.  Despite 
his military prowess, ‘Ulukālala tried on multiple occasions to integrate Tongatapu into his 
sphere of power but was never successful. Although his intentions were to unify Tonga under his 
control, there is no indication that ‘Ulukālala was doing so in order to gain international 
recognition of Tongan sovereignty. Fīnau ‘Ulukālala II was fighting for traditional Tongan 
claims to power, and not necessarily sovereignty as defined by eighteenth century European 
philosophy.  
 A brief overview of what warfare consisted of in 18th century Tonga, and prior, sheds 
light on how warfare and military service changed after the creation of the monarchy, and later 
with the creation of the official state military, the Tonga Defense Force. Battles were typically 
fought on land, although there was near constantly shuttling of armies from island to island in 
order to fight and to recuperate.9 Fortresses with a surrounding ditch, earthen wall, and wooden 
fence were common in Tonga, and offensive attackers were adept at sieging such structures. 
Fortresses were not necessarily permanent structures and could be erected relatively quickly with 
a large enough army, especially if the location provided natural protection such as a cliff.10 
Those within the fortress would shoot arrows and throw spears at the oncoming attackers.11 Once 
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the offensive army was close enough to the garrison, face-to-face combat would commence, and 
fighters would use various clubs and spears to repel their enemies. William Mariner, an English 
captive of Fīnau ‘Ulukālala , witnessed many battles lead by ‘Ulukālala . When possible, 
‘Ulukālala would take the bodies of deceases enemies and give them to various god-houses as 
offerings.12  
 Armies were divided into segments, somewhat akin to regiments and companies, known 
as kongakau and matanga respectively. Matanga were headed by a single commander and 
kongakau were comprised of two or more matanga. The leader of a tau, a large army, was the 
eikitau and the best fighter, but not necessarily of high rank. Eikitau also had assistant 
commanders who were great fighters known as toa. The commander-and-chief was generally of 
very high rank such as one of the premier chiefly titles but did not usually participate in actual 
battle.13 In nearly all aspects of Tongan society in the past and present, birth rank and lineage 
determine one’s place, but in the case of military service, power was based on merit and prowess 
in battle. In this way, military service has offered social mobility in the rigid hierarchical 
structure of Tongan society for centuries and continues to do so. Individuals who were great 
fighters were known as matatangata. Accomplished matatangata were permitted to wear a 
special hair style for battle called a malumalu. 14 The malumalu masked the matatangata’s eyes 
and identity by draping his hair over his face in order to mystify their enemy, who would only 
see their face once they engaged in combat with the matatangata, and he would flip his hair 
backward to reveal his face.15 By all accounts, Tongan warfare was highly organized and 
technologically and culturally complex. From the large vessels tau used to transport themselves, 
to the fortresses they built, to the battle rituals they completed, all elements of Tongan warfare 
were perfectly adept to the Tongan land and seascape as well as to Tongan religion and culture. 
Military alliances and partnerships were based on familial relations and religious commonalities, 
as well as shared goals, and not necessarily motivated solely by monetary or political gain, but 
also to strengthen the existing relationships between chiefs. 
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After ‘Ulukālala’s death in 1809, Tupouto‘a (who was the son of Tuku‘aho and 
Tāufa‘āhau Tupou I’s, the first king of Tonga’s, father) controlled Ha‘apai and ‘Ulukālala’s son 
Moengangongo assumed control of Vava‘u, before he died in 1812. The Tu‘i Tonga, 
Fuanunuiava, passed away in 1810 and all three premier Tu‘i titles were vacant.16 
Tupouto‘aeventually assumed control of Vava‘u but he died in 1820, leaving his son Tāufa‘āhau 
with only a tentative claim to power in Ha‘apai. Tonga remained fractionated and in disarray 
from civil war and epidemics brought by foreigners. Additionally, a new Tu‘i Tonga had been 
instated, Laufilitonga, who would become Tāufa‘āhau’s primary political challenger in his early 
reign.17 By 1826 Tāufa‘āhau had seized control of Ha‘apai, but control of Vava‘u and Tongatapu 
were still out of Tāufa‘āhau’s reach.  
In the midst of all of the civil unrest in Tonga, a second attempt at Christianization was 
made. In 1822 the Wesleyan Missionary Society sent a mission to Tonga. In 1827 Aleamotu‘a of 
Nuku’alofa, and great uncle to Tāufa‘āhau, adopted Wesleyanism; Aleamotu‘a was installed as 
Tu‘i Kanokupolu in the same year.18 His devotion sparked his grandnephew’s interest. 
Tāufa‘āhau turned to the Christian faith and was formally baptized in 1831. Upon his baptism 
Tāufa‘āhau assumed the name King George in honor of the late King George III of England.19 
From this moment forward, Tāufa‘āhau’s quest for power became intertwined with the 
Christianization of Tonga. As part of his efforts to solidify control in Ha‘apai, Tāufa‘āhau burned 
and obstructed places and items of worship. He also systematically disempowered traditional 
priests and priestesses, and he continued this method of political and religious conquest in all of 
his campaigns.20 Additionally, the adoption of the name King George is the first indication that 
Tāufa‘āhau took interest in European forms of governance. His assumption of the title “king” as 
opposed to Tu‘i is indicative of a shift in objectives. Previous attempts to consolidate power in 
Tonga had been within the traditional Tu‘i system. However, Tāufa‘āhau’s attempt at 
consolidation took the form of creating a monarchy. 
After the Napoleonic Wars, the British Navy returned in full force to the Pacific with the 
task of protecting and preserving British interests and promoting “Christianization and 
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Civilization.”21 This created a symbiotic relationship between British missionaries and the 
British Navy whereby the Navy would protect the missions’ interests and missions served as 
strategic naval stations. By allying with British missionaries, Tāufa‘āhau gained the favor of 
British officials.22 In 1831 Tāufa‘āhau convinced the Tu‘i Vava‘u, Fīnau ‘Ulukālala III, to 
convert. ‘Ulukālala III facilitated the conversion of Vava‘u with the same destructive tactics 
Tāufa‘āhau employed in Ha‘apai. Upon his death in 1833 ‘Ulukālala III conceded Vava‘u to 
Tāufa‘āhau, which made him the principle ruler of both Ha‘apai and Vava‘u. Tāufa‘āhau’s 
growing power incited the “Tongan Pentecost” in 1834.  The Pentecost was characterized as the 
massive and enthusiastic conversions of thousands of Tongans. However, the religious fervor did 
not spread throughout Tongatapu, where Tāufa‘āhau’s political rivals resided. The Tu‘i Tonga, 
Laufilitonga, and the Ha‘a Havea chiefs staunchly rejected Christianity and Tāufa‘āhau’s rise to 
power. Their disdain for the new faith and the rising king led them to attack missions in 
Tongatapu and persecute converts.23 The animosity between Tāufa‘āhau and the Ha‘a Havea 
chiefs continued into the 1850’s with a series of violent rebellions.  
Further evidence of Tāufa‘āhau creating a sovereign nation-state was in his promulgation 
of the first Tongan law code, the “Code of Vava‘u, 1839.”24 Among other things, the code 
outlawed murder, theft, idolatry, suicide, free roaming pigs, and tattooing. Tāufa‘āhau’s 
commitment to Christianity and how deeply his conversion influenced the creation of the Tongan 
government is evident in his introduction to the “Code of Vava‘u 1839”: 
I George make known this my mind to the chiefs of the different parts of 
Haafuluhoa, also to all my people. May you be very happy.  
It is of the God of heaven and earth that I have been appointed to speak to you, he 
is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, he doeth whatsoever he pleaseth, he lifteth up one 
and putteth down another, he is righteous in all his words, we are all the work of his 
hands and the sheep of his pasture, and his will towards us is that we should be happy.25 
 
While missionaries had a significant influence on the King’s political and religious 
ideology, the Code of Vava‘u was conceptualized by Tāufa‘āhau, not by missionaries.26 The 
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code also set the precedent for a state facilitated legal system with the appointment of judges 
who would hear cases. The values embodied in this law code reflected both Christian and 
indigenous interests, but the format in which it was presented clearly demonstrated a shift in 
Tongan governance. The idea of universal and standardized laws was also a shift in the Tongan 
legal system which was previously at the digression of ruling chiefs; “there was no judicial 
branch of the government in ancient Tonga. Judges and police were lacking, except in so far as a 
chief might settle a case and his armed followers execute judgement…Anciently there were no 
jails and apprehension of a wrong-dower was followed immediately by punishment.”27 In 
addition to his newly assumed King title, Tāufa‘āhau gained the Tu‘i Kanokupolu title in 1845, 
after the death of his uncle Aleamotu‘a.28 With this succession, Tāufa‘āhau further legitimized 
his power in Tonga.29 Tāufa‘āhau’s accession to Tu‘i Kanokupolu legitimized his power based 
on the existing indigenous hierarchies in Tonga, but he was not quite a sovereign based on the 
19th century European definition of sovereignty.  
Notably, no foreign governments had recognized Tonga’s independence and 
Tāufa‘āhau’s political supremacy through treaties, and Tonga still did not have the bureaucratic 
infrastructure to systematize tax collection and to enforce the law. Tāufa‘āhau created the second 
law code “The 1850 Code of Law.” The most significant aspect of this code is that it places the 
sole power of governance in the king.30 Previously, Tongan politics has been far less centralized; 
layers of chiefs of different rankings governed over sections of land and ensured that tribute 
would be paid to the Tu‘i Tonga. However, neither the Tu‘i Tonga nor the Tu‘i Kanokupolu, nor 
the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua had sole control of the whole of Tonga in the highly centralized and 
standardized way the modern nation-state system functions.31 The 1850 Law Code also outlawed 
dancing, abortion, and clearly forbade the sale of land to foreigners. Again, the laws promulgated 
reflected both indigenous and Euro-Christian values, but their presentation and structure clearly 
mirrored the codes of a bureaucratic nation-state.    
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 Tāufa‘āhau was not the only one to have sought the advice of foreign powers. In 1848 
the Tu‘i Tonga, Laufilitonga, converted to Catholicism, and invited French priests to Mu‘a.32 
The conversion of the Tu‘i Tonga and the presence of French priests stoked the anxieties of 
Tāufa‘āhau and the Wesleyan missionaries. In 1852 Tāufa‘āhau declared war against the chiefs 
at Pea and Houma. The rebellious chiefs hoped that France would intervene in their support. 
Alas, French assistance never came and Tāufa‘āhau finally squelched the violent rebellions of 
the Ha‘a Havea chiefs and the Tu‘i Tonga.33 Although the French never aided the Tu‘i Tonga’s 
rebellion, this episode demonstrates the contention between France and Britain over territorial 
expansion in the Pacific. Tongan chiefs clearly manipulated these tensions to their benefit. This 
episode also increased Tāufa‘āhau’s concerns about imperial powers that could potentially 
colonize Tonga.  It was becoming ever more apparent that Tonga needed foreign recognition of 
sovereignty in order to preserve Tonga for Tongans. 
With political control of all of Tonga, Tāufa‘āhau strengthened the 1850 Code of Law via 
the 1862 Code of Law. Divisions had been slowly growing between the Wesleyan missionaries 
and Tāufa‘āhau. Traders, nonreligious business, and military men frequented Tonga and began to 
gain influence among chiefs. The Tongan copra market was in its early stages, but it was already 
attracting foreign settlers. In 1852 Tāufa‘āhau took a trip to Australia and met with Charles St. 
Julian in Sydney. Julian deeply influenced Tāufa‘āhau’s construction of the 1862 Code of Law 
and it was based on a version of the Hawaiian constitution.34 The most important aspect of this 
code was the Emancipation Edict, which freed commoners from their chiefs, and established that 
everyone was equal in the eyes of the law regardless of their rank or title.35 The consequences of 
the emancipation edict dramatically reduced the power and influence of lesser chiefs. By 
reducing the influence of lesser chiefs, the Law Code fortified the monarch’s power and served 
to simplify the complex and traditional Tongan power structures into manageable and malleable 
units dictated and controlled by the state.36 Traditional Tongan polity was informed 
genealogically, spiritually, and politically, but these multi-leveled dimensions of power conflict 
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with the modern nation-states’ desire to categorize, organize, and control as many layers of 
society as possible. I am not arguing that the often exploitative and abusive relationship between 
chiefs and commoners was an ideal organization of power, but rather I acknowledge that this was 
a fundamental shift from indigenous Tongan socio-political organization. Furthermore, the 1862 
Code of Law prohibited the sale of land to foreigners even more firmly than the last code. In 
later years, Queen Sālote suggested that Tāufa‘āhau’s adamancy in forbidding land sales was due 
to the poverty and homelessness he witnessed in Australia. By outlawing the sale of land to 
foreigners and forcing chiefs to lease land to commoners, Tāufa‘āhau hoped to protect Tongans 
from disenfranchisement.37  
Despite Tāufa‘āhau’s consolidation of power and his promulgation of law codes, no 
foreign governments had recognized Tonga’s sovereignty. The King wanted a constitution, so he 
employed the missionary Shirley Baker to draft him one. Using the Hawaiian Constitution of 
1852 and the laws of New South Wales, Baker created the framework for the 1875 
Constitution.38 The new constitution included the Declaration of Rights which assured the 
equality of all men whether they were chiefly, common, or foreign, it also ensured freedom of 
religion and speech and the promise that the government would protect its subjects. Additionally, 
it allowed anyone who paid taxes, who was over the age of 21, and “native or naturalized,” the 
right to vote for members of the Legislative Assembly.39 The 1875 Constitution formalized 
Tonga’s government as a constitutional monarchy and gained the international recognition 
Tāufa‘āhau had sought for so long. In 1876 Tonga signed its first international treaty with 
Germany; Britain had consistently rejected recognizing Tongan authority, but Tonga’s treaty 
with Germany prompted Britain and the U.S. to follow suit.40 
From 1875 to 1900, Tonga was a fully consolidated nation-state with a constitutional 
monarchy, and it was entirely independent from any foreign powers. Tupou I adopted the 
strategy of making Tonga fakapalangi (to make foreign/white) in order to fortify his power and 
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protect Tonga from European colonialism in the Pacific. The influence of Wesleyan missionaries 
on Tupou I’s politics is apparent in the early Law Codes of 1839, 1850, 1852, and 1862. Central 
to his strategy was the help and consultation of the Wesleyan missionaries, the most famous (or 
infamous) being Shirley Baker.  Baker advocated for Tonga’s independence, but also helped 
promulgate the series of laws that forbade traditional Tongan customs and power relations.41  
Lātūkefu emphasizes in his work that Tupou I ultimately made the final decisions on what laws 
were appropriate for Tonga; he argues that missionaries did have a significant impact on Tupou 
I’s decisions, but they were not controlling Tupou I. 42  
Although Tonga was not formally colonized, missionaries and Christian doctrine 
influenced powerful Tongan leaders and ultimately resulted in the suppression of indigenous 
cultural practices. Furthermore, conversion and religious differences fueled a great deal of 
violence both during Tāufa‘āhau’s military conquest of Tonga and after his ascension to power.43 
To imagine that Tonga entirely evaded violent and oppressive forms of European colonialism 
would be erroneous. While Tāufa‘āhau did remain in control, and Tongans’ were able to keep 
their land, the 18th and 19th century brought heightened relationships with palangis, which in turn 
sparked violence, and radical cultural and political change. I mention this not to perpetuate the 
idea of fatal impact, but rather to offer a sober perspective on the realities of early Tongan 
sovereignty, which was simultaneously impressive, empowering, and ingenious, but also deadly 
and disruptive.  
 
The Protectorate  
Shortly after the establishment of the Tongan Kingdom, through The Constitution of 
Tonga signed in 1875, tensions between Tonga and Britain were already on the rise. Tupou I 
knew well that recognition by foreign powers was tantamount to ensuring Tonga’s 
independence.  Britain hesitated to recognize Tonga’s independence, but Germany engaged in 
formal relations with Tonga more willingly, and signed a treaty recognizing Tonga’s 
independence and the two nations’ friendship in November of 1876.44 The treaty allowed 
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Germany to build a coaling station in the Nieafu harbor, along with ensuring favorable trade and 
other privileges to German citizens in Tonga and vice versa.45 Only after Tonga established a 
formal relationship with Germany did the British government take Tonga’s aims for 
independence seriously. Fearing that Germany would surpass British influence in Tonga, Britain 
finally came to recognize Tonga through a formal treaty in 1879.46 Britain’s anxiety over 
increasing German influence in Tonga was overtly apparent in the 1880 Treaty of Friendship 
Between Great Britain and Tonga. The first line of the second article states, “His Majesty the 
King of Tonga engages to grant no other Sovereign or State any rights, powers, authority or 
privileges in Tonga in excess of those accorded to Her Britannic Majesty.”47 Tonga’s fervent 
insistence on independence, and Britain’s anxiety over losing dominant influence in Tonga 
would characterize the two nation’s relationship into the late 20th century. 48 
Tonga was not the only place that experienced a major political reorganization in the late 
19th century; Britain also dramatically shifted their policy in the Pacific towards a more active 
role in the region. They did so through the creation of the Western Pacific High Commission. 
The establishment of the Western Pacific High commission was partly rooted in the growing 
plantations established by the increased numbers of white settlers in the mid 19th century and in 
the resulting Pacific labor trade.49 One of the most infamous planter colonies was Queensland, 
Australia. Queensland was established as a colony in 1859, through the brutal and violent 
massacre and removal of indigenous peoples, so that white planters could capitalize on the 
profitable sugar markets.50 The Pacific labor trade in Queensland began around 1863, when 
planters faced a labor shortage, and it lasted until 1906. As Tracey Banivanua-Mar so 
successfully argues in her book Violence and Colonial Dialogue: The Australian-Pacific 
Indentured Labor Trade, “the labor trade was not, as many have written, a benign labor 
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migration...It regulated the right to take mainly young men away from their homes for three 
years of coerced labor in a tropical industry considered fatal to white labor, with standards of 
accommodation that were too frequently fatal for Islanders, and with a standard of care that was 
systemically negligent.”51 The majority of islanders who were kidnapped, coerced, or misled into 
the labor trade, came from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia 
and Fiji.52 Tongans were not spared from black birding either, half of ‘Ata’s population of 300 
were kidnapped in 1863 and sold into labor in Peru.53   
Reports of brutality and kidnapping reached England and caused anti-slavery groups to 
take up the issue and demand that the British government take action.54 Britain’s first attempt at 
controlling the Pacific labor trade was with the passage of the Polynesian Labourers Act in 1868 
and later the Pacific Islanders Protection Act in 1872.55 These laws regulated and legitimized the 
violence of the labor trade rather than stopping it.56 Some of the British reasoning behind 
establishing a Western Pacific High Commission was to be able to sentence, try, and police 
British citizens in the Pacific, who would otherwise be outside of Britain’s jurisdiction.  
The second most important event that spurred the creation of the Western Pacific High 
Commission was Britain’s annexation of Fiji. In the 1850s, Cakobau, a powerful Fijian chief, 
achieved popularity and European support. At the same time, Henele Ma’afu, Tupou I’s cousin, 
was also, quickly gaining prominence. However, the 1874 Cession of Fiji to Britain ended 
Ma’afu’s climb to power. The annexation marked a shift in British policy in the Pacific; Britain’s 
influence in Fiji and Tonga advanced rapidly and assumed an unprecedented legal and formal 
mode.57 In 1877, the Western Pacific High Commission (WPHC) was established. The head of 
the commission was the High Commissioner who was also the governor of Fiji. The WPHC was 
responsible for trying and convicting British subjects in the Pacific, and later for influencing the 
governments of Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Kiribati, as well as advancing and 
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protecting British imperial interests in the Pacific more generally.58 The point of contact for the 
High Commissioner in Tonga would be the British Agent and Consul to Tonga.   
The earliest signs of conflict between Britain and the Tongan government, began in 1885 
when Tupou I established the Free Church of Tonga. He did so on the advice of Shirley Baker 
and in opposition to the Wesleyan mission. Against Tupou I’s wishes, the Wesleyan Mission 
recalled Baker in the year prior. He was recalled because of his significant influence in Tongan 
politics, which went against the mission’s policies. The break from the Wesleyan church, and the 
ensuing persecution of Wesleyans by the Tongan government, prompted the British to intervene 
more seriously in Tongan affairs.59  The WPHC carried out an investigation against Shirley 
Baker, and recommended that he be deported, and that a religious liberty act be reinstated.60 
However, Baker remained until the High Commissioner James Bates Thurston officially 
deported him from Tonga in 1890. This was the first of many times that the British would 
overstep their authority in Tonga.  
After Baker’s dismissal, Siaosi Tuku’aho, the King’s primary political rival, became the 
Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. ‘Uiliame Tungī, Tuku’aho’s father, continued as the 
Chairman of Parliament and Minister of Lands.61 ‘Uiliame Tungī was heir to the Tu‘i 
Ha‘atakalaua title which had become defunct in 1797 and was suppressed by Tāufa‘āhau.62 
Siaosi Tuku’aho, Fatafehi Tu‘ipelehake, and Tungī, were all high chiefs with legitimate and 
ancestral claims to rulership; they relished in Baker’s deportation and in Tupou I’s devalued 
status. Fatafehi Tu‘ipelehake, the King’s grandson and the father of Tupou II, went so far as to 
insult and debase the king. When the chiefs went to demand that one of them be named the 
Premier, Fatafehi Tu‘ipelehake said to the aged and ill Tupou I, “Tupou, your reputation is bad 
throughout the world; your name stinks.”63 This unsavory interaction demonstrates the ways 
traditional Tongan politics were enmeshed in monarchical politics and were also manipulating 
imperial interests.  Britain’s interjection into Tongan politics was an abridgment of Tongan 
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sovereignty, but some chiefs welcomed the action as a means to aggrandize themselves in ways 
they perceived to be their right because of their high-ranking genealogies.   
The power triangle between Tonga, Britain, and Germany played an exceptionally large 
role in the late 19th and early 20th century leading up to WWI. This triangle was further 
complicated by the contentious currents of indigenous Tongan political competition that 
characterized the political atmosphere. In addition, many of those who had been deprived of 
power under the new political system grew frustrated with the changes.  These tensions would 
not deescalate for another several decades. Furthermore, Tonga’s tightening relationship with 
Germany and German copra companies continued to peak Britain’s anxieties. Britain was 
already in a tug-of-war for control of the Pacific with Germany, particularly in Samoa. 
Therefore, the shift in power from Tupou I to his great grandson Tāufa‘āhau Tupou II, and the 
ensuing financial and political instability, primed Tonga for Britain’s encroaching influence.  
The 18-year-old Tupou II assumed the throne in 1893, after his great grandfather’s death. 
The Premier, Tuku’aho did not challenge Tupou II’s ascension, despite Tuku’aho also having 
legitimate claims to the throne. The young Tupou II needed to fill both his ancestral role as the 
new Tu‘i Kanokupolu and his new secular role as Tonga’s monarch.64 Both a crowning and a 
traditional kava ceremony were performed to install the King and the Tu‘i Kanokupolu.65 As the 
first monarch to inherit the throne, Tupou II had to carefully toe the line between traditional 
Tongan protocol and the new European style of government. During his early reign, Tupou II 
worked cautiously to not arouse conflict between himself and Tuku’aho.66 Tupou II managed this 
relationship by being absent from the capital and staying in his home in Ha‘apai. By keeping his 
distance, Tupou II allowed Tuku’aho to retain the power he had assumed with the help of 
Thurston.67  
This lasted until the summer of 1893, when a measles epidemic killed 5% of the Tongan 
population. The ship carrying the disease was allowed to dock while Tuku’aho was in charge, 
and he was therefore blamed. In response, Tupou II removed him and installed Siosateki Tonga 
Veikune (Sateki) as premier; Sateki had no significant ancestral claims to power and was a long-
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time ally of Tupou I.68 Sateki was both more competent and more loyal than Tuku’aho, but 
Tupou II still struggled to keep the government functioning efficiently. This was in part due to 
his youth and inexperience.69 By 1897 the government found itself in financial turmoil, 
predominantly due to over spending, and the drought and hurricanes that devastated the islands 
in the years prior.70 In an effort to soothe some of Tonga’s financial woes, Parliament took a 
£500 loan from Deutsche Handel’s und Plantagen-Gesellschaft (DHPG).71  Tonga’s increasing 
debt to Germany worried and frustrated British officials. 
Tonga maintained a close relationship with Germany and German copra companies since 
they acknowledged Tonga’s independence in 1876. This was a fact that irked British 
imperialists, especially after Britain annexed Fiji in 1874. The annexation of Fiji made Britain 
even more eager to control the surrounding South Pacific seas. The British were particularly 
concerned about Vava‘u’s Neiafu harbor, because they believed it was the best harbor in the 
Pacific and could easily serve as a base for foreign powers to threaten Fiji. Even further to 
Britain’s displeasure, Tonga’s treaty of friendship with Germany allowed them to have a coaling 
station in the Neiafu harbor.  Therefore, Britain seized the opportunity to secure British influence 
in Tonga in 1899 when Germany, America, and Britain agreed to divide Samoa between the U.S. 
and Germany. This agreement was made in exchange for Germany and the U.S. relinquishing 
their interests in Tonga to Britain.72 No Samoans or Tongans were consulted during this process. 
Certainly, if Tupou II had been consulted, he would have vehemently objected to such an 
abridgement of Tongan sovereignty.73 However, the greatest blow to Tongan independence was 
yet to come.  
In April of 1900, the British Special Commissioner Basil Thomson arrived in Nuku’alofa 
with the sole purpose of convincing the King to sign a protectorate agreement that would secede 
a significant amount of Tonga’s independence to Great Britain.74 The treaty required that Tonga 
be placed under the “protection” of Britain. In doing so, Britain would have sole control of 
                                               
68 Ibid., 68. 
69 Ibid., 73. 
70 Ibid., 97. 
71 Ibid., 98. 




Tonga’s foreign affairs. Britain also gained free access to Tongan ports and legal control over 
foreigners.75  A few factions of powerful chiefs supported the treaty because they did not support 
Tupou II, but the King himself was staunchly against the treaty, especially the aspects that 
required him to relinquish control of Tongan foreign policy.76 
Thomson’s reflection on his role in the protectorate agreements, shows his true disregard 
for Pacific independence. The following is his description of his return to Tonga. During the trip 
he would spend six weeks attempting to convince Tupou II to surrender Tonga’s full 
independence to the British Crown: 
Ten years bring many changes in the circumstances of little states. When I was 
last in Tonga, Hawaii was independent; three great Powers were still wrangling over 
Samoa; countless islands in the Pacific were yet unclaimed. All had fallen now, and eyes 
had been cast upon Tonga-the last independent state in the Pacific. She could make no 
resistance; her seizure was only a question of months, unless she had a powerful 
protector. For political, strategic and geographical reasons England could not afford to 
tolerate a foreign Power in possession of the best harbor in the Pacific islands within 
striking distance of Fiji…Germans had ceded all their treaty rights to us, we had either to 
take what was given to us, or leave the field open to others. In extending our protection, 
therefore, to the Tongans we were serving their interests even more than our own.77 
 
Thomson’s high opinion of himself and his surety in the British imperial mission demonstrates 
his personal political zeal and distrust of indigenous governance. Additionally, his feminization 
of Tonga reflects imperial rationalizations of conquest by depicting indigenous spaces as fragile 
and helpless without white male protection and guidance. Thomson’s account also distorts the 
reality of the context in which the Treaty of Friendship was actually signed.78 Tupou II certainly 
did not believe that the treaty was “serving [Tonga’s] interests more than [Britain’s],” and many 
of the Tongans in Parliament who supported the treaty were mostly interested in spiting Tupou 
II.79 The Draft Treaty that Thomson presented to Tupou II, had intentionally vague language that 
did not promise that Britain would not annex Tonga. Tupou II’s greatest concern was the first 
and second article of the Draft Treaty which read: 
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Article I  
His Majesty the King of Tonga agrees to place freely and unreservedly himself, his 
subjects, and his dominions under the protection of Her Britannic Majesty from the date 
of the signature of the present Treaty. 
 
Article II 
His Majesty the King of Tonga further understands and agrees that all his 
relations of any sort whatever with foreign Powers, shall be conducted under the sole 
advice and through the channel of Her Majesty’s Government.80 
 
Thompson offered to include, “without prejudice to the sovereignty of the King to 
Tonga,” in the first article, which momentarily appeased Tupou II and his supporters.81 However, 
by the next day, Tupou II rescinded his approval. After weeks of negotiations, Thomson finally 
resorted to threatening Tupou in order to obtain his signature.82 To finalize the agreement, 
despite Tupou II’s numerous protestations, Thomson announced Tonga’s new status as a British 
Protectorate without Tupou II’s consent. According to Thomson’s official report, he went to the 
city center in Nuku’alofa, and stated:  
Whereas His Majesty the King of Tonga has been pleased to sign an Agreement, 
dated the 2nd May 1900, and a Treaty dated 18th May 1900, wherein he agrees that his 
relations with foreign powers shall be conducted under the sole advice of His Britannic 
Majesty's Government, and that Her Majesty shall protect his dominions from external 
hostile attacks, it is hereby proclaimed that a Protectorate by Her Britannic Majesty has 
been established accordingly, and all persons concerned are commanded to take notice of 
this establishment.83 
 
The following morning, Tupou II admitted that he was very dissatisfied with Tonga’s 
new status as a British Protectorate, but that he was relieved to see that the British flag was not 
flying above Tonga. The country had maintained at least some of its domestic sovereignty.84 The 
language of the treaty draft, that Tupou II had tried so ardently not to sign, left ample room for 
the outright annexation of Tonga. The other articles stated that the British Navy would have free 
access to Tonga’s ports and harbors, and that an appointed British Consul must be consulted for 
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all important government affairs. Even from this early treaty between Tonga and Britain, it is 
apparent that the abridgement of Tongan was part of a military strategy, which allowed the 
British to utilize precious Tongan land to defend Fiji from German threats and to extend the 
reach of the British Navy in the Pacific.  
The Draft Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship that was later ratified, deeply wounded 
Tongan independence, but did not entirely abrogate it. The first and second article in the official 
Treaty of Friendship read: 
Article I 
His Majesty the King of Tonga agrees that he will have no relations of any sort 
with foreign powers concerning the alienation of any land or any part of his 
Sovereignty or any demands for monetary compensation. 
 
Article II 
Her Majesty will at all times to the utmost of her power take whatever steps may 
be necessary to protect the Government and territory of Tonga from any external hostile 
attacks; and territory of Tonga from any external hostile attacks; and for this or similar 
purposes Her Majesty’s officers shall at all times have free access to the waters and 
harbours of Tonga; and the King of Tonga hereby agrees to lease to Her Majesty a suitable 
site or sites in any harbour or harbours in Tonga for the purposes of establishing a station 
or stations for the coaling and repair of Her Majesty’s ships, and for the erection of any 
military works for fortification which may be necessary or desirable for the protection of 
such stations, and will at all times to the utmost of His power co-operate with and aid Her 
Majesty’s naval or military forces in defence of such station or stations.85 
 
Each experience of colonialism and imperialism is unique, and no two affected peoples 
are affected in the same way. For Tonga, the fact that the Treaty of Friendship did not 
completely nullify its domestic sovereignty, often belies the extent to which Britain curtailed 
Tongan independence. As aforementioned, British missionaries played a large hand in the early 
law codes promulgated by Tupou I. These codes bore the trappings of repressive colonial 
mandates that criminalized cultural practices and disempowered those who previously enjoyed 
influence under the traditional political system. These laws were not forced upon Tupou I, and 
they were written with his full volition, but the outcomes of the laws were still a form of cultural 
violence, or at the very least disruption. The extent to which these laws suppressed Tongan 
culture is apparent in the popularity and power of Christianity in Tonga today, along with the 
near disappearance of Tongan tattoo practice and the cultural emphasis on modesty, and 
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abstinence, that were not apparent prior to missionization.86 Thomson’s coup formalized British 
control in Tonga and institutionalized the social change that had previously been promoted by 
missionaries. While Tupou I had been able to choose more readily which reforms he believed 
were helpful to Tonga, Tupou II under the 1901 Treaty of Friendship was coerced to adopted 
many of Britain’s suggestions under threat of dethronement.  
I raise these points to emphasize that the myth of perpetual and continuous Tongan 
sovereignty has too often deflected analyses of colonialism and imperialism in Tonga and has 
prompted researchers to look at Tongan culture and foreign policy without adequately 
questioning the ways in which Western imperialism informs Tongan political decisions and 
social change. This critical lens is especially useful when considering Tongan participation in 
global military affairs, and the ways in which Tonga continues to be enmeshed in the global 
military industrial complex. Examining the motivations for Tongan participation in international 
military campaigns, that from a geopolitical standpoint do not threaten Tonga, reveals the 
insidious nature of militarization, and its particular articulations in a nation that was never 
formally colonized. Critiquing Tongan involvement in foreign military campaigns is essential in 
combating narratives that fuel “imperial nostalgia” by not questioning the impact militarism has 
on the political health of Tonga and the broader Pacific. By reexamining Tonga’s independence 
narrative and accessing Tonga’s role in global military conflicts, both historically and in the 
present, we can create a more accurate picture of where Tonga fits in the overall militarization of 
the Pacific. The 1901 Treaty of Friendship between Tonga and Britain is starting point for this 
enmeshment in the global military industrial complex. The manipulative and coercive nature by 
which the document was signed and ratified, further reflects the true and continued nature of 
Tonga’s relationship with Western powers. 
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Chapter II 
From Protectorate to Protector: 
Tongan Participation in WWI 
 
The decade leading up to WWI in Tonga was full of dramatic change that ultimately 
dictated Tonga’s unenthusiastic response to WWI and the British effort. Tupou II was a young 
and inexperienced ruler and Britain’s influence was continually growing in Tonga. It would be 
up to Tupou II to reassert Tonga’s sovereignty and determine the best course of action for 
Tongan participation in WWI, given the country’s previously friendly relationship with 
Germany. Although imperfect, Tupou II’s decisions preserved Tonga’s domestic sovereignty and 
eventually led to his daughter’s, Queen Sālote Tupou III’s, amicable relationship with the 
British.  
The Treaty of Friendship was ratified in February of 1901, 13 years before the start of 
WWI. The treaty was already a product of growing animosities between Britain and Germany. 
As part of the Treaty of Friendship, Tupou II and the Tongan government would be required to 
consult on important domestic matters with an appointed British Consul, the first of whom was 
W. Hamilton Hunter.1 Hunter wasted no time in overreaching his powers, and immediately 
insisted on an excessive amount of land to accommodate his new British Consulate. In order to 
ensure that his wishes would be met, he enlisted the help of a British naval captain to demand the 
accommodations he desired.2 This characterized the relationship between Tupou II and Hunter; 
Tupou II repeatedly attempted to assert his authority while Hunter frequently threatened the use 
of British force. Tupou II and Hunter clashed incessantly, most often over the treatment of 
Europeans, their lease agreements, and rent rates. Tupou II was clearly determined to maintain as 
much control as possible over domestic affairs, especially those pertaining to land issues.3 By 
1902 the relationship soured further. Hunter’s scathing reports of Tonga to the British High 
Commissioner jeopardized Tonga’s independence and reignited discussions on whether or not 
Tonga should be annexed by New Zealand or Britain.4 
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In 1904 British High Commissioner Sir Everard im Thurn decided to investigate the state 
of Tongan affairs for himself by traveling to Nuku’alofa and meeting with the King and by 
examining the Tongan Treasury. A Sydney newspaper described im Thurn’s visit and intentions: 
Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner of Toga, his Excellency Mr. Im Thurn 
came to Toga in H.M.S. Clio early in December, and with a large body of bluejackets, 
fully armed, proceeded at once to the King’s palace, and after paying his respects to him, 
told him the commission he had received from the British Government, and gave him to 
understand that it would be useless for him or his chiefs to attempt to obstruct the 
carrying out of the reforms in the Togan Government, which were so urgently required.5 
 
Once again, Britain demanded control by threat of force. Despite arriving on a naval ship 
complete with fully armed soldiers, Tupou II and Premier Sateki refused to comply with im 
Thurn’s demands. Out of frustration he concluded that Sateki, and the Minister of Finance should 
be deported to Fiji at once.6 Startled by im Thurn’s rash and illegal actions, Tupou II followed 
the High Commissioner’s instructions for fear of being deported. Im Thurn went on to instate 
Sione Tupou Mateialona as Premier and also replaced the Treasurer, Chief of Police, the Chief 
Justice and a variety of other lesser government positions.7  Im Thurn’s actions, made it 
exceedingly clear that Britain did not intend to be a bystander and benevolent protector to 
Tongan domestic politics. The High Commissioner required that the King sign a new 
Supplementary Agreement, which greatly reduced his power and required him to consult the 
British Consul for most domestic decisions. When Tupou II attempted not to sign the agreement, 
im Thurn threatened to deport and dethrone him, according to the Sydney Catholic Press, Tupou 
responded: 
“As far as I’m concerned your threat does not affect me in the least; it is just the 
same thing to me whether I die in Fiji or any other country. But as my people dearly love 
their country and independence I shall for their sake sign. At the same time I call upon all 
present to bear witness that I’ve been forced to do so by the threat to deport me and give 
away our country to the British.”8 
 
Tupou II’s words reflect his commitment to his people and Tongan sovereignty. 
Ironically, becoming a protectorate of Britain made Tonga more vulnerable to abridgements of 
sovereignty.  Although Germany’s relationship with Tonga was no less imperial in its intentions, 
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it was ultimately Britain that curtailed Tongan sovereignty. The disharmony between Britain and 
Tonga only grew as WWI neared.  
One potentially positive aspect of Tonga’s status as a protectorate was the fact that the 
country had access to British funding, that allowed for public works projects to be completed. 
The access to better funding allowed the government to build new roads, government offices, 
and better harbors. In general Tonga’s overall financial state was greatly repaired.9 However, 
another way of understanding Britain’s interference in Tongan politics is as a further disruption 
of indigenous power frameworks that were still functioning within the Tongan government. 
Some might argue that Britain’s overreach was ultimately good for Tonga because it facilitated a 
more functional government, but the style of government that Britain’s intrusions facilitated was 
a European one. In fact, Hunter and im Thurn’s primary intentions were to improve the quality of 
life for Europeans who were living in Tonga.  The system under Tupou and Sateki stymied many 
Europeans’ abilities to renew their loans and acquire trading permits.10  
Tongans themselves did not call for Britain to interfere in the country’s affairs, and most 
Tongans did not wish to see their King disempowered despite some of his leadership failings.11 
Tupou II’s power was derived as much from his constitutional right to be the monarch as it was 
from his high birth rank and his indigenous claims to power as Tu‘i Kanokupolu. Britain’s 
interference not only suppressed Tupou II’s power as a monarchal sovereign, but also disrupted 
his right to rule granted to him via his ancestral title that predated western style governance in 
Tonga by several centuries. This fact was not part of Hunter’s or the High Commission’s 
calculations that reasoned that if Tupou II did not comply with their suggestions that he could 
simply be deported and replaced.12 
The extent of British influence in Tonga came to a head in 1909 when the Tonga Ma’a 
Tonga Kautaha was established under the leadership of Alister Donald Cameron. The copra and 
banana export business were thriving in Tonga at the time, but the relationship between the 
palangi traders and Tongan farmers was less than harmonious. This was due to traders giving 
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discounts to palangi traders and charging Tongans full price.13 Nobleman Vaea of Houma and 
Cameron partnered to create the Kautaha, so that Tongans could export their copra and then 
receive maximum profit by cutting out the palangi middlemen.14 The venture proved highly 
popular, up to 4,000 producers joined, and branches were formed in Ha‘api (Ha`apai?) and 
Vava‘u. In addition to exports, the Kautaha began to import goods from overseas, and sold them 
wholesale to members.15  The success of the Kautaha infuriated the independent traders, who 
then reached out to the Western Pacific High Commission and British Consul to Tonga, William 
Telfer Campbell, to stop the Kautaha.16 
The manager of Ha‘api (Ha`apai ?)branch, R.G.M. Denny, attempted to start a new 
cooperative and slandered the Tonga Ma’a Tonga Kautaha members. Due to Denny’s 
defamatory comments, Cameron sued Denny. Since they were both foreigners, Campbell 
oversaw the case. Campbell believed the Kautaha was exploitative and put in motion a full audit 
of the business. In 1910, before the conclusion of the audit, which found no serious fraud or 
exploitation, the High Commissioner, Sir Everard im Thurn, ordered the Premier Mateialona to 
close the Kautaha, against the wishes of the Tongan members of the cooperative. The Kautaha 
was closed and liquidated; the members’ property was not returned but instead sold for less than 
the full value.17 When the Acting Chief Judicial Commissioner of the WPHC, Albert Ehrhard, 
heard the case in Tonga, he acquitted Cameron, and praised the value of business such as the 
Kautaha.18 Despite the verdict, Campbell continued to pressure the Tongan government and 
Tupou II to deport Cameron, but the King would not comply. In addition to demanding the 
deportation of Cameron, Campbell also wanted the King to suspend Chief Justice Robert Louis 
Skeen, and threatened that Britain would annex Tonga if the King did not do so.19 Tupou II 
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continued to support the Kautaha and felt that it was Campbell’s meddling and bias towards 
palangi businesses that was the true issue, not the Kautaha.   
The new High Commissioner, Sir Henry May, also felt that Campbell’s actions had been 
unjust, but went to Tonga to reason with Tupou II. The King refused to submit to May’s wishes, 
because he found them unconstitutional.20 Further, Tupou II requested that Campbell be removed 
from Tonga. He also demanded that the parameters of the 1905 Supplementary Agreement, 
which had greatly curtailed the power of the King and increased the powers of the WPHC and 
the British Consul to Tonga, be renegotiated.21 The outcome proved to be monumental in 
reestablishing domestic sovereignty in Tonga; the advice of the Consul and WPHC could no 
longer outweigh the decisions of the Tongan government and the Tongan constitution would be 
held above the Supplementary Agreement and the Treaty of Friendship.22 
The positive outcome for Cameron in the lawsuit and Tupou II’s support of the Kautaha 
resulted in the strengthening of Tongan sovereignty. Additionally, it led to the dismissal of 
Campbell in 1911, and a vote of no confidence in Premier Mateialona. Since Campbell had 
seriously overstepped his power and had cost the Tongan government considerably in his 
misdoings, the British government was forced to renegotiate their terms of power in Tonga. The 
King was able to name Tevita B. Tu‘ivakano as Premier and Treasurer.  This decision brought a 
significant amount of peace and stability to the Tongan government.23  Tu‘ivakano was neither 
opposed to Tupou II nor fully committed to him, so he served as a skillful mediator between the 
King, the British Consul, and Parliamentary chiefs who opposed Tupou II.  
 
World War I 
Shortly after the Kautaha case, WWI broke out and all the reaches of the British Empire 
were called to pledge allegiance to Britain and to support the war effort. Tongans were no 
strangers to political conflict or warfare, but this was the first global conflict that the country had 
been a part of since the creation of a European style monarchy in Tonga. Tonga’s soured 
relationship with Britain and previously close relationship with Germany resulted in the King’s 
                                               
20 Rutherford, “Tonga Ma’a Tonga Kautaha,” 38. 
21 Ibid., 39. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Fusitu’a, “King George Tupou II,” 181. 
 47 
declaration of neutrality.24 Tupou II expressed his anxiety over the war and of Tonga’s 
precarious and limited sovereignty in his address at the Opening of the 14th Assembly of 
Parliament on December 17th, 1914, 
Never in the past have I experienced such times of hardship as at present existing 
our land, and that is the principal reason why Parliament has been convoked and meets 
here to-day. To me the future of the Kingdom seems clouded, but when all the leading 
Nations of the Earth are involved in difficulties how can Tonga hope to escape from 
similar troubles. What Kingdom in the whole world has not suffered? All are in distress 
on account of the war which is raging, and if the waters at the fountain head are defiled 
how can the flowing stream remain clear. What Governments of the world have not been 
assembled in Parliament since the war broke out?... 
Although we share in common with all the feeling of distress occasioned by the 
war, yet we feel that the peace of Tonga has not yet been affected, and although we stand 
surrounded on all sides by the war, and although Tonga has not yet come within that 
radius of actual warfare in the Pacific, yet there is Samoa to the north of us, Tahiti to the 
east, New Guinea to the west and many other places throughout the world which have 
repeatedly been captured by the Great Nations of the Earth. But how stands Tonga to-
day? That we have remained safe is indeed a miracle, but we feel no doubt for we know 
that the Lord Almighty commands all things. It is by his grace that that great nation 
whom we have Treaty relations has been so guided that safety remains with us.25  
 
Throughout the rest of Tupou II’s opening and in his closing, he made no mention of 
Germany or Austria-Hungary, and he did not expressly espouse support for Britain or France. 
Rather, he thanked Britain and the British Consul for allowing Tonga to retain the level of 
independence it currently enjoyed and voiced his anxieties about the future of Tongan 
sovereignty. Tupou II’s words and concerns emphasize that the largest outside threat to Tongan 
sovereignty was European colonialism. In his references to Sāmoa, Tahiti, and New Guinea, 
Tupou II showed that he viewed European colonialism as a powerful threat in the Pacific. Britain 
was not a natural ally of Tonga nor was Germany a natural enemy; therefore, at the outbreak of 
WWI an image of Germany as an enemy needed to be constructed.  
This process of constructing the enemy is most apparent when comparing Tonga’s 
response to WWII to the nation’s response to WWI, which will be covered in the following 
chapter. However, in brief, Queen Sālote and the Tongan public enthusiastically rallied to 
support Britain immediately after Britain declared war on Germany in 1939. Comparatively, 
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Tongans’ reaction to WWI was mixed, and most people were primarily concerned with how the 
war affected the copra trade.26 Still, Tonga’s protectorate status meant that the government was 
required to comply with British wartime mandates regardless of public opinion in Tonga. 
Britain declared war on Germany on August 4th, 1914. Some Europeans in Tonga 
immediately enlisted in Australian forces, but the majority of Tongan participation didn’t come 
until later.27 In September 1914 the King of England issued a detailed proclamation that was 
spread across the colonies, which forbade business interactions with “enemy aliens.” The 
proclamation required that residents of German or Austro-Hungarian descent must the 
catalogued and treated as “enemy aliens.” This meant that German families who had been living 
in Tonga for decades were now unable to enjoy their full rights in Tonga, regardless of what their 
relationship was with the Tongan government and the larger Tongan community.28  In 1916, the 
British Consul in Tonga created a list of “enemy aliens,” and counted 150 German subjects, 
some of whom were deported to NZ as prisoners of war.29 This list was extremely 
comprehensive, and included children, elderly, and hafekasi Tongans who were only partly 
German. One account even marked a four-year-old boy of German descent who was born in 
Ha‘apai as an “enemy alien.”30 
 
 
Although individuals with German heritage were immediately accounted for, the treaty 
between Germany and Tonga was not terminated until 1916.31 From Tupou II’s letter to the High 
Commissioner on the matter, it is apparent that the treaty was ended due to British mandate, and 
not based on the Tongan government’s initiative. This was not the only instance where Tupou II 
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needed prodding in order to fully support the British cause against Germany. In a 1917 letter 
from Tupou II to the acting British Consul, G.B. Smith-Rewse, Tupou II wrote: 
2. Regarding the portrait of the German Emperor and other German 
portraits hanging in prominent positions in the Palace, they shall be removed this 
week according to the request made to me, by the Honourable the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, through His Excellency the High Commissioner. 
       I am, Sir,  
       Your true friend,  
         G. Tubou II32 
 
Given that this correspondence took place three years after the start of WWI, it is interesting to 
note that German portraits were only removed from the Palace after it was ordered by the High 
Commissioner. The fact that the King had not removed the portraits on his own initiative 
suggests that the idea of Germany as a clear and serious enemy was not fully formed. 
Additionally, the King’s possession of the portraits demonstrates how close and significant the 
relationship between Tonga and Germany once was. Unlike WWII, where Japan’s offensive 
course in the Pacific threatened Tonga’s safety, WWI posed little threat to Tonga’s wellbeing. 
Tonga’s official policy towards the war was relatively ambivalent, and most of the 
correspondences between Tupou II and the British Consul to Tonga and the Tonga Government 
Gazette were focused on internal economic issues rather than the war.  One of the ways Tongans 
did express support was by donating to the Lord Kitchener Memorial Fund (LKMF), that 
provided aid to wounded soldiers.33 On one occasion, in May of 1917, the Governor of Ha‘apai, 
J. Maeakafa, collected £457 for the LKMF, which was no small sum for Tongans at the time and 
suggests that many were interested in supporting the war cause.34 
While monetary support for the war was common, enlistment in the armed forces was 
low. Tonga had a small guard and artillery, but no standing army as it does today.35 Participants 
from Tonga were all voluntary, and most of them were foreign nationals of European descent. In 
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total 91 men from Tonga served in WWI: 3 Reservists, 10 in the Australian Imperial Force, 2 in 
French Forces as chaplains, one British Royal Engineer, 62 in the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force (NZEF), and 15 in the Pioneer Maori Battalion. Two men died in action, while one 
succumbed to disease.36 In 1916 recruiters from the New Zealand  Army went to Tonga to recruit 
soldiers into the Pioneer Maori Battalion and Auckland Infantry Battalion.37 Most men from 
Tonga served in NZEF and fought in the Battle of Messines and Passchendaele in Belgium in 
1917. Those who were Tongan generally served in the Pioneer Maori Battalion and those who 
were hafekasi chose between enlisting in the Maori Battalion or the Auckland Infantry 
Battalion.38    
 
Tongan Soldiers in WWI 
 An important aspect of Teaiwa’s approach to understanding military participation among 
islanders is articulation, which requires one to look beyond the political and monetary 
motivations and ramifications of enlistment, and to consider the individual and cultural 
motivations that inspire participants. Although the relationship between the Tongan and British 
governments were tense at the onset of WWI, a few individual Tongan men still chose to join 
New Zealand forces regardless. Their military and medical records do not offer insight into the 
reasons why these men chose willingly to fight alongside the Allies in WWI, but their 
enthusiasm and commitment to the cause is evident in their multiple enlistments and valiant 
service. The following is a brief look at just a few of the Tongan men who chose to enlist, and a 
reflection of their possible motivations and consequences of their participation.  
The Tongan men who served came from both modest and prominent backgrounds.  One 
Tongan man who served was David Fotu. He worked for the Tongan Education Board as a 
school teacher. Fotu enlisted in the Maori Reinforcements in 1918. He never served overseas, but 
he lived in New Zealand for the rest of his life. Interestingly, on his medical file, Fotu listed that 
he had a tattoo on his left arm, even though tattoos were made illegal in Tonga under Tupou I.39 
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The medical report does not describe what type of tattoo Fotu had, but traditional Tongan tattoos 
were not generally on arms, but rather waist down. Another participant was Tevita Mohenoa who 
lived and worked in New Zealand, when he decided to join the New Zealand Rifle Brigade. The 
New Zealand Rifle Brigade served in the Battle of Messines which was a perilous fight; although 
the allied troops proved successful, soldiers describe the battlefield as an endless stream of 
bullets, murder, and explosions.40 After his service in the Rifle Brigade, Mohenoa later served in 
the 2nd Battalion for Britain, and again with the Rarotongan Contingent in Egypt.41  
 
 
Fig. 2  The back of the photograph reads: “No3 Platoon, A Company Coastal Defence 3rd 
Auckland Regiment. The Island boys are Tongan. Narrow Neck Camp 23318 Donated by J. 
Duffy, 210 Arthur St.” 
 
One young man, Sione Talia’uli was a medical student in NZ when he enlisted in 1915 to 
the 3rd Maori Contingent.42 His first deployment was to Cairo where he served as a corporal 
before returning to New Zealand in 1916 after catching measles. The following year Talia’uli 
joined the 12th Maori Reinforcements and returned to Egypt. During his service, he caught 
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pneumonia in Palestine. He died in 1918 and is buried in Ramleh Cemetery.43 44 His medals and 
the news of his passing were sent to his son and aunt in Kolofu’ou in 1923.45  His military 
records offer no insight into why Talia’uli joined the military, or what he might have been 
thinking during his service, or in his last moments in a land so far away from Tonga. Sione 
Talia’uli was a young man when he died, most likely around the age of 26, but his life would 
have been full of exciting and dramatic changes. He was Anglican, and his baptism date is listed 
as June 21, 1892, a year before Tāufa‘āhau passed away, and 9 years before Tonga became a 
British Protectorate. Talia’uli listed his next of kin as his brother Malakai who lived in 
Nuku’alofa. Given the locations of his kin it is likely that he grew up on Tongatapu in 
Kolofu’ou.46 During his childhood he would have been in close proximity to the government and 
Tonga’s main points of trade, business, and development.  It’s impossible to know if Talia’uli 
would have joined the war effort if Tonga was not a protectorate, but his multiple enlistments 
indicate that his motivations were likely personal more so than out of obligation or coercion.  
Like all Tongans who joined the NZEF during WWI, Talia’uli joined the war effort by 
choice. Tupou II did not call on Tongans to enlist, and Talia’uli did not join once but twice. He 
was obviously a smart man since he was studying medicine and he served as a corporal and as a 
translator during his time in service. His family no doubt lost an important member of their 
kainga, and Tonga lost a brilliant mind.47 When remembering Sione Talia’uli, what does his 
body in the grounds of Palestine say about the entanglements of Tonga and empire? By 
evaluating the significance of his burial from a contemporary perspective, I do not mean to erase 
the individual importance of his life. However, the question begs asking when considering 
Tongan participation on behalf of U.S. and British forces in the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan 
in the 21st century. What does his passing and interment in Palestine say about the geographies of 
militarization and can these geographies of violence be remapped into generative alliances?48 I 
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pose these questions without any answers but ask them in order to probe the politics of 
remembrance and to wonder how past violence can become generative in contemporary 
conversations. 
Hehea Sina Faletau proudly remembered her grandfather’s service in WWI and her 
father’s service during WWII when she called into Kaniva Tonga Radio Programme.49 Her 
grandfather, Sateki Veikune Faletau was a medical student in Tonga  when he joined the Maori 
contingent in 1916, but he was discharged shortly after in 1917 when he caught pneumonia while 
in England.50 Fortunately, Faletau survived and reenlisted in 1919, until he was discharged in 
1920.51 In 1936 he became the Honorable ‘Akua’ola Sateki Veikune Faletau and was Governor 
of Vava‘u until 1939. He was also the Minister for Police from 1939-1952.52 During WWII 
Faletau went on to become Lieutenant-Colonel of the Tongan Defence Force.53 Faletau’s service 
during WWI was his first step in a life-long career of military and public service. His legacy 
continues to make his family and his country proud.  
Sateki Faletau’s military file lists his nearest of kin as his father John (probably Sione) 
Faletau who was living in Neiafu Tonga, although Sateki’s is birth place is listed as 
Nuku’alofa.54 Neiafu Tonga is in Vava‘u, and the district which sits next to the coveted Neiafu 
harbor, that the British cited as their reasoning behind making Tonga a protectorate in 1901. 
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British officials saw Neiafu harbor as an ideal military base, which could potentially serve as a 
harbor for the Germans to launch an attack on Fiji. While the association between Neiafu and 
Faletau’s military career most likely bore little literal significance in the past, it is interesting to 
conceptualize this symbolically. During the Tongan civil wars of the 19th century, there was no 
one particular harbor from which Tāufa‘āhau or his challengers launched their attacks. In fact, 
Tāufa‘āhau was from Ha‘apai, and began his military campaign from there. However, after the 
consolidation of the monarchy and the British, German, French and American establishments of 
Pacific colonies in the late 19th century, the Neiafu harbor became synonymous with the military 
in the eyes of imperialists. The imperial gaze’s militarized interpretation of Vava‘u’s harbor was 
the main cause in the establishment of the protectorate; in other words, militarism has threatened 
Tonga’s sovereignty since 1901. The imperial gaze often vacillated between viewing Pacific 
Islands as romantic escapes into the past and empty spaces ideal for military testing and bases.  
These militarized understandings would eventually lead to the violent and destructive nuclear 
testing in Micronesia and Tahiti. Although Tonga’s experience of militarization and colonialism 
differs drastically from other Pacific nations, it should not be excluded from critiques of Pacific 
militarization.  
While these stories constitute only a handful of Tongans who either participated in WWI 
by joining the forces or by donating to war funds, even this small sample group suggests that the 
Tongan response to WWI was not uniform. They represent the varied backgrounds of those who 
did serve and demonstrate the wide array of Tongan experiences in the early 20th century. 
Furthermore, because Tonga did not have a military at this time, and because Tupou II did not 
heartily encourage Tongan enlistment in NZ, AU, or UK forces, only individuals who were truly 
interested joined. The largest direct impact that WWI had on Tonga was the decrease in trade. 
Although wartime made the price of copra sky-rocket, limited shipping and a few storms that 
devastated the islands prevented Tonga from profiting from the elevated prices.55  
 On top of the economic difficulties that the war years brought to Tonga, Tupou II’s health 
rapidly declined throughout 1917. King Tupou II died on April 5th, 1918, leaving his 18-year-old 
daughter, Sālote to assume the throne and the Tu‘i Kanokupolu title.56 Five months earlier, 
Sālote had married Tungī Mailefihi, the son of Tupou I’s and II’s greatest political rival, 
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Tuku’aho. Tungī’s genealogy would have made him the holder of the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua title, 
had Tupou I not rendered it defunct when he assumed kingship. As mentioned, Queen Sālote’s 
genealogy made her the title holder of the Tu‘i Kanokupolu, and on her mother’s side she 
belonged to the Tu‘i Tonga lineage. Through their marriage, all three of the most powerful 
chiefly lineages were united, thus quelling some of the most virulent political opposition to the 
Tupou dynasty.57 Like her father and her great, great grandfather before her, Queen Sālote’s rule 
would be one of firsts. She was the first woman to become a monarch in Tonga, and the first 
ruler to inherit Tonga’s protectorate status. Her relationship with Britain and the Consul to Tonga 
was slightly less oppositional than her father’s, and this more amicable relationship would prove 
impactful when Queen Sālote faced WWII.  
 
Conclusion 
The Tongan government did not formally participate in WWI, because Tonga’s lack of a 
military prevented the nation from deploying troops via the state. However, it is hard to say if 
Tongan soldiers would have been deployed if the nation possessed a standing army at the time 
since Tonga’s relationship with Britain was so strained at the war’s onset. Tonga’s participation 
in WWI is critical to understanding the nature of the Tongan military, because this early 
engagement in warfare on the global stage demonstrates how the Tongan government and public 
viewed outside conflict prior to the official creation of a military, and before the protectorate 
relationship between Tonga and Britain fully matured. As aforementioned, Tonga had only 
recently become a protectorate at the onset of WWI and had previously been in close business 
relations with Germany. German presence and power in Tonga had been waning since the 1899 
partition of Samoa between the U.S. and Germany, when Britain agreed to release its claims to 
Samoa in exchange for Germany to leave Tonga.58 There were many Germans living in Tonga at 
the onset of WWI; Germany was not a clear enemy to Tonga at the time. WWI served to solidify 
Britain’s influence and control of Tonga, and by WWII Tongans quickly rallied to the support of 
the British and against Germany.  
By creating a timeline of the changing attitudes in Tonga concerning warfare on the 
global stage, it then becomes easier to analyze the true purpose of the Tongan military. 19th 
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century Tongan sovereignty, constructed under Tāufa‘āhau, was predicated upon European 
standards of governance and acceptance into the global political sphere via Euro-American 
powers.  Therefore, to what degree did the Tongan government have to sacrifice indigenous 
modes of power and sovereignty just to be able to participate in the global politics? Furthermore, 
the Tongan military was not constructed to protect Tonga against foreign enemies, but rather to 
support Britain. With this in mind the question then becomes: is the Tongan military a proxy for 
UK, US, and AU interests? If the control of violence via the military and police is a central tenet 
of the modern nation state, then is Tonga’s sovereignty affected by contracting out their military 
to foreign nations? These questions will be explored in the following chapters. However, these 
questions and critiques should not belie the personal and patriotic motivations behind Tongan 
participation in WWI or WWII. Understanding and critiquing the mechanism of imperialism and 
militarization do not need to be understood as conflicting with the agency of islander soldiers. 
Rather both the pride of soldiers and their families along with the deeper political consequences 
of service are part of one complex system of nation-states, citizenship, policing, and violence 





Becoming Soldiers:  
The Tongan Defence Force and World War II 
 
 At the end of the 19th century Tonga transformed from a complex indigenous empire into 
a bureaucratic nation-state, through military conquest under Tupou I and strategic political 
decisions made by Tupou I and II. With the advent of WWII, under the reign of Queen Sālote 
Tupou, the final piece in state formation, the creation of a military, took shape. Military prowess 
and pride were not new to Tonga, as mentioned in the previous chapter. However, a military 
comprised of soldiers from across the nation, who receive salaries and who fight on behalf of the 
nation differ from the closely bonded and loyal warriors of Tonga’s past. I use the word “warrior” 
very cautiously in the context of Tonga and the broader Pacific. The Pacific male body has too 
often been fetishized and essentialized in into caricatures of warriors, and many Pacific cultures 
have been reduced and replicated in media in ways that solely focus on the might of traditional 
fighters without adequate attention to the complexities and richness of our cultures.  I am using 
the term “warrior” to connote a political difference between service to a particular leader and an 
intimately known community versus a soldier who fights in allegiance to a state. In Tonga’s case, 
in the 20th century, the state was entangled with the British Empire. Therefore, when the Tonga 
Defence Force [TDF] was formed it was made according to British standards and in order to fight 
under the direction of U.S. and British military leaders. In order to answer the question of who the 
Tongan military truly serves, we must look back to its creation during WWII.  
It should be noted that the criticism of imperialism and militarization hold theoretical 
validity, but do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of the soldiers who joined the Tongan Defence 
Force in WWII or all Tongan government officials at the time. It is important to be critical of the 
military relationship Tonga has with the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and Britain without 
negating the tremendous sacrifice Tongan soldiers and civilians have made in order to support 
these more powerful nations. Although the relationship is deeply problematic, Tongan soldiers 
continue to risk their lives to participate in military campaigns that do not directly threaten their 
homeland; this is a tremendous act of bravery and patriotism that cannot be over looked.  While 
imperialism, largely informed the creation of the TDF, Tongans also volunteered to serve out of 
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pride, love for their Queen and country, and to protect Tonga from potential Japanese and 
German threats.  
“Glory to-day in these young men who have given their lives in loyal service to the 
country. What true Tongan will not often speak of these Youths who struck the first 
blows at the enemy. Theirs was the blood which Tonga shed in the blood poured out by 
the Allied Nations for Right and Freedom.”1 
 
 The Speaker of the Tongan Assembly, Nuku, was addressing the recent casualties 
suffered by a Tongan platoon, part of the First Fijian Commando Guerillas, at the Battle of 
Munda Point in the Solomon Islands during World War Two. His words embed Tongan soldiers’ 
sacrifices into the broader narratives of WWII which characterized the conflict as the ultimate 
battle between good and evil.  In his speech, he mixes the blood of Tongans with the Allied 
Nations, which symbolically represents the way in which WWII served to fully enmesh Tonga 
into the global military industrial complex.  From WWII forward, the Tongan military has only 
fought on behalf or alongside allied powers, regardless of whether the conflicts threatened 
Tonga. Tonga’s efforts during WWII have been greatly minimized, and in some cases erased. 
This invisibility masks a darker relationship that has been growing since WWII: Tonga’s 
growing dependence on and participation in U.S., Australian, and British military operations. In 
order to critique these more contemporary relationships, we must first give voice to Tongan 
service during WWII, which is where these strong and formal military relationships began. In 
hindsight the participation of Tonga in WWII seems inconsequential in comparison to larger and 
more affected nations’ contributions to such a massive war. However, by 1941 Japan controlled 
the northwestern Pacific and was moving quickly towards the south. Allied powers could not 
face the Japanese military without Pacific Islander soldiers, including Tongans. 
The Pacific War began after Allied forces declared war on Germany, but political 
tensions in Asia and the Pacific had been mounting for decades. Japan had already gained 
German colonial holdings after World War One and controlled the Caroline, Marshall, and 
Northern Marianas Islands.2 Further, Japanese military expansion commenced in 1931 when it 
began military campaigns to annex parts of Manchuria. Their advances sparked an international 
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embargo, and strained Japan’s already limited resources.3 By 1942 Japan occupied Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos, which at the time was a French colony known as French Indochina.4 
Shortly after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor the Japanese Army began attacks on the Philippines. 
Additionally, the Japanese military began encroaching upon Kiribati, Tuvalu and Papua New 
Guinea. Japan occupied the northeast coast of Papua New Guinea by March of 1942.5 The 
Japanese Imperial Navy intended to take over Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New 
Caledonia, and Fiji, in order to cut Australia off from Allied support.6 
Both Japan and Allied powers saw Pacific Islands as stepping-stones into enemy holdings 
and as buffers against military campaigns on their homelands.7 Japan and Allied forces began 
construction of air and naval bases in the Pacific, well before December 7th, 1941, but it was 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into WWII that sparked an all-out Pacific 
War.8 The U.S. controlled Guam, American Samoa, and Hawai’i as well as Johnston, Palmyra, 
Wake and Midway islands.9 Decades before the outbreak of World War II, British, New Zealand, 
and Australian colonies and protectorates in Oceania included: Samoa (1914), Australian Papua 
(1914), Kiribati (1892), Tuvalu (1892), Niue(1901), Pitcairn(1838/1902/1938), Tokelau(1916), 
Nauru (1919), Fiji (1874), Solomon Islands 1893/1900), Vanuatu (1906), and Tonga(1901).10  
The Tongan government had changed its policy towards Britain since WWI. Unlike her 
father, Queen Sālote’s relationship with the Western Pacific High Commission and the British 
Consul to Tonga was amicable, and she viewed Tonga’s status as a protectorate as 
advantageous.11 Her political decision to willingly accept British influence and advice served as 
a strategic measure to win over nobles who did not support her reign. The more support the 
Queen received from Britain, the more politically savvy she appeared to those who doubted 
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her.12 In her early reign, the young Queen formed a strong alliance with the Agent and Consul to 
Tonga, Islay McOwan. McOwan enjoyed a strong influence on Queen Sālote, but she did not 
follow his advice blindly, and at times rejected his suggestions.13 However, the close relationship 
between the Queen and Premier Tungī and the British Consul to Tonga often drew criticism from 
the government’s dissenters who questioned “Where the Tongan government ends and where the 
British Agent & Consul begins.”14 Dissenters were generally comprised of high ranking chiefs 
and nobles who felt their lines had claims to more land and power than they were allotted; many 
in the opposition also felt that Queen Sālote’s and Tungī’s reliance on British advice was 
offensive to Tongan sovereignty and to Tupou II’s legacy of resisting British encroachments of 
power. Nevertheless, the Queen’s decision to embrace British influence proved to legitimize her 
claims to power and potentially prevented further British intervention in Tonga. Even after 
McOwan’s departure, his confidence in the Queen remained imprinted in the minds of WPHC 
officials. Although Queen Sālote’s relationship with the British was more harmonious than her 
father’s, the nature of the relationship was still rooted in British paternalism and distrust of 
indigenous governance.  
Given the Queen’s favorable stance on British influence, it is not surprising that her 
reaction to supporting Britain during WWII was much more enthusiastic than her father’s 
reaction to WWI before her. On September 3rd, 1939 Tonga declared war on Germany. Queen 
Sālote called on her people to volunteer in support of the British and initiated the creation of the 
Tonga Defence Force.15 Enthusiasm for the Queen and the war effort was overwhelming, even 
elderly women clamored to join the TDF.16 The Queen’s consort and Tonga’s Premier, Prince 
Tungī Mailefihi was made colonel-in-chief. Until Premier Tungī Mailefihi’s sudden passing in 
1941, he oversaw the TDF and worked with the New Zealand Public Works Department on the 
construction of the Fua‘amotu Airfield.17 At the onset of WWII, Queen Sālote gave 546 acres to 
Britain in order to build an airfield for the Royal New Zealand Air Force. 18 Much of the 
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Fua‘amotu airfield was built by hand and by volunteers. The first plane landed on the airfield on 
March 15th, 1940.19 This airbase was highly desirable and remained in use throughout the war.20 
 





Fig. 3 “Queen Reviews Tongan Defence Force” 
 
For the first year, Tongan soldiers and laborers were unpaid. Later, privates were paid 
five pence per day while lieutenants received two shillings.21 Tongan and Allied forces trained at 
Nukualofa College. Volunteers built fales for incoming soldiers from New Zealand, Australia, 
and later the U.S.22 Although Tongan women were unable to join the TDF, many volunteered to 
sew uniforms and assemble aid kits for their soldiers. Queen Sālote herself allocated 10% of her 
salary to the war effort, and the Tongan government donated £117,500 to the cause over the 
course of six years.23 Although the Pacific war did not officially begin until December 7th, 1941, 
Tonga was deeply committed to the British war effort from the beginning of WWII. In Queen 
Sālote’s opening address to the 41st legislative assembly on June 26th, 1941, a few months before 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor, she expressed her sincere concern: 
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“In regard to ourselves in Tonga, it is almost impossible for us truly grasp the 
difficulties that have engulfed the great nations, we do not know how we are to be really 
affected by them, apart altogether from the matter of trade. But whatever the future may 
have in store it is important that we have strength and will to meet it. We Polynesians are 
not strangers to steering the ship in turbulent seas and we are well aware that it can be 
done only by unity of purpose and fidelity, as is proved by Tonga retaining its 
independence to the present day.”24 
 
Her message contrasts from her father’s address at the opening of WWI. Tupou II’s 
speech focused on Tonga’s evasion of colonialism, and the uniqueness of Tongan sovereignty, 
and stressed that only through god’s will and Tonga’s treaty with England that Tonga remained 
safe.25  Queen Sālote also emphasized the importance of Tonga’s independence, but instead of 
looking towards Britain for protection, she calls upon Tongans to face the challenges ahead. She 
also attributes Tonga’s retained domestic independence to Tongans themselves, rather than 
attributing it to god and the British, as her father did before her. Her Majesty also championed 
British and Allied power as promoters of peace, freedom, and Christian values. However, just as 
in her father’s speech before her, the reason to tout Tongan independence is because it had been 
threatened by European, especially British, imperialism.  
Regardless of the previously contentious relationship between Tonga and Britain, the 
Tongan people were adamantly committed to supporting the British in their efforts, in ways that 
were exceedingly more visible than the Tongan reaction to WWI. This shift in policy was noted 
in Australian newspapers, one of which described Tonga as being famous for its declaration of 
neutrality during WWI.26 Furthermore, many articles recognized and praised Tonga’s 
commitment to WWII. One paper describes Tonga’s war effort as such:  
Although not forming an integral part of the British Empire, the protected 
Kingdom of Tonga is second to none in the support of the case for with the Empire is 
fighting…The Royal family has given the site of an aerodrome at Peppercorn Bend and 
the five miles of road giving access to it was constructed free of charge by the Tonga 
Government. Barracks to accommodate the defence force, which was raised on a purely 
voluntary basis after the war broke out, were built from materials provided free of cost by 
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the nobles and the people. Under the personal direction of Queen Sālote, the ladies of 
Tonga have made the defence force uniforms and presented them to the force.27  
 
From the descriptions of Tonga’s efforts, it is clear that the whole of society, men, 
women, wealthy, and common, were mobilized and motivated to support allied powers. Despite 
the fact that Tonga’s formal economy has never been tremendously robust and that the Great 
Depression had negatively impacted Tong’s copra markets, the nation did not shy away from 
committing their best efforts and resources to the war cause. This generosity, loyalty, and 
commitment is reflective of some of the core values in Tongan culture which emphasizes the 
importance of supporting friends and family regardless of one’s own financial circumstances.  
Tongan commitment to the war cause came before the threats to Tonga and the South Pacific 
were overtly present. The epitome of Tongan support and generosity is evident in their 
fundraising which generated enough money to purchase four fighter planes for the Royal Air 
Force.28 Three were named after the royal family: the Prince Tungi, Queen Sālote, and Tupou I, 
two of which served in Europe.29   
Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the advent of the 
Pacific War, many people living in the Pacific had hoped that the war would not spread to the 
region. They hoped the war would stimulate the economy, which had been badly wounded 
during the Great Depression.30 However, once the Pacific War began, Japan made rapid and 
astounding victories in South East Asia and in the Pacific, which caused unprecedented alarm. 
One news article warned, “Until the Allies work out a co-ordinated plan of naval action against 
this extraordinary strategy there is not an island in the South Pacific, nor town in Australia, nor a 
point in the East Indies which may be regarded as safe from sporadic Japanese attacks.”31  
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Tonga declared war on Japan on December 8, 1941, in solidarity with the U.S. and 
Britain and in response to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. In 1942, New Zealand 
transferred responsibility and control for the “South Pacific Area,” which included Fiji and 
Tonga to the U.S. This move violated the Treaty of Protectorate between Tonga and Britain, but 
this violation was overlooked due to the serious threats in the region.32 According to Queen 
Sālote, an agreement was made between the U.S. and Tonga that entailed Tonga “providing 
water, land, wharfage facilities and houses…to accommodate the Army, the Navy, and the Air 
Force,” in return America, “agreed to evacuate her army from Tonga as soon as practicable after 
hostilities cease[d] ; to hand over free of cost any permanent works such as wharves, roads, 
harbor facilities, and aerodomes; and to respect the Sovereign rights and independence of the 
Kingdom of Tonga.”33 On March 3rd, 1942 Operation Bleacher, the U.S. occupation of Tonga, 
took effect.34 
It is not surprising that many of the troops that spent time in Tonga during WWII would 
agree that, “of all the islands on which the battalion has served, Tongatapu was the most 
enjoyable.”35 Although Tonga had not been called the Friendly Islands in many years, the name 
was often invoked to describe soldiers’ pleasant experiences in Tonga.36  In addition to the 546 
acres given to the British, the U.S. demanded 767 more acres to expand the airfield and set up a 
total of 13 camps around Tongatapu.37 The primary naval base was stationed at Ma‘ufanga, the 
Air Corps was at Fua‘amotu, and the Construction Battalion was at Havelu. Tongans provided 
the war effort with their best materials and land. The Fua‘amotu airbase was even constructed on 
a portion of Premier Tungī Mailefihi’s estate. Even further, another camp was built in Mu‘a, the 
ancient capital of Tonga and burial place of over 22 Tongan chiefs.38 At Mu‘a, many ancestral 
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rulers have been interred in centuries old, coral stone, step pyramids called langi. In addition to 
access to the most desirable land, foreign troops enjoyed gathering at Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui, an 
ancient and sacred megalith.39 As construction continued, foreign military men and bases 
physically overlapped the sacred geographies of Tongatapu. This overlap did not cover or erase 
the importance of these sites, but temporarily transformed the landscape in the service of foreign 
empire. Images of U.S. and NZ soldiers climbing on the Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui and sitting on the 
langi represent the entanglements of militarism, empire, and indigenous lives and landscapes that 
were at their peak in Tonga during WWII.40   
As formal operations intensified so did Tongan volunteer work. On top of dances and 
fundraising sales, Queen Sālote created a theater company, Hengihengi’a Tonga. The company 
preformed traditional Tongan legends and fictional war scenarios in order to raise funds for the 
Red Cross.41 Through their charity efforts Tongans raised £5,450 for the Red Cross, £7,400 for 
various war efforts, and £1525 for the Tonga Defence Force Comforts Fund that sent treats and 
extra rations for Tongan soldiers overseas.42 Over fifty Tonga Defence Soldiers would fight 
overseas, including the Queen’s nephew Vaea ‘Alipate Tupou who flew Catalinas with the Royal 
New Zealand Air Force.43  
While many sources suggest that the foreign soldiers generally enjoyed their time in 
Tonga, aside from the complaints over fleas and humidity, there is much to suggest that Tongans 
had mixed if not negative experiences with foreign soldiers, especially with U.S. soldiers.44 A 
side effect of the war was an influx of cash and wage labor jobs. Women and men both seized 
the opportunity to join the new and suddenly transformed cash economy. A common and 
lucrative job for women was a laundress, men got jobs supporting the military, and many 
households made and sold hopi, home-brewed alcohol.45 The foreign service men brought a time 
of excitement and prosperity, but the Tongan government was concerned about this sudden 
market boom and cautioned the public against becoming reliant on wage labor and neglecting 
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their agricultural work. Queen Sālote was especially concerned about this fact stating, “I 
seriously advise the chiefs and the leaders of our country to spare no efforts in encouraging 
agriculture and more stable sources of our national wealth.”46 
Despite the government’s warnings, the excitement and new opportunities were too 
enticing for everyone to simply ignore. Social gatherings, dances, and hopi were at the center of 
many Tongan- U.S. conflicts and accidents.47 However, the most infamous confrontation was 
called the Great Cigarette Raid, which took place in August of 1944.48 600 gallons of oil, 32 beer 
cases, and 72 cigarette cases were stolen from the naval base in Ma‘ufanga. U.S. soldiers 
immediately took it upon themselves to retaliate by blocking the roads, terrorizing households, 
and arresting Tongans they perceived to be suspicious.49 They even broke in to Premier Ata’s 
home and threatened his family.50 In total they arrested 40 men, although only 8 Tongan men 
were eventually prosecuted.  The stolen goods were never fully recovered.51 Many of the U.S. 
troops stationed in Tonga were from the South and had little regard for Tongans’ rights. The U.S. 
Navy silenced complaints by minimally compensating innocent people who had been targeted 
and by replacing the officer in charge of the raid.52  
Queen Sālote remained relatively silent on the matter, perhaps due to threats of martial 
law being instated in Tonga. In fact, before he was replaced, Commander R.P. Hodsdon 
threatened to declare martial law but he was promptly reminded that his men had just attacked a 
loyal British protectorate and that he had no authority to do so.53 These events suggest that 
although martial law was not officially declared, the U.S. military was the dominant political 
power in Tonga during the war years.54 U.S. actions in Tonga were ultimately forgiven, but they 
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clearly violated the agreement that the U.S. made with Queen Sālote at the onset of Operation 
Bleacher. The Great Cigarette Raid was just one of many incidents of U.S. soldiers violating 
Tongan rights. At the close of WWII, and on top of these aggressions, the U.S. attempted to bill 
Tonga for services they had previously agreed would be free.55 When Tonga refused to pay for 
the equipment that the U.S. no longer needed, instead of giving Tonga the equipment, they 
pushed it into the wharf and burned the buildings they abandoned.56  
During the war, as tensions rose and fell at home, two platoons of Tongan soldiers left to 
train and fight along Allied forces in the Solomon Campaign. Fifty TDF soldiers left Tonga and 
fought with Fijians, Americans, and New Zealanders in Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and 
Bougainville. The Pacific had been keenly aware of Japan’s creeping power in the region, but the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor signaled a turning point in the war effort. New Zealand and Australia, 
unlike the U.S., had been deeply involved in the war since its advent and were unable to 
adequately redirect soldiers and resources to the Pacific War.57 Despite being short on resources, 
Japan’s bases in the Solomon Islands and in New Guinea posed too great of a threat to ignore. 
Guerilla forces were seen as the most viable option in the face of an ever-expanding war.  
The First Commando Fiji Guerillas were comprised of skilled Fijian, Solomon Islander, 
Tongan, and New Zealander soldiers.58 Commandos in Fiji were extremely effective and skilled 
in their knowledge of combat as well as navigating the harsh and humid tropical environments in 
the South Pacific. 59 Throughout 1941 and 1942, the threat of an assault on Fiji as well as on 
Tonga seemed imminent.  It was not until the U.S. victory at the Battle of Coral Sea in early May 
1942 and later at the Battle of Midway in early June that the capacity of the Japanese Navy to 
launch an assault on more South Pacific Islands greatly diminished.60  
 With the threat diverted, the First Commando Fiji Guerillas joined the U.S. in the 
Solomon Islands Campaign.61 The campaign began in August of 1942 and lasted until December 
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1943.62 Japanese bases in the Solomon Islands marked the furthest reaches of the rapidly 
expanding Japanese empire. The Japanese established a formidable base at Rabaul in New 
Britain, in the Bismarck Archipelago. The Rabaul base served as the epicenter of the Japanese 
offensive in the Solomons and in Papua New Guinea.63 In January 1942, the Japanese military 
began bombing the Solomon Islands, and by July of 1942 the Japanese completed construction 
of an airbase on Guadalcanal.64 Once Japan secured the Solomons, their plan was to move on 
Papua New Guinea and to launch an offensive on New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa to sever U.S.-
Australia supply lines.65 In August of 1942, the U.S. sent 11,000 Marines to Guadalcanal and 
Tulagi in order to destroy the Japanese airbase.66 The Solomon Campaign lasted over a year and 
caused 23,800 Japanese casualties and 1,600 U.S. casualties.67 
Although the Japanese defeat at Midway stymied their plans to extend further into the 
South Pacific, their bases in the Solomons remained pertinent for their continued campaign to 
secure New Guinea. Allied action in the Solomons and later in the Bismarcks ultimately enabled 
U.S. and Australian forces to successfully regain control of New Guinea. While many suggest 
that it was the Battle at Midway, that marked the turning point in the war, it was also the multiple 
successes of the Solomon Campaign that began the course of Allied victories in the Pacific.  
  The success of the Solomon Campaign, and the Pacific War overall, was greatly 
dependent upon indigenous support and soldiers. U.S. soldiers proved ill equipped to maneuver 
the thick and humid forests of the Solomons. Fijian and Solomon Islander scouts, leaders, and 
translators proved invaluable to the campaign. Tongan soldiers proved especially good at coast 
watching and locating marine mines as well as quickly traveling between islands and traversing 
along the dangerous and crocodile infested rivers.68 Without support from indigenous soldiers 
and volunteers the Pacific front could have been lost to Japan. Despite the necessity of 
indigenous support, they were consistently paid less than their white counterparts and top 
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commanders were predominantly white.69 Representations of Solomon Islander support of the 
British during WWII has often been simplified as unwavering loyalty of indigenous islanders to 
their British colonizers, but as in the case of Tonga, the relationship between the British and 
Solomon Islanders was complex. Many islanders joined out of feelings of obligation and fear of 
punishment.70 Tongan soldiers joined out of loyalty to Queen and country and anxieties over the 
war’s potential threat to Tonga, but their willingness to fight under the guidance of British, New 
Zealand, and U.S. leaders was based in an imperial framework that had been cultivated over four 
decades. Furthermore, Pacific islands were threatened, because imperial powers used them as 
stepping stones in larger military strategies.  
 While WWII weaponry and military strategy was more lethal and more diverse than ever 
before, the deadliest forces during the Solomon Campaign and across the South Pacific was the 
environment itself. The Solomon Islands’ climate is extremely moist, generally sitting at about 
80% humidity, rain is especially frequent from November to May, and the temperature ranges 
from 70° to 90° F.71 All four types of malaria thrive in New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu. Malaria caused significantly more casualties than combat itself.72 Additionally 
filariasis, typhus, and dengue fever, caused by parasites, mites, and mosquitos were incredibly 
pervasive and debilitating.73 The wet, dense forests of the Southwest Pacific are ripe grounds for 
mosquitos and parasites, and treacherous grounds for combat.  
 The first group of TDF soldiers to join the First Commando Fiji Guerillas was led by 
Lieutenant Henry Taliai as well as New Zealander, Lieutenant Benjamin Masefield.74 They 
landed on Guadalcanal on April 19, 1943 The troops were tasked with combing the lush and 
mountainous island in search of remaining Japanese soldiers.75 The bulk of Japanese force had 
been diminished a month earlier at the Battle of Guadalcanal. Still the Solomon Islands 
Campaign was far from over. Japanese losses at Midway and Guadalcanal had not stopped their 
efforts in New Guinea, Kiribati (then the Gilbert Islands,) nor in the Philippines.76  
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After nearly three months on Guadalcanal, the First Fiji Commandos arrived in New 
Georgia on July 2, 1943.77 The primary objective of the New Georgia offensive, Operation 
Order, was to capture the Munda Airbase.78 After securing the nearby islands of Baraulu, 
Sasavele, and Roviana, the Tongan platoon joined an American battalion on the main island, 
New Georgia.79 Operation Order lasted 35 days, 25 days longer than anticipated. The operation’s 
strategy was to travel and create a nearly half kilometer front along the western side of the 
Barike River, and then to push towards the Munda Airbase.80 This was especially challenging 
due to New Georgia’s dense forest and lack of roads apart from local footpaths. Additionally, 
Munda is protected geographically by sharp reefs and the narrow Hathorn Strait.81 The Japanese 
built the Munda Airbase in November of 1942, and it served as an essential point for the support 
and defense of Japan’s Rabaul and Guadalcanal bases as well as for their Solomon offensive.82 
 The Tongan platoon of the First Commando Fiji Guerillas, led by Lieutenant Henry 
Taliai and Lieutenant Benjamin Masefield, joined the initial U.S. troop and trekked up the Barike 
River on July 4th 1943.83 The following morning, the troop found their camp was neighboring a 
Japanese camp. 
“The Tongans and the Japanese realised what had happened at the same time and 
both parties took cover to give themselves time to size up the situation. In taking cover a 
Tongan and a Japanese dived behind the same tree. In the excitement of the moment the 
Japanese was not quite sure what nationality the Tongan was so he asked the Tongan 
whether he was Japanese or American. The Tongan wasted no time in answering with a 
bullet. The rest of the Japanese withdrew at the sound of the shot and the Tongans 
returned to the Battalion’s headquarters.”84 
 
This startling and violent encounter would be the first of many in the long and hard-
fought Operation Order. On July 5th, 1943 Lieutenant Taliai and Lieutenant Masefield joined 12 
Americans on the Munda Trail to set up headquarters further inland along the Barike River. 
Unfortunately, the Japanese military had anticipated their move inland and ambushed them less 
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than a mile into their mission.85 The troops organized themselves with the Americans in the 
middle while the commandos took the flanks; the Commandos were often put in the most 
dangerous and difficult positions. They avoided firing in order to optimize stealth.  
“Visibility was limited to less than ten yards in this part of the jungle…The commandos 
had trained themselves to shoot only when they had something to shoot at and their 
silence had the Japanese bluffed…they threw everything they had at the commandos-
there were grenades and rifle and machine gun bullets everywhere- it seemed amazing 
that anyone could avoid being hit with so much lead flying about.86 
 
 The First Commando Fiji Guerillas’ strategy differed drastically from the U.S. policy of 
“go[ing] forward behind a blaze of fire.” Instead the Commandos moved quietly and carefully, 
and they strategically used grenades to get behind the foliage that protected enemies from rifle 
fire.87 The next day, July 6th, the soldiers set up camp in enemy territory just behind the Munda 
Airfield; unfortunately the Japanese troops spotted them, surrounded the Commandos, cut their 
communication lines and “showered the area with lead.”88 This was the day that the Munda 
Battle began, the second major offensive in the Solomon Campaign, and the day that Sergeant 
Sione Inukia’angana and Private Simote Vea Mahe earned their Silver Stars and Military Medals 
for “gallant and distinguished services in the South West Pacific.”89 The Tongan Government 
Gazette celebrated their soldiers recognition,  
“Private Vave and several Americans were wounded, but Sergeant Sione InukiHa‘angana 
and Private S.V. Mahe continued to engage the enemy…and when the United States 
Company withdrew each of them carried back a wounded American under fire. Their 
conduct and coolness under fire was an inspiration to all.”90 
 
Pacific Islands Monthly described Sergeant Sione Inukia’agana’s feat in greater detail, 
A sergeant in the South Pacific Scouts (American name for the Fiji battalion, that 
is serving overseas), Jione Inukiha’ Agana who comes from Nukualofa, Tonga has been 
awarded the American Silver Star. The decoration is for gallantry in action on New 
Georgia Island in the Solomons, on July 19 last year. 
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Sgt. Agana saw two or three Japanese making directly for a wounded American 
soldier, he killed the Japanese and then under heavy enemy fire, successfully evacuated 
the injured man.91  
 
Both InukiHa‘anga and Mahe were clearly deeply committed to the war cause and risked their 
lives to save American soldiers.  
 Although there are many stories of success, the Tongan platoon of the First Commando 
Fiji Guerillas was not without setbacks and casualties. By the 8th of July the American battalion 
was out of rations, but the Commandos sharedewhat they had with them. Rations and the 
wounded were carried up and down the river in Solomon Islander canoes and with their support 
until the Americans facilitated the conversion of the Munda trail into a road fit for vehicles. 92 
The initial successes of the Munda Battle stagnated “to a war of attrition with no spectacular 
successes.”93 The stall in advancement caused more soldiers to contract malaria, and the 
Japanese adopted night attacks to push back the Americans and commandos, leaving the soldiers 
sleepless and paranoid. The first Commando to succumb to enemy attacks was a Fijian named 
Sailosi, who was killed at night on July 10th.94 The next to fall was Lieutenant Masefield himself. 
While leading a Tongan scouting troop further along the Munda Trail, the team found enemy 
machine guns and as they were returning to report their findings they were subject to friendly 
fire, which unfortunately killed Lieutenant Masefield. On the 12th Lieutenant Henry Taliai and 
Uraia, a Fijian soldier, were killededuring one of many small patrol missions that the 
commandos were often put in charge of. These small patrols greatly helped the Allied 
advancement, and the Commandos often served as scouts and spearheads for the larger American 
battalion.95 The Commando’s position as scouts and flanks for the U.S. Army speaks both to the 
troops bravery and to U.S. and NZ leaders disregard for islander lives. Indigenous bodies, 
intelligence, and homelands were utilized to fight an imperial war.  
 Lieutenant Masefield and Lieutenant Taliai were greatly loved and admired by their 
troops and their passing was a devastating blow to the Commandos. To this day, Tonga’s naval 
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base is called Masefield Naval Base and their military camp is called Taliai Camp.96 A story in 
Pacific Islands Monthly about Fijian and Tongan soldiers in the Solomons ran on September 













The Munda Airfield was officially captured on August 5th, 1943, after an exhausting 35-
day campaign. The Munda Airfield was extended and converted into an important Allied base.97 
After the success of the Solomon Campaign, the Allies could finally move on to the Japanese 
Rabaul base. On January 23, 1942 Japan had occupied Rabaul on the island of New Britain, 
which is part of the Bismarck Archipelago.98 This base was the primary support station for 
Japan’s attacks on New Guinea and for their initial plan of invading Port Moresby. New Guinea 
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Henry Taliai, who was killed in action 
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and the Bismarcks were seen as strategic holds from which the Japanese could threaten Australia 
and sever communication between Australia and Indonesia (at the time the Dutch East Indies.) In 
order to attack this vital base, the Allies began with an assault on the island of Bougainville. 
Japan had occupied Bougainville since March 1942 and by 1943 over 38,000 Japanese 
forces were well established in and around the island.99 The U.S. constructed a base at Empress 
Augusta Bay on November 1st, 1943.100 Although the First Commando Fiji Guerillas were 
disbanded shortly after the New Georgia Campaign, a new group of Tongan soldiers joined the 
3rd Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment in the Bougainville Campaign on March 3rd 1944.101 Tevita 
Fusi, a Tongan soldier in the battalion received a Military Medal during the Bougainville 
Campaign.102 The soldiers of the Bougainville Campaign faced similar challenges to those in the 
Solomon Campaign. The terrain was equally as rugged, and malaria was rampant. Japanese 
formal surrender at Bougainville finally came on August 21st, 1945, less than a month before the 
Pacific War officially ended on September 2nd, 1945. The campaigns that followed the Solomon 
and Bougainville Campaigns are far better known. In brief, while the New Georgia assault was 
underway Australia began its offensive in Papua New Guinea [PNG], in November 1943 the 
U.S. began assaults in the Gilberts (Kiribati,) and by 1944 the U.S. was fighting in the 
Marshalls.103 In June 1944, the U.S. won the Battle of Philippine Sea and aggressively attacked 
Japanese strongholds in the Marianas.104 By 1945, the U.S. was in Okinawa, and in May 
Germany surrendered. Australian forces continued to fight in New Guinea as well as in 
Indonesia, and by July the U.S. took back the Philippines. And of course, the war came to a 
tragic and infamous end with the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 
1945.105  
The contributions of Tongan soldiers to the Allied war effort comprise just a small 
portion of the many indigenous Pacific contributions, but they were no less brave. U.S. efforts 
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are often credited as being the determining force that ended the Pacific War and ended Japanese 
imperialism in the Pacific, but without indigenous support navigating the dense jungles of the 
South Pacific, assisting in food production and cultivation, as well as participating in war 
infrastructure construction, Allied efforts would not have been as swift and effective as they 
were. Ironically, it was Allied Power and imperialism that had colonized and exploited many of 
the nations that were so deeply affected by the Pacific War the century leading up to it. Tongans, 
Fijians, Papuans, Solomon Islanders all fought alongside Allied Forces in the South Pacific. To 
the Allies, islands were seen as pawns and buffers against attacks on their lands. However, for 
the indigenous soldiers of the Pacific, they fought for their homes, in a war waged between 
imperial powers. With these contradictions at play, Tongan loyalty and enthusiasm seems 
conflicting, but Tongan unwavering loyalty and commitment to their countrymen, neighbors, and 
allies is undeniably commendable.  
 Money and territory are common topics in the discussion of militarization. Militarization 
in the Pacific is often relegated to the discussion of military bases, most of them owned and 
operated by the U.S. From the U.S. and Australia perspective, Pacific islands continue to 
represent strategic military pawns rather than the cherished homelands of millions of people. It is 
also clear that there is a deep interest in the militarization of the Pacific male body. Many 
scholars have addressed the issue of military masculinity in the Pacific, but most focus on 
Chamorro, Maori, Fijian, and Kanaka Maoli identities. Although Tonga was never formally 
colonized in the way many island nations continue to be, the exploitation and fetishization of 
Tongan male bodies in the interest of warfare is no less present.  
 In early 1941 while Allies were determining where to setup bases: 
Lieutenant-Colonel John McLeod, M.C…Found the Tongans keen to make good 
soldiers, and they took to drill and manoeuvres like ducks to water, New Zealanders have 
a flair for getting the best of Polynesians races, for they know that, as with their own 
Maoris, the blood of warriors and gentlemen flows in their native veins.106 
 
Tongans, as well as other Polynesians were touted as being desirable because they were strong 
and brave but also submissive. Instead of seeing indigenous soldiers as equal partners, white 
officers viewed them more like one of the many weapons in the military’s advancing arsenals–
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Polynesians were dangerous and desirable but needing of white direction in order to be useful.107 
Similar attitudes are reflected in today’s politics as Pacific nations who assist the U.S. and 
Australia are viewed as brave warrior forces, while those that challenge the status quo of power 
are labeled threats, such as the militants in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. Additionally, 
Tongans are still represented as having an essential and dangerous warrior quality. This 
representation is apparent in the military as well as in sports, especially rugby and football. 
While this stereotype may seem favorable in the context of war and sports, it is detrimental to the 
well-being of young Tongan men especially those living in the diaspora who are subject to 
racism and racial profiling. 
 
 Although Tongan involvement in international warfare is highly problematic and is 
essentially a symptom of a continually unbalanced power structure in the Pacific, Tongans 
willingly participate in these affairs and many are proud of their military service. Tongan men 
are compelled to join the military for a variety of reasons including patriotism and belief in their 
cause, but many enlist for an opportunity at economic mobility.108 Even the Tongan government 
sees Tongan participation in international military affairs as lucrative. Essentially contracting out 
Tongan military forces is a short-term solution to a systemic problem, and the long-term effects 
of military relationships with major world powers could ultimately compromise Tongan 
sovereignty. Contracting out Tongan soldiers to any military campaign that would prove to be 
the most lucrative also contributes to the militarization and commodification of Pacific bodies.  
Moreover, such close relationships with volatile and powerful nations could turn Tonga 
into a de facto U.S. or Australian military base. Additionally, if the various nations who now 
support the Tongan military ever find themselves opposed to one another, this could prove 
politically dangerous for Tonga.  These military relationships have already caused Tongan 
citizens to be subject to the harshness of warfare in conflicts that have nothing to do with Tonga 
or the South Pacific in general. A nation having a standing military in order to protect its own 
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interests and sovereignty is understandable, but the generally peaceful condition of Tonga’s 
politics makes their forces more relevant to foreign interests than Tonga’s own.  
 This military dependence leaves Tonga subject to other nation’s destructive military 
industrial complexes. Perhaps the most chilling critique of war comes from Sergeant  
Colin R. Larsen and his account of the New Georgia campaign: 
Jungle warfare becomes a very personal affair between yourself and the enemy, who is so 
close at times the you can almost see the white of his eyes. If you catch sight of his face 
once, the features are indelibly printed on your mind; and if you see it a second time it 
seems that you have known the man for years. In fact jungle warfare is so much of a man 
to man affair, that it strikingly reveals the true nature of war-murder.109 
 
Larsen’s quote is a powerful reminder that although war can be profitable, it comes at a grave 
expense. Tonga’s partnership and growing dependence on military powers is a danger to Tongan 
individuals, families, sovereignty as well as to global peace. 
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Chapter IV 
Tonga, Money, and Militarization:  
A Kingdom within the Global Military Industrial Complex 
 
A typical and concrete understanding of militarization and its motivations can be 
summarized as, “the hallmark of militarism is the lust for war.”1 This lust is caused by 
depoliticization, and conceptualizing war on purely ideological terms, in which the “other” poses 
an existential threat to a particular world-view. Therefore, absolving the aggressor of considering 
the ethical and moral consequences of waging war. This instead creates a crusade of ‘good’ 
against ‘evil.’2  War becomes a “precisely “‘altruistic’ pursuit... that generates militarism and 
leads to the systematic undermining of every limit placed upon war.”3 The only conclusion 
available to such severe logic is total hegemony. However, to understand Tonga’s participation 
in foreign military campaigns as a full incorporation into U.S. hegemony, belies the political 
complexity of the Pacific and the large degree of sovereignty Tonga possesses. A more 
applicable understanding of militarization in the Pacific, is posed by Sasha Davis in Empires 
Edge (2015) which views U.S. posturing in the Pacific as a means to protect  “vital systems” 
rather than “defending territory and perpetuating the state against opposition.”4 Since the Pacific 
is a “critical space of a transnational economic system,” the U.S. is compelled to protect it due to 
the state’s reliance on “capitalist accumulation and neoliberal trade policies.”5 Having a strong 
military presence in the region allows the U.S. to dictate trade and defend “ ‘the system’ from all 
threats, environmental, military, and political.”6 The U.S. is a leader in this pursuit, however, 
Australia, in recent years, has taken a larger role in militarizing the Pacific. Thus, I will argue 
that Tonga’s growing presence in U.S. and Australian military efforts is also a product of such 
militarization. Max Weber argues in his foundational text, Politics as a Vocation, “a state is a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
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force within a given territory.”7 Tonga is not a democracy but rather a constitutional monarchy. 
This raises the concern as to whether the Tongan military is in service of the state or of the 
sovereign. I will explore this particular issue by discussing the Tongan military’s role in quelling 
the 2006 Democracy Riots. If we consider Weber’s argument, that violence and the state are 
intimately intertwined, then Tonga’s utilization of their military should be an expression of 
sovereignty. Therefore, it is imperative to know what motivates Tonga to participate in foreign 
military campaigns, especially when we consider Tonga’s participation in campaigns in places as 
far away as Iraq or Afghanistan - over 13,000 miles from Tonga - that have made no direct 
threats to the safety of Tonga or its citizens. Tonga’s participation in such distant and dangerous 
campaigns suggests that Tonga’s actions are less indicative of sovereignty and state power. 
Instead, these efforts suggest a drive towards economic imperialism, whereby Tonga is 
dependent on militaristic nations for support, and therefore becomes enmeshed in foreign wars.  
If complete control of violence is an expression of state sovereignty, what is the nature of 
a state that utilizes this power predominately to serve foreign interests? Following WWII Tonga 
has faced no serious direct military threats; yet their military remains active. In this chapter, I 
consider who or what Tonga is fighting by looking at His Majesty’s Armed Forces (HMAF) 
participation in the Iraq and Afghanistan War. I also consider HMAF participation in RAMSI 
(Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands), and in calming the 2006 Democracy Riots in 
Nuku’alofa. From this perspective, we see the projection of Tongan military power from the 
outside in. Later in the chapter, I delineate Tonga’s foreign military engagements geographically 
and based on proximity. By funneling the engagements in this way (as opposed to 
chronologically) I hope to construct an image of a militarized geography that better demonstrates 
the impact of foreign militarization on Tonga. The geographic shape of this chapter is a 
decrescendo which begins by outlining the furthest reaches that Tongan soldiers have been 
pulled into and ends within Tonga. By ending in Tonga, we can re-center in order to consider the 
future of the Tongan military. 
 Although Tongan soldiers have participated in many training exercises with foreign 
militaries, the engagements mentioned in this chapter represent the most significant actions since 
Tonga’s independence in 1970. With the loosening of Britain’s reins on Tonga’s international 
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affairs, Tonga’s foreign policy has become entirely their own. Tonga was never formally 
colonized, but its position as a British protectorate severely limited the nation’s sovereignty. 
Therefore, the rapid legal and economic changes that Tonga experienced after independence can 
still be seen as a “state-formation” process, because the kingdom still needed to adjust politically 
and economically in order to exercise its newfound, full sovereignty. As Alexander Wendt and 
Michael Barnett so poignantly describe, “third World state-formation has often proceeded on a 
dependent basis, conditioned by relations of economic, political, and/or cultural subordination to 
individual Great Powers or to the world-system as a whole.”8 This dependency skews the state-
formation process in favor of foreign interests and incentivizes elites to focus on appealing and 
appeasing donor states over their own citizens. There is strong evidence to suggest that Tonga 
has also been subject to subordination towards “Great Powers,” which has thusly impacted the 
kingdom’s “state-formation” process and continues to inform its foreign policy.  
Tonga’s road to independence was long, but peaceful. In 1958 Tonga and Britain revised 
the terms of their protectorate relationship; under the new agreement, Tonga was no longer 
required to receive British approval on financial decisions and civil cases brought by foreigners 
could be held in Tongan courts.9 In the same revision, Britain transferred control of Tonga’s 
defense to New Zealand. The Tonga Defence Force was temporarily disbanded after World War 
II but was then reestablished in 1954 with support from Britain and New Zealand.10  New 
Zealand agreed to provide Tonga with strategic, monetary, and material support in exchange for 
influence over Tonga’s military and reasonable compensation for the support provided to 
Tonga.11 In 1970 Tonga ended its protectorate status with Britain and the TDF’s name was 
changed to the Tonga Defence Services. Although Tonga became more and more legally 
independent as Britain and Tonga moved towards an independence agreement, Tāufa‘āhau 
Tupou IV’s “modernization” efforts caused Tonga to borrow even more heavily from Britain. 
Therefore by 1970, when independence was finally achieved, Tonga was already economically 
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dependent on foreign investors. The primary benefactors to Tonga at the time were New Zealand 
and Britain and this remained so until the 1990s, when Australia surpassed them and became 
Tonga’s primary donor.12 Presently, Australia remains Tonga’s greatest donor, but China is a 
very close second; however, Tonga has yet to participate in any Chinese military campaigns.  
The weakness of Tonga’s formal economy makes the nation vulnerable to being 
dependent on foreign aid. It is this dependency that facilitates economic imperialism or “informal 
empires.” “Informal empires…are constituted by a fusion of power and social purpose in which 
the authority of dominant states penetrates the territorial space of subordinate states.”13 By 
providing weaker states with weapons, donor states prevent their beneficiaries “from becoming 
militarily self-sufficient.”14 In addition to weapons supplies, foreign training programs 
“explicitly intend to promote the political and military interests of the host.”15  Through this 
process, Tonga has been incorporated into Pacific militarization despite the nation’s perceived 
continuous independence from colonial powers.  
Once again, I turn to Teresia Teaiwa’s, "The Articulated Limb: Theorizing Indigenous 
Pacific Participation in the Military Industrial Complex." She positions militarized Pacific Island 
nations as the limbs of empire, she writes: “the ligaments, tendons, nerves and blood vessels that 
grow around an articulated limb make the possibility of disarticulation inevitably violent and 
traumatizing. I suggest that the MIC as an ensemble is held together not simply by mechanistic 
linkages but, at certain points in space and time, by tendential forces analogous to those 
surrounding an articulated limb.”16 In the article she explores the motivations behind Fijian and 
Chamorro participation in U.S., British, and UN military and peacekeeping campaigns. She 
argues that in both instances notions of bravery, masculinity, and duty compel indigenous 
soldiers to support colonial powers.17 The emotional and identity driven aspects of indigenous 
enlistment are further perpetuated by the profitability of service. Teaiwa does not include Tonga 
in her analysis, but Fiji and Tonga are two out of only four indigenous independent militaries in 
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the Pacific, so there is considerable overlap between the two nation’s defense policies. Therefore, 
her conclusions are compatible with the current state of Tonga’s military. For example, Teaiwa 
argues that Fijians are incorporated into the MIC by serving as laborers for the British military; 
similarly, Tonga has provided the U.S., UK, and Australia with labor in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
the Solomon Islands. In return for their service, Tonga is compensated, which fosters a 
dependent and militarized relationship between Tonga, the U.S., UK, and Australia. 
Serious efforts to incorporate Tonga into the global military industrial complex became 
evident in 1988 when Australia established a Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) in Tonga.18 
The Australian DCP emerged after the UN established exclusive economic zones. The DCP was 
designed to assist Pacific nations who could not afford to monitor their newly established 
exclusive economic zones, or EEZs (200 nautical miles beyond their coastlines) by providing 
them with patrol boats, defense aid, and maritime training.19 By positioning the project as a 
philanthropic venture to support Pacific nation’s security, Australia legitimized their increased 
military presence in the Pacific, and inherently increased their power in the region. The DCP is 
still active and growing; the Australian government describes the role of DCP as “maximise[ing] 
Australia’s security through developing close and enduring links with partners that support their 
capacity to protect their sovereignty, work effectively with the Australian Defence Force and 
contribute to regional security.”20 The estimated budget for DCP funds to Tonga from 2017-18 
was $2,700,000AU, and is the third largest South Pacific recipient of DCP aid, behind Fiji and 
Timor Lest.21  
Since the 1990’s Australia has also funded the renovation of Taliai Military Camp, the 
Touliki Naval Base, and the Vilai Barracks. Additionally, Australia continues to train Tongan 
soldiers at their military academies.22 Tonga also receives training and military financial support 
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from the U.S. and has collaborated with the Royal Air Force on multiple occasions. Fiji, PNG, 
Vanuatu, and Tonga are the only Pacific Island nations with independent militaries in the Pacific. 
Despite the existence of independent militaries, there is no production of firearms or military 
equipment in the Pacific; all of it is imported. As of 2003, the main suppliers of weapons to the 
Pacific were the U.S., Israel, South Korea and Singapore.23 At the time the standard infantry 
weapon for Tongan soldiers was the Belgian 7.62 mm FN FNCE and .303 Mark IV rifles left 
over from WWII which had been given to Tonga by New Zealand. By 2003, Tonga was hoping 
to upgrade their equipment through the US Foreign Military Sales program.24 Tonga’s interest in 
upgrading their artillery coincided with their deepening involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan 
Tonga was not a participant in the coalition of nations who supported the U.S. during the 
Gulf War, which lasted from 1990-91. This is most likely because Tonga was only in the early 
stages of militarization funded by foreign aid. New Zealand, Australia, and Britain were all 
involved in the Gulf War as well as in the Iraq and Afghanistan war. This suggests that there was 
a clear change in Tongan foreign policy, and an increase in Pacific militarization by foreign 
powers from the time of the Gulf War to the beginning of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars in the 
2000s.  
Afghanistan has suffered successive invasions by foreign powers since the 1979 Soviet 
invasion in which the Soviets fought in favor the communist government, and against the U.S. 
backed Mujahedeen. After Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan was in a state of perpetual 
civil unrest, which allowed the Taliban to gain considerable control. During the chronic chaos, 
the Afghan economy collapsed, and became dependent on exporting opium.25 The U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan, or as President George W. Bush named it, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 
was prompted by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the New York World Trade Center and the 
U.S. Pentagon. The attacks were attributed to al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden who was 
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living in Taliban controlled Afghanistan. On September 20th, 2001, President George Bush met 
with British Prime Minister Tony Blair who offered Britain’s full support to the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan.26 Within a month U.S. and British forces bombarded Afghanistan with devastating 
airstrikes and took control of Kabul, thus significantly weakening Taliban dominance in 
Afghanistan.27 The goal of OEF was to dismantle the Taliban, capture Bin Laden, and establish a 
stable state government that would be favorable to the U.S. The U.S. strategy was to limit ground 
troops by utilizing air assaults and by partnering with the Northern Alliance who had been 
fighting the Taliban for over a decade by the time of the U.S. invasion.  
After the 9/11 attacks there was global support for U.S. military campaigns into the 
Middle East, and a widespread panic over the threat of “terrorism.” In late September 2001 the 
UN Security Council passed resolution 1368 and 1373 as well as General Assembly Resolution 
56/1.28 Resolution 1368 “Call[ed] also on the international community to redouble their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts including by increased cooperation and full implementation of 
the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions.”29 International support for the Afghan War 
continued through the early 2000s. NATO even took charge of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. ISAF soldiers were predominately U.S., British, German, 
Canadian, and Dutch soldiers. 30 Despite the massive flow of soldiers and equipment into the 
U.S. and NATO attacks on the Taliban, the organization seemed elusive, and utilized Pakistan as 
well as the Afghani mountains to shield themselves from destruction. Additionally, the 
devastating violence caused by U.S. and NATO forces inspired many Afghanis to join the 
Taliban in defense of their homeland.31 After a decade of fighting, exhaustion and frustration 
pervaded international opinion, but the war only seemed to be intensifying. Therefore, in 2010 
when most international forces were ready to leave Afghanistan, Britain recruited Tongan 
soldiers to support them in defending the Joint Operating Base at Camp Bastion, the most critical 
base in southwest Afghanistan. Britain agreed to pay for the cost of deployment and to pay the 
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soldiers 30 pounds per day. Rotating contingents of 55 Tongan soldiers partnered with the Royal 
Air Force to preform security detail at the camp from 2010-2014.32 
 In September of 2012 fifteen Taliban members dressed in U.S. Army uniforms, cut 
through the protective wire on the eastern border of the camp and began attacking the base’s 
airfield. During the assault, two U.S. Marine Corps soldiers died and sixteen U.S. and British 
personnel were wounded.33 The attackers were killed relatively quickly by a helicopter strike, but 
the attack still managed to cause $200 million dollars’ worth of damage. A U.S. accountability 
review in 2013 found that two U.S. generals were at fault for inadequate leadership and 
oversight; RAF personnel were also cited as not securing the base sufficiently enough, but they 
were not found culpable since the responsibility of the base’s security was ultimately in the 
hands of the leading U.S. officers.34 The watchtower closest to the breach, number 16, was 
unmanned during the attack, and towers 15 and 17 did not have clear views of the breach point.35 
Tower 16 was unmanned due to a management decision, not due to any personal mistake made 
by a guardsman. At the time it was common practice for towers to be unmanned.   
Neither the UK nor U.S. investigations found Tongan Defence Services at fault, but a 
variety of news articles did not hesitate to place the blame on Tongan soldiers. A Washington 
Post article claimed that prior to the attack, “Marine officers also had been concerned about the 
performance of the Tongan troops, who were sometimes found asleep at their posts.”36 This 
claim was perpetuated and included in a variety of publications but was never mentioned in the 
official investigations. Captain Toni Fonokalafi refuted the criticisms of Tongan troops; he 
explained that the “drop in the level of security in general enabled the Taliban to filter into the 
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camp.”37 Additionally, Tongan soldiers were performing security duties along with RAF 
members, and could not be singled out as the group with the most culpability. During this 
incident, Tongan soldiers served as cheap alternatives to standard RAF guards, and a convenient 
target for media blame. Stereotypes of Pacific Islander men as fierce warriors and lazy natives 
worked together to mask the true failures behind the attack. In reality the assault was possible 
due to the high-level management decisions made by U.S. generals, not by Tongan soldiers.38  
In 2014, NATO withdrew from Afghanistan without having completely defeated the 
Taliban. It was also in 2014 that the last contingent of Tongan soldiers returned from duty. In 
May of 2014, over one hundred Tongan soldiers received Afghanistan Operational Service 
medals for their work at Camp Bastion. Tonga’s involvement in Afghanistan had lasting 
economic and political impacts. The U.S. State Partnership Program created a link between the 
Nevada National Guard and Tonga. The Tongan Military and the Nevada National Guard were 
paired together, because the U.S. government believed that the two shared common issues such 
as population isolation due to Nevada’s mountains and deserts and Tonga’s many dispersed 
islands and two places’ limited economies. The partnership arranged for the two militaries to 
have between 4 and 6 exchanges a year so that the militaries could provide pertinent information 
to one another and participate in training exercises.39 The general of the Nevada National Guard 
at the time of the signing, General Burks, said of the partnership: “As one of the anchor tenants 
in the Oceania region, Tonga can inform us on matters of military significance as we shift our 
emphasis to the Pacific theater…This partnership will create a shared sense of responsibility as 
we work together on security issues, humanitarian assistance and domestic response goals.”40 
Burk’s statement acknowledges the U.S.’s intentions to continue militarizing the Pacific. As 
described earlier, the logic of militarization is rooted in the notion that wars are fought from an 
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ideological vantage point and that the solution to security dilemmas is hegemony or at least 
control of “vital systems.”41 By investing in Pacific militaries, the U.S. is attempting to broaden 
and strengthen its influence in the Pacific and globally. In addition to the partnership, the U.S. 
also continues to provide Tonga with Foreign Military Financing funds and International 
Military Education and Training programs.42  
In an interview with the Pasifka Director at Massey University, Malakai Koloamatangi, 
Don Wiseman of Radio New Zealand questioned Koloamatangi on Tonga’s motives for 
deployment to Afghanistan:  
Malakai I Kololamatangi: Yes, of course, there were several objectives that directed 
employment in the first place, and perhaps beginning in the two world wars Tonga has 
always tried to play its part. Not only in regional affairs but also, of course, 
internationally. 
Don Wisemen: This was more about the government making some money though wasn't 
it? 
MK: That's right, yes. But in the guise of being a good international citizen, but Tonga 
has tried to do that and of course it's gotten revenue in the process and training for the 
military, and of course the question becomes: what do you do with a standing army that 
has seen action overseas and that is used to being in warring areas? So, what do you do 
with a large standing army in peace time?43 
By Koloamatangi’s first answer, it is apparent that Tongan soldiers’ military service in 
Afghanistan is connected to Tongan participation in WWI and WWII. Koloamatangi goes on to 
predict that the Tongan military will only increase in size and continue to receive aid for 
participating in foreign campaigns despite the current and continuing peace in Tonga. So far, 
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Tonga also participated in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Unlike the Afghan War, which was 
prompted by direct assaults on the U.S., the Iraq War was fueled by the global panic against 
“terrorism” following the 9/11 attacks and the erroneous belief that Iraq possessed and 
manufactured “weapons of mass destruction.” Despite the panic, unlike in the Afghan War, the 
U.S. did not receive UN approval and support for the invasion of Iraq. In light of the UN’s 
disapproval of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. compiled what it termed a “coalition of the 
willing.”44 The U.S. was able to garner international support based on the claim that Iraq was in 
possession of “weapons of mass destruction.” This conclusion was made despite the fact that the 
U.S. intelligence agencies had no physical evidence or reliable human intelligence sources that 
could prove the existence of chemical or nuclear weapons in Iraq.45 By 2004, only a year after 
the war began, numerous sources regarding the existence of biochemical weapons were found to 
have been fabricated, and no “weapons of mass destruction” were ever uncovered.46 Beyond the 
concern that Iraq might possess “weapons of mass destruction,” the U.S. also argued that the 
Saddam Hussein regime could support and supply “terrorist” networks thus posing a “security 
dilemma.”47 The U.S. characterized the Iraq War as a justifiable “pre-emptive strike.”  
Furthermore, 9/11 created a “policy window” due to the pervasive panic; policies that the 
U.S. government had wanted to pass for a longtime could now be sanctioned by Congress and 
implemented.48 Suddenly, toppling the reign of Saddam Hussein regime became a political 
possibility. Dismantling the regime had been considered since the Gulf War, and now that the 
political climate would allow military intervention, the U.S. government saw it as an opportunity 
to create more democracy in the Middle East. The U.S. hoped that more democracy would lead 
to more stability and less “terrorist” activity, and more broadly they saw it as an opportunity to 
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create governments that were favorable to U.S. interests.49 At least one of the primary motives 
behind the invasion of Iraq was to begin a state-building project designed to create a Middle East 
more amenable to U.S. desires. By compiling an international force through the “coalition of the 
willing” the U.S. also attempted to assuage accusations of colonialism and imperialism.50 
However the state building goals of both the Iraq War and the Afghan War are unmistakable and 
cannot be separated from analyses of U.S. imperialism. 
On the 20th of March 2003 “Operation Iraqi Freedom” commenced; although the U.S. 
government claims between 20 and 50 countries formally supported U.S. actions, in reality only 
the U.S., UK, Australia, and Poland sent ground troops in the first attack, and Spain and Italy 
joined later. By May, President Bush decided to declare the end of “major combat missions” and 
commenced the implementation of Phase IV of OIF, which was focused on state building.51 By 
October, the UN passed Security Council Resolution 1511 which legitimized creating and 
supporting a multinational security force in Iraq. This passage inspired broader international 
support and participation for the U.S. war effort.52 U.S. and international forces were able to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein’s government relatively swiftly, but U.S. strategy for the 
reconstruction of Iraq was ill conceived and misguided, as imperial projects tend to be. The 
chaos that ensued, following the destruction of Saddam and the Ba’ath Party’s regime, fomented 
anti-American sentiment within Iraq and served to strengthen terrorist organizations. Therefore, 
from 2004-2011, the U.S. and the gradually waning Coalition Forces fought against ever-
emergent post-Saddam insurgencies. 
Tonga was an original member of the Coalition of the Willing, and in 2004 Tonga sent its 
first contingent to Iraq to support the US I Marine Expeditionary Force in Al Anbar Province as 
security at Camp Blue Diamond.53 This was Tonga’s first deployment as an independent country 
with an independent military outside of the Pacific. Interestingly, Tonga sent troops to Iraq 
before Afghanistan, even though the war in Afghanistan began earlier and had UN support. The 
New Zealand Herald quoted then Prime Minister Prince ‘Ulukalala Lavaka Ata saying “We 
remember when the United States came to defend Tonga and the region during the Second 
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World War…but Tonga’s contribution to the effort to bring peace and stability to Iraq is only 
relative to what we can afford.”54 Interestingly enough, despite Tonga’s small size and limited 
resources, the kingdom sent only fifty soldiers fewer than New Zealand, and stayed longer.55  
Although Lavaka did not mention profit in his reasoning for Tonga’s participation in Iraq, 
government officials did cite jobs as a reason for deploying to Afghanistan. The British invested 
2.6million pounds in the deployment of Tongans to Afghanistan, which included stipends, 
uniforms, and equipment.56 Therefore, one can infer that there was a financial component to 
Tonga’s decision to join the Coalition Forces in Iraq. 
Tonga’s second deployment to Iraq was in 2008, which sent 55 Tongan Royal Marines to 
provide security for the Coalition Forces at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad.57 Unlike Camp Bastion, 
Tongans performed their security duties without incident, and received praise from the U.S. and 
the international community for their commitment to supporting the U.S. despite Tonga’s small 
size and limited resources. By 2009, all Tongan troops had left Iraq, and shortly afterwards 
Tonga began their participation in the Afghan War. The U.S. never fulfilled its goal of gaining 
complete control in Iraq and establishing a fully functioning democratic government. The last 
combat operation ended in 2010, Operation Iraqi Freedom was officially ended in 2011, and now 
only a few U.S. forces remain in Iraq and operate a training mission.58  
As aforementioned, the goals of the Iraq and Afghan War had state building at their 
cores. This is why the missions failed and why the wars lasted so long, because as quoted from 
A.J. Coates earlier, “It is precisely the ‘altruistic’ pursuit of warfare that generates militarism and 
leads to the systematic undermining of every limit placed upon war.”59 The ideology behind the 
Iraq and Afghanistan Wars went far beyond any practical goals and sought to establish 
completely new governments. As a state-building and essentially imperial project, there was no 
definitive end point, and so more and more resources were poured into the cause. This is how 
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militarism breeds militarization, and how Tonga is becoming increasingly enmeshed in the 
global military industrial complex.  
While the TDS assisted the U.S. in its state building goals, Tonga’s engagements in these 
military campaigns also served to foster foreign state building in Tonga. The U.S., Australia, and 
the UK’s ardent support of the Tongan military in training and arming soldiers reflect the 
arguments of Wendt and Barnett. By funding Tonga’s military, the U.S., UK, and Australia have 
significant influence on Tonga’s foreign policy, and have informally limited the extent to which 
Tonga is militarily independent. Radio New Zealand reported that in 2006 alone, as a response to 
Tongan support of the U.S. military effort, the U.S. gave Tonga at least one million dollars’ 
worth of weapons and equipment.  
Dependent states are more responsive to donor state interests than their own citizenry. 
Public opinion in Tonga concerning their involvement in the Middle East was lukewarm at best, 
and some were even openly opposed to the decision. Now Prime Minister, Akilisi Pohiva, was 
quoted as saying “Tonga doesn’t want any foreign country or foreign power to interfere in our 
local, you know, domestic affairs. So the question is why should Tonga interfere in the Iraqi 
affairs?”60 Since the public seemed to have mixed feelings about Tonga’s involvement, there is 
reason to believe that the decision to join was made by government elites interested in pleasing 
donor states rather than being prompted by public support. Pohiva leads the Tongan Democracy 
Movement, a political faction that wants to democratize Tonga. The Democracy Movement’s 
disapproval of Tonga’s participation adds another layer of irony to Tonga’s engagement in OIF 
and OEF since Tonga was fighting to spread democracy when Tonga itself is a monarchy. 
 
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
 At the same time that Tonga Defense Services joined the U.S. and Coalition forces in 
Iraq, Tongan soldiers also joined the Australian backed Regional Assistance Mission to the 
                                               





Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July of 2003.61 Tarcisius Kabutaulaka draws parallels between the 
Afghan War and RAMSI in his article, “Australian Foreign Policy and the RAMSI Intervention 
in the Solomon Islands.”  Kabutaulaka suggests that: “The goal, in both Afghanistan and 
Solomon Islands, was to turn these countries not into Jeffersonian democracies, but into at least 
quasi-functioning states where roads, bridges, and water supplies would be restored, violent 
conflicts and law-and-order problems ended, and an institutional climate established to ensure 
that terrorists did not use failed states venue for launching attacks on western countries.”62 This 
goal was adopted by Australia in the post 9/11 fervor about the dangers of “failed states” as 
fertile ground for terrorist organizations.  
 Although the Solomon Islands gained independence in 1978, the legacies of British 
colonialism continued; development was concentrated on Guadalcanal despite higher 
populations on other islands and preferential treatment was given to massive multinational 
corporations who in turn caused land alienation. The nascent government quickly accumulated 
debt while simultaneously providing tax breaks for predatory corporations. In addition to the 
country’s financial woes, there was rampant government corruption. Furthermore, the 
concentration of development in Honiara attracted many internal migrants, which was then 
compounded by Bougainville immigrants. The government’s refusal to respond to Guadalcanal 
residents’ concerns over migration and the increasing economic inequities throughout the 
country resulted in the Guadalcanal Crisis.63  
 In the mid 1990s, frustration was already brewing among a group of Guadalcanal men 
over the increased settlement of outside islanders in Honiara, particularly Malaitans, and the 
government’s inactions concerning the country’s stagnating economy. In 1998 the group began 
attacking Malaitan settlements and demanding compensation for the usage of Honiara as the 
capital. The Guadalcanal combatants named themselves the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM); 
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tensions continued to rise and in response, Malaitans united to create the Malaitan Eagle Force 
(MEF). In 2000, the MEF and members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police ousted Prime 
Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu.64 Most reports have emphasized the role of ethnicity in the 
Guadalcanal Crisis, but Kabutaulaka argues that simple ethnic divisions between people from 
Guadalcanal and Malaita do not exist and that both islands are home to a diverse array of 
language and ethnic groups; instead it was socio-economic disparities and political 
disagreements, which led to the violence. The Solomon government requested Australian and 
New Zealand assistance multiple times, but it was not until 2003 that international forces 
involved themselves.65 Australia had initially rejected the requests due to fears that their 
participation would inspire criticisms and accusations of imperialism throughout the Pacific, and 
because there was no public support in Australia to justify such action. However, after the 9/11 
attacks and Australia’s support of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, the nation finally agreed to 
intervene in the worsening violence in the Solomons, but only through partnership with the 
Pacific Islands Forum. 
 The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is a multinational organization that was founded in 1971 
and consists of 18-member states including Tonga. In October of 2001, PIF members signed the 
Biketawa Declaration, which affirmed their commitments to regional peace and security and 
“recognized the need in time of crisis or in response to member’s request for assistance for action 
to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended 
family.”66 This declaration created the legal framework for Australia to organize RAMSI.  
 On July 24th 2003, Australia, the Solomon Islands, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga signed an agreement “concerning the operations and status of the 
police and armed forces and other personnel deployed to Solomon Islands to assist in the 
restoration of law and order and security.” The agreement decided a police peace-keeping 
mission was necessary “to restore law and order, supported as required by armed peace-keepers, 
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and a program of assistance to strengthen the justice system and restore the economy and basic 
services… [and] to assist the effective functioning of government, the restoration of confidence 
in law and order, and the economic recovery of Solomon Islands.”67 The agreement allowed for 
visiting contingents to exercise a great deal of power. They had the right to seize and destroy 
weapons they believed to be possessed illegally or with the intention to cause violence; they 
were not subject to Solomon Islands courts but remained under the jurisdiction of their own 
countries; and the leader of both the Participating Armed Forces and Participating Police Force 
[PPF] was always the most senior Australian member.   
 The excessive power allotted to the PPF inevitably resulted in conflict. In 2007 Tongan 
soldiers were accused of badly beating Malaitan youths after the two groups had a dispute over a 
break-in at a gas station.68 Additionally, in 2010 two Tongan police officers were accused of 
killing a Solomon Islander man, after being called to calm a bar fight. The Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force attempted to conduct a full investigation of the incident, but they were 
unable to interview the two officers. Prime Minister Feleti Sevele stated that there was no need 
for an investigation since the soldiers “were only acting under the rules of engagement.”69 
Tongans were not only participants to RAMSI, but they were complicit in undermining Solomon 
authority.   
The three pronged approach of RAMSI consisted of “commencement,” i.e., quelling 
violence, disarming the public, and enforcing law and order. “Consolidation” which focused on 
governmental reform was the second approach. The third, “sustainability and self-reliance” 
addressed economic and social reform.70 The first goal of RAMSI was to disarm militias and the 
                                               
67 “Agreement Between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and  
Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and  
Order and Security,” opened for signature 24 July, 2003, Treaty Series: Australian Treaty  
Series (2003) ATS 17, www.aphref.aph.gov.au_house_committee_jsct_september2003  
_treaties_sitext.pdf. 
68 “Tongan Soldiers in Alleged Brawl with Drunk Solomon Islands Youths,” Radio New 
Zealand, November 1, 2017, https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-
news/173665/tongan-soldiers-in-alleged-brawl-with-drunk-solomon-islands-youths. 
69 “Tonga’s PM Comments on Soldiers,” Solomon Times Online, September 2, 2010, 
http://www.solomontimes.com/news/tongas-pm-comments-on-soldiers/5509. 
70 Glenn Russell, Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 23. 
 95 
public; therefore, the Participating Police Force strictly implemented anti-gun regulations. 
Individuals could face prison time or massive fines if found to possess a weapon.71 RAMSI 
instituted a gun amnesty program whereby civilians had to turn-in their firearms to RAMSI 
officials who would destroy the weapons in front of them; more than 3,700 were confiscated in 
this manner.72 The next step in the “commencement” phase was the surrender of militia leaders 
including the leader of the Guadalcanal Liberation Front, Harold Keke. The final stage of 
RAMSI, supporting state institutions and the economy, would take until 2017, and it is debatable 
whether or not RAMSI truly met these goals.  
The greatest challenge RAMSI faced was in supporting the RSIPF (Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force.) The RSIPF was predominately made of Malaitans, which proved 
problematic during the Crisis since they were not able to act without bias, and even helped the 
MEF oust PM Ulufa’alu.73 Between 2003-2013 there was a 62% turnover in the RSIPF, resulting 
in a loss of leadership. Public opinion of the RSIPF has also been damaged. The PPF working as 
a parallel institution with seemingly more power resulted in the widespread “perception that the 
RSIPF was less efficient, less competent and less trustworthy than the PPF officers.”74 
Reforming the RSIPF remained the central focus of RAMSI until its conclusion in July of 2017.  
The long-term impacts remain to be seen, but most agree that RAMSI effectively mitigated the 
violence and tensions that were escalating in 2003. However, RAMSI has not escaped critiques 
of creating dependency on Australia and failing to address the socio-economic issues that created 
the tensions in the first place. Australia’s approach to stabilizing the Solomons is aligned with 
the assertions of Max Weber, that the state legitimizes itself by having sole control of violence. 
Therefore, RAMSI’s primary goal was to reform and fortify the RSIPF rather than to address the 
social needs of disgruntled and frustrated Solomon Islanders. In turn for its participation, Tonga 
received military support and training, plus the salaries received by soldiers contributed to 
Tonga’s remittance economy. By monetarily supporting Tonga’s defense programs, Australia is 
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fortifying the strength of the Tongan state in a way that conforms to Weberian notions of 
legitimizing power via enforcing the state’s sole control of violence. This militarized relationship 
between Tonga and Australia causes Tonga to be increasingly, monetarily, politically, and 
militarily dependent on Australia and ultimately makes Tonga more amenable to Australian 
power in the Pacific.  
Although the Solomon Islands’ government did request help from Australia, the state 
building aspect of RAMSI’s goals is concerning. Kabutaulaka says, “the “failed state” discourse, 
and the parallel negative representation of the region, are not simply descriptions of actual 
situations—not neutral representations of realities—but are in addition a crucial justification for 
outside intervention and for Canberra’s leadership.”75 By representing the Solomon Islands as a 
“failed state” in desperate need of Australian rehabilitation, Australia not only served to justify 
its involvement, but encouraged state building policies that fostered dependence on Australia, 
giving the country even more influence in the Solomons than before they intervened. Under 
RAMSI, Australians assumed positions of power throughout the Solomon government especially 
in the financial sector, thereby giving Australia significant political power over the direction of 
the Solomons’ economy. Although RAMSI was a collaborative effort, only Australia gained 
political influence in the Solomons, not Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, or any of the other PIF states that 
participated. If anything, the collaborative effort instead strengthened Australia’s influence in 
participating states, rather than participating states gaining more influence in the region. 
Furthermore, RAMSI was initially expected to last a few months, but instead lasted from 
2003-2017 and cost Australia around $2.6billion.76 The extended length of RAMSI and the sheer 
amount of money Australia willingly contributed to the project demonstrates the commitment 
Australia has to increasing its influence throughout the region. Tonga does not seem to be wary 
of this, but rather very supportive, by offering military services to a variety of Australian 
projects. As China continues to become a major donor to Tonga, it’s interesting to consider how 
this might impact Tonga’s relationship with Australia. So far Tonga has not served in any 
Chinese military campaigns, but it is reasonable to believe that this might change in the near 
future.  
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2006 Democracy 
 As Tonga deployed soldiers to enforce law and order and to spread democracy, the 
kingdom itself was facing a growing movement demanding democratic change. The death of 
Tupou IV in September 2006 was followed by violent riots in Nuku’alofa. He reigned during the 
transition years of Tonga as a British protectorate to becoming a fully independent state, and part 
of his strategy was to develop Tonga’s economy as quickly as possible without democratizing. 
Prior to 2006, Parliament consisted of 9 elected representatives and 9 nobles elected by the 
nobles; legislation was generated from the King and the Privy Council, of which the King 
selected the members. In order for legislation to pass, it had to have majority approval of the 
Parliament, unanimous approval of the cabinet and the king’s consent.77 King Tupou IV’s refusal 
to implement constitutional reform during his reign guaranteed that his death would bring 
demands of radical change.78  
 A desire for political reform had been growing in Tonga since the 1990s, and with the 
King’s ailing health, the public held more and more demonstrations calling for better 
representation in the government. Due to the growing hostility of the public towards the Tongan 
government, in early 2006 Prime Minister Prince Lavaka stepped down and Dr. Feleti Sevele, 
the first commoner to hold the office, took his place.79 Although his standing as a commoner 
made the public hopeful, Sevele was a known close associate of the crown prince, and he was 
appointed by the king and not elected. Sevele began reforms quickly, beginning with plans to 
nationalize electricity and reorganizing the cabinet, but the changes did not satisfy the public 
since Sevele did not transfer power away from the executive branch. In response to the 
intensifying protests, the government finally put forth a proposal to adopt a Westminster style of 
governance in October of 2006; however, the Parliament decided that changes to the proposal 
would not be renegotiated nor taken into effect until 2007.80  
The proposal was seen as too little too late. While heated debates raged inside Parliament, 
protesters in support of reform continued to gather outside of the Parliament building. On 
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November 16th 2006, the Assembly demanded that the protesters disburse before they would 
vote on the constitutional changes. This incited fury among the demonstrators, and the riot 
began.81 After supporting Australia in the Solomons and the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, it 
seemed as though Tonga was teetering on the verge of becoming a “failed state” itself. Those 
who participated in the destruction and violence focused on businesses owned by members of the 
royal family, Parliament, and Chinese residents. Ultimately Nuku’alofa was badly damaged by 
looters and arsonists, and eight individuals died in the chaos.82 Following the riots, Tonga 
declared a state of emergency and enacted the Emergency Powers Regulation, which allowed the 
Tonga Police and Tongan Defence Services to use force if necessary against persons suspected 
of causing violence and allowed them to search any person or vehicle without warrant; this lasted 
until February 2011.83  Additionally, contingents from New Zealand and Australia were called in 
to control the riots.84 
 By December, 400 people were charged in relationship to the destruction caused during 
the riots. Two reports accused the Tongan Defence Services of torture and maltreatment of 
detainees. One report was made by the National Centre for Women and Children and one by the 
Community Para-legal Taskforce on Human Rights. In response, the Tongan government argued 
that the report made by the National Centre for Women and Children was not credible and 
expressed skepticism concerning the report by the Para-legal Taskforce on Human Rights. The 
report made by the Para-legal Taskforce alleged that 41% of individuals who were arrested for 
participating in the riots experienced physical abuse, especially facial injuries and tooth loss.85 
The government offered two press releases in which they denied allegations of torture and abuse; 
still, the government insisted that their actions were legal and that “the Tonga Defence Services 
will use force as necessary (including force causing death) as stated in the TDS Act 1992 to 
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restore and maintain Law and Order in the Kingdom.”86 Fortunately, no deaths caused by the 
TDS were reported, but no officials were penalized for the alleged abuse either.  
Finally, in 2010 the Tongan government fully implemented the changes laid out in 2006. 
Now there are 17 elected Public Representatives, 9 Noble Representatives (elected by nobles,) 
and the Prime Minister appoints cabinet members.87 The king is still head of state, retains veto 
power, and is commander and chief. While the riots did not serve to bolster the democratic 
political agenda, the role of the TDS in quelling the riots raises the question of who the Tongan 
military serves, and who the “enemy” is.  This question was further agitated when in 2013, 
parliament renamed the Tongan Defence Services to His Majesty’s Armed Forces. Although the 
name change received a majority vote in parliament, many of the PRs expressed concern that the 
name change connoted that the Tongan military’s allegiance is to the king rather than to the 
Tongan public.88 While these concerns were dismissed by the majority of Parliament, the 
question as to who the Tongan military is designed to serve is valid. Given the military’s 
reputation of fighting for foreign agendas and using force against the Tongan public, it stands to 
reason that His Majesty’s Armed Forces’ primary goal is to serve the interests of the Tongan 
political elite and donor states. 
 
China 
 Part of the reason that Chinese aid is becoming dominant in Tonga, and elsewhere in the 
world, is that China does not require beneficiary countries to comply with Chinese standards of 
governance; whereas aid from the U.S., UK, and Australia are conditional and usually requires 
that a country adhere to a set of requirements, such as having a democratic government in order 
to receive funds.89 After the 2006 riots, the US and Australia refused to donate considerably to 
rebuilding the capital on the grounds that Tonga was not democratic enough. China on the other 
hand, contributed $49 million in soft loans and a $10 million-dollar grant in order to rebuild 
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Nuku’alofa. This fact is one that Tongans have held on to since, and are generally glad that 
China contributed so generously, even though the Chinese community was targeted during the 
riots.90  
Dependency on foreign aid poses three primary issues. Aid and loans to Tonga’s 
government directly benefits the ruling elite who do not always make decisions that benefit the 
majority of the population.91 Secondly, it makes Tonga more amenable to foreign desires and 
more susceptible to foreign interreference. Lastly, a major concern in terms of China’s monetary 
support is that their funds are given as soft loans and not outright aid. Therefore, China has the 
right to demand repayment on the loans, and in Tonga’s case, it is unlikely that the country 
would be able to repay their staggering debts to China. A common concern that I frequently hear 
among Tongans is that China could ask for land as payment for debts. This is especially 
troubling for Tongans, since under the current system the sale of land is illegal, and no foreigner 
can own land. This principle has been central to the Tongan state since its inception under 
Tāufa‘āhau.  
Australia is still the largest donor to the Pacific, but in Tonga, China is a very close 
second. The Lowy Institute estimates that between 2006-2012 China has given $130.49 million 
USD to Tonga and Australia has given $157.74 million USD.92 Australia’s anxiety over China’s 
growing influence in the Pacific is no secret. In 2017 Australia released its “Foreign Policy 
White Paper,” a ten-year projection for the country’s foreign policy goals. In the introduction, 
Australia acknowledges China: “In the Indo–Pacific, the economic growth that has come with 
globalisation is in turn changing power balances. The United States has been the dominant power 
in our region throughout Australia’s post-Second World War history. Today, China is 
challenging America’s position.”93 The white paper’s concerns echo much of Davis’ analyses 
which argue that China is both the U.S.’s largest trading partner and the U.S.’s main competitor 
in global hegemony. He suggests that U.S. military posturing in the Pacific is an effort to protect 
                                               
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 172. 
92 Philippa Brant, “Chinese Aid in the Pacific, Lowy Institute for International Policy: Tonga 
Snapshop,” February 2015, https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/. (Accessed September 7, 
2018). 
93 Australian Government, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” https://www.fpwhitepaper 
.gov.au/ foreign-policy-white-paper/overview. 
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“vital systems” of capitalist trade and protection rather than a means of “defending territory and 
perpetuating the state against opposition.”94 Having a strong military presence in the region 
allows the U.S. to dictate trade as well as defend “the system’ from all threats, environmental, 
military, and political.”95 The further Tonga becomes incorporated into the U.S. and Australian 
militaries, the more complicated Tonga’s relationship with China becomes.  
 
Conclusion 
As previously discussed, Tonga’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan was not due to 
widespread public support, but rather a desire to create jobs, and to appease donor states. The 
same might be said about RAMSI; Tonga did profit from participating in the mission and has 
continued providing labor to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions led by Australia since. 
Lastly, the Tongan military’s role in stopping the 2006 Riots generated great criticism from the 
public, and inspired fear among citizens about the willingness of Tongan soldiers to use force 
against Tongan citizens. All of these engagements suggest that Tonga is being more deeply 
incorporated into the global MIC, and that Tonga is in fact part of the militarized Pacific even 
though it has never been formally colonized. By acknowledging and understanding how Tonga 
has become part of the global MIC, it becomes possible to draw stronger lines of solidarity with 
other island soldiers who experience the harsh reality of warfare for the benefit of wealthier 
nations. David Lipset eloquently summarizes the relationship between the U.S. and the Federated 
States of Micronesia in his review of the film Island Soldier (2017): “it is an abusive 
relationship, where the stakes are always high and there is only one victor.”96 Island Soldier by 
Nathan Fitch is a documentary on Kosraen soldiers who fight in the U.S. military; it explores the 
soldiers’ motivations for joining, and the consequences the soldiers and their families experience 
due to their service.97 Tonga and Tongans are not alone in their experience and participation in 
                                               
94 Davis, Empires’ Edge, 14. 
95 Ibid., 15. 
96 David Lipset, “Review of Island Soldier,” The Contemporary Pacific 31, no. 1, (2019): 248-
261, 249. 
97Nathan Fitch, Bryan Chang, and Fivel Rothberg, Island Soldier, documentary film, Passion 
River Films, 2017. 
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Pacific militarization, but rather Tonga is a part of an ever-growing network of indigenous 
soldiers fighting imperial battles for settler states.98  
 The military provides Tongans with opportunities to make decent wages and to move-up 
socioeconomically in a country where economic mobility is greatly limited, but if Tonga 
becomes reliant on defense aid from foreign nations, this poses a threat to Tongan sovereignty. 
From the theoretical perspective, the definition of sovereignty is having complete control of both 
international and domestic affairs. However, if Tonga is beholden to donor states, especially 
militarily, this infringes upon Tonga’s ability to make foreign policy decisions based on what is 
best for its citizens rather than what will be profitable. Furthermore, if for some reason Tonga’s 
donor states were to become hostile towards one another, this could potentially leave the 
kingdom in a compromising position. For example, if Australia and China were to become 
openly hostile, Tonga would be caught in the middle. This would pose a serious security threat to 
the kingdom, since either country could view Tonga as a potential threat due to the amount of aid 
each country has contributed to Tonga. 
In Teaiwa’s conclusion of "The Articulated Limb" (2017), she asks “Is disarticulation 
from the MIC possible?”99 Her answer is inconclusive, but hopeful; she points to growing 
political movements led by women in the Pacific that are calling for an end to war and violence. 
One of the most difficult aspects of the MIC is that it is fueled economically; making a living is 
literally a matter of life and death for those who join the military. For Tonga to divest from its 
military and refuse to participate in foreign military campaigns would mean forfeiting millions of 
dollars in aid money and the loss of jobs in an already struggling economy. However, refraining 
from foreign military engagements would better preserve Tonga’s sovereignty and could 
possibly limit the extent to which the state relies on military power to assert its legitimacy. 
Ideally, the Tongan military would divest from foreign military campaigns and refuse militarized 
aid. However, if Tonga continues to grow its military, and continues to provide labor to foreign 
militaries, then it should focus on engagements that are relevant to the security of the Pacific and 
that have been approved by the Pacific Islands Forum. These would be preferable to campaigns 
that have little to no regional significance and lack PIF or UN approval.  Confining Tonga’s 
involvement to issues that are immediately relevant to the Pacific creates a limit to how much 
                                               
98 Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” 388. 
99 Teaiwa, “The Articulated Limb,” 114. 
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Tonga will militarize. If Tonga remains open to any conflict that their donor states are a part of, 
the potential for the militarization is limitless and could eventually jeopardize Tonga’s 








With Our Backs to the Future 
 
I remember the first time I saw Tongatapu. As the plane neared, I was in awe of the small 
rectangle of concrete in a sea of tropical trees. My angsty and doubtful adolescent mind thought, 
“there is no way we’ll ever make it,” and yet we did and do every time. When you step off the 
plane, the air is heavy with humidity and the smell of sweet flowers from the rows of families 
with gifts for their returning kin.  Earlier in my thesis, I asked if the geographies of militarization 
could ever be remapped into generative spaces and alliances.1 Now when I fly into Fu’amotu 
Airport, the original site of the WWII airbase, I think of this airport is an example of reclaiming 
geographies of violence. The Fu’amotu airport is now a place of excitement and joy for Tongans 
who are coming home to their families; it is also a gateway for new opportunities for those who 
are leaving home to explore new places and to look for a better way to support their families. It is 
a space for those of us who have been widely dispersed across the diaspora to return to the 
homes of our ancestors. It is within these complicated and layered spaces where I have begged 
the questions about the purpose and place of the Tongan military.  
This thesis has created a timeline of the changing attitudes in Tonga, concerning warfare 
on the global stage, making it easier to analyze the true purpose of the Tongan military. To 
begin, I shared my positionality. I have a very particular lens as a Tongan woman living and 
studying in the U.S., and the insights and analyses I’ve constructed in this thesis by no means 
represent the opinion of the majority of Tongans living in Tonga. Instead, my ideas reflect a 
particular theoretical genealogy that has shaped the critiques on militarization of the Pacific. The 
foremost influential academic on my analysis of the Tongan military has no doubt been Teresia 
Teaiwa, who I acknowledge in my introduction and continued to refer to throughout my thesis.  
 In chapter one, I explored 19th century Tongan sovereignty – constructed under 
Tāufa‘āhau – as predicated upon European standards of governance and acceptance. I suggested 
that Tāufa‘āhau’s rise to power differed significantly from his predecessors since he focused on 
                                               
1 Ideas based on discussions with coordinators and contributors to the “(Re)Mapping Indigenous 
and Settler Geographies in the Pacific Conference,” October 19-20,2018, at the University of 
Hawai‘i at Mānoa. In conversation with PhD Candidate in American Studies at the University of 
Hawai’i at Mānoa, Katherine Achacoso and M.A. Candidate in Pacific Island Studies at the 
University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa Patricia Tupou 
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creating a nation-state. This creation required that he abolish some of the most important and 
ancient social, political, and cultural, power structures that governed Tonga for centuries. 
Another transformative event in the Kingdom’s early history was the establishment of Tonga as a 
protectorate. Tonga’s protectorate status deeply damaged the sovereignty that Tāufa‘āhau and 
Tupou II worked so ardently to protect. In chapter two, I explain that due to the strained 
relationship between Britain and Tonga, Tonga’s response to WWI was limited. Only those who 
felt passionately about the cause of the war joined, and only those with the means contributed to 
the war effort. This response starkly contrasted with Tonga’s response to WWII, in which Queen 
Sālote established the Tonga Defence Force in order to serve Allied forces.  
In chapter three, I looked at Tonga’s involvement in WWII. The whole of Tongan society 
was mobilized in support of the effort. In part, Tongan enthusiasm was derived from anxieties 
over a Japanese or German attack on Tonga, but much of the excitement was also out of support 
for Queen Sālote and for Britain. While I highlighted the problematic aspects of Tonga’s 
participation, I also drew attention to the generous fundraising efforts Tongans created and the 
braveness of Tongan soldiers who fought alongside Fijians and Solomon Islanders in the 
Solomon and Bougainville campaigns. While I acknowledge the importance of these sacrifices, I 
also asked: given that the Tongan military was not constructed to protect Tonga against foreign 
enemies, but rather to support Britain, is the Tongan military a proxy for UK, US, and AU 
interests? If the control of violence via the military and police is a central tenet of the modern 
nation state, then is Tonga’s sovereignty affected by contracting out their military to foreign 
nations? I assert that these questions and critiques should not belie the multiple personal and 
patriotic motivations behind Tongan participation in WWI or WWII. Understanding and 
critiquing the mechanism of imperialism and militarization does not need to be understood as 
conflicting with the agency of islander soldiers. Rather, both agency and outside imperial 
influences operate within a complex system of nation-states, citizenship, policing, and violence 
that continues to function across the world and into the present.   
Lastly, chapter four looks to more contemporary engagements of Tonga’s military. I 
discuss Tonga’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan as a consequence of Tonga’s desire to 
create jobs and appease donor states as opposed to responding to public support. I argue that the 
same can be said for RAMSI – given that Tonga profited from their participation in the mission 
and has continued to provide labor to Australia’s peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Such 
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close relationships with volatile and powerful nations could turn Tonga into a de facto U.S. or 
Australian military base, placing Tonga in a politically haphazard space between bigger and 
wealthier nations. Ultimately, I argue that military dependence leaves Tonga subject to other 
nation’s destructive military industrial complexes. Further, Tonga’s partnership and growing 
dependence on military powers is a danger to Tongan sovereignty as well as global peace. I also 
drew attention to the anxieties expressed by Tongan citizens, about the military’s allegiance to 
the public or to the King. These anxieties were stoked by the harsh response of the military to the 
2006 riots as well as the King changing the name of the military to His Majesty’s Armed Forces.  
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, ideally Tonga would cease all military 
engagements, and focus on economic development that directly benefits Tongans without having 
to participate in foreign military campaigns. However, if the Tongan governments continues to 
see Tongan collaboration with foreign militaries as necessary, the HMAF should only 
participated in military campaigns that are directly relevant to the safety of Tonga or for the 
broader Pacific. While the UN and PIF are not perfect entities, having their approval of the 















Fig. 5  Photo taken by author, June 2018. Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui.  
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In closing, I’d like to reflect on the ways Tongan spaces have transformed overtime. 
While this thesis’ timeframe has spanned over 100 years and has raised issues that I believe to be 
deeply serious and threatening, in the scope of Tonga, the events delineated in this thesis are 
mere flashes in the deep ocean of Tongan history. Although it may seem that “disarticulation” 
from the global MIC is a distant aspiration, it’s important to remember Tonga’s history of 
resilience and the persistence of Tongan and culture through the millennia and in the face of 
imperialism and diaspora. Most likely the greatest symbol of Tongan pride and culture is the 
Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui. When I last visited Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui, with my cousin Sateki, in the 
summer of 2018, I watched as a Tongan father hoisted his son onto the better footholds of the 
giant coral rock structure. The boy sat on top of the ancient megalith. Sateki teased me and told 
me to go join the little boy, boasting that he himself had climbed it many times before. The 
Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui was once the grand entrance to the fortress of the Tu‘i Tonga. The heavy 
and sacred mana of the Tu‘i Tonga would never have allowed small children to climb the gate to 
his fortress. Likewise, the US and NZ soldiers who climbed it in WWII would also have been 
unwelcome. However, sacred places change over time and so do the ways that we interact with 
such spaces. The Ha‘amonga ‘a Maui has seen the rise and fall of the Tongan empire, the growth 
of the Tongan kingdom, and the ebb and flow of imperialism. It has seen many changes in 
Tonga’s landscape and in the people of Tonga. It has felt the touch of those WWII palangi 
soldiers, and of countless others – tourists, Tongans, and non-Tongans alike. But the sun 
continues to rise directly above the trilithon, just as it was designed to do so, and it will continue 



















“Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa  
 and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and  
 Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and  
 Order and Security.” Opened for signature 24 July, 2003. Treaty Series: Australian  
 Treaty Series (2003) ATS 17. www.aphref.aph.gov.au_house_committee_jsct_  
 september2003_treaties_sitext.pdf. 
  
The Barrier Miner. “In the South Seas, The Taking of Samoa, Tonga’s Neutrality.” September 9,  
 1914.  
 
“‘Biketawa’ Declaration.” Opened for signature October, 2000. 31st Summit of the Pacific  
 Islands Forum Leaders, Kiribati. https://www.ramsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/  
 Biketawa-Declaration.pdf.  
 
The Catholic Press. “Breaking the Power of King Tapou II of Toga: A Dramatic Scene in an  
 Island Palace.” March 9, 1905.  
 
Daily Mercury. “Tonga: A Pacific Paradise.” January 7, 1942. Accessed November 12, 2018.  
 https://trove.nla.gov.au. 
 
“Exchange of Notes: Constituting an Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and  
 the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning  
 Defence Arrangements for the Kingdom of Tonga.” Opened for signature June 24, 1954.  
 Suva, Fiji.  
 
Faletau, Sateki. “Casualty Form-Active Service, 1917.” Archives New Zealand, Archway  
 Record. Accessed November 20, 2018. http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery 
 /DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE13981940. 
 
Faletau, Sateki. “New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Military History Sheet, 1916.” Archives  
 New Zealand, Archway Record. Accessed November 20, 2018. http://ndhadeliver  
 .natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE13981940. 
 
Fotu, David. “Medical Examination, 1918.” Archives New Zealand, Archway Record. Accessed  
 November 20, 2018. http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?  
 dps_pid=IE17265598. 
 
House of Commons Defence Committee. “Afghanistan- Camp Bastion Attack.” Thirteenth  





Kalgoorlie Miner. “Tonga and the War: Voluntary Defence Force.” February 5, 1941. Accessed  
 November 12, 2018. https://trove.nla.gov.au. 
 
 Pacific Islands Monthly: PIM. “How Long Will This Hitler War Last?” September 15, 1939.  
 Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1931-2000. https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-315282345  




Pacific Islands Monthly: PIM. “Roll of Honour-Section II.” November 16, 1945. Sydney: Pacific  
 Publications, 1931-2000. 
 
 Pacific Islands Monthly: PIM. “Tongan Receives US Decoration.” Pacific Islands Monthly:  
 PIM. March 20, 1944. Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1931-2000. http://nla.gov.au/nla.ob  
 J-314899430. 
 
 Pacific Islands Monthly: PIM. “What This New War May Mean to Residents in Pacific.”  
 December 15, 1941. Sydney: Pacific Publications, 1931-2000. 
  
“Second Supplement to The London Gazette.” September 9, 1914. Western Pacific archives.  
 MSS & Archives 2003/1-WHPC 50. Special Collections, University of Auckland  
 Libraries and Learning Services. 
 
Siousi Tupou II to G. B. Smith-Rewse, Esquire. July 26, 1917. Western Pacific archives. MSS &  
 Archives 2003/1-BCT 1/3. Special Collections, University of Auckland Libraries and  
 Learning Services. 
 
Siousi Tupou II to G.B. Smith-Rewse, Esquire. May 28, 1917. Western Pacific archives. MSS &  
 Archives 2003/1-BCT 1/3. Special Collections, University of Auckland Libraries and   
 Learning Services. 
 
Siousi Tupou II to G.B. Smith-Rewse, Esquire. November 10, 1916. British Consulate to Tonga.  
 Western Pacific Archives. MSS & Archives 2003/1-BCT 1/ 3. Special Collections,  
 University of Auckland Libraries and Learning Services. 
 
 “Supplement to The London Gazette.” February 17, 1944. Microfilm #36382, University of  
 Hawai’i at Mānoa. 
 
Taliuli, Sione. “Casualty Form-Active Service, 1918.” Archives New Zealand, Archway Record.  
 Accessed November 20, 2018. http://ndhadeliver.natlib.govt.nz/delivery/Delivery  
 ManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE10308730. 
 
Tonga Government Gazette. “Address of Her Majesty Queen Sālote Tubou at the Opening of the  
 Forty-First Session of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga at Nuku’alofa on the 26th Day  
 of June, 1941.” August 21, 1941.  
  
 110 
Tonga Government Gazette. “Address of Her Majesty Queen Sālote Tubou at the Opening of the  
 Forty-Second Session of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga at Nuku’alofa on the 29th  
 Day of June, 1942.” September 2, 1942.  
 
Tonga Government Gazette. “Address of Her Majesty Queen Sālote Tupou at the Opening of the  
 Forty-Third Session of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga at Nuku’alofa on the 24th Day  
 of June, 1943.” September 9, 1943.   
 
Tonga Government Gazette. “Awards.” May 16, 1944. 
 
Tongan Government Gazette. “Fighter Plane.” April 10, 1941.  
 
Tonga Government Gazette. “The Honorable, The Speaker, Nuku.” September 9, 1943.  
 
Tonga Government Gazette. “Tupou II’s Opening Address.” January 15, 1915. 
 
“The Treaty of Friendship Between Great Britain and Tonga.” Opened for signature 29  
 November, 1879. Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives, 1880 Session  
 I, A-07. https://atojs.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/atojs?a=d&d=AJHR1880-I.2.1.2.9. 
  
U.N. Security Council, 2001. “Resolution 1368 [Threats to International Peace and Security  
 Caused by Terrorist Acts].” September 12, 2001. In Resolutions and Decisions of the  
 Security Council 2001 (S/RES/1368) .https://undocs.org/S/RES/1368(2001). 
 
 
Secondary Sources  
 
Aumua, Shaun. “Tongan Defence Force WWII.” The Volunteers 30, no.1 (September 2010):  
 19-35.  
 
Australian Government. “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.” Accessed September 7, 2018.  
 https://www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policy-white-paper/overview.  
 
Australian Government Department of Defence. “2017-18 Defence Portfolio Budget  
 Statements.” Budget Related Paper No. 1.4A. Accessed, 22 April 2017.  
 http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/17-18/2017-18_Defence_PBS_00_Complete.pdf. 
 
The Australian. “Tonga Sends Troops to Afghanistan to Create Jobs.” 28 July, 2010.  
 https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/tonga-sends-troops-to-afghanistan  
 -to-create-jobs/news-story. 
 
Banivanua-Mar, Tracey. Violence and Colonial Dialogue: The Australian-Pacific Indentured  
 Labor Trade. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006. 
 
Bennett, Judith A. Natives and Exotics. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009. ProQuest  
 Ebrary.  
 111 
 
Betts, Richard K. “Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD.”  
 Political Science Quarterly 122, No. 4 (Winter, 2007/2008): 585-606. 
 
Bevacqua, Michael Lujan. “The Exceptional Life and Death of a Chamorro Soldier.” In  
 Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific, edited by  
 Shigematsu, Setsu and Keith L. Camacho, 63-90. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
 Press, 2010.  
 
Brant, Philippa. “Chinese Aid in the Pacific, Lowy Institute for International Policy: Tonga  
 Snapshot.” February 2015. Accessed April 15, 2018. https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute  
 .org/. 
 
Campbell, Ian Christopher. "Across the Threshold: Regime Change and Uncertainty in Tonga  
 2005-2007." The Journal of Pacific History 43, no. 1 (2008): 95-109. 
 
Campbell, Ian Christopher. Island Kingdom: Tonga Ancient and Modern. Christchurch:  
 University of Canterbury Press, 1992. 
 
Campbell, Ian Christopher. "The Nettle Grasped." The Journal of Pacific History 47, no. 2  
 (2012): 211-25. 
  
Capie, David H. Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific. Wellington: Victoria  
 University Press in Association with the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust, 2003. 
 
Carney, Stephen and Center of Military History. Allied Participation in Operation Iraqi  
 Freedom. CMH Pub; 59-3-1. Washington, D.C.: United States Army, Center of Military  
 History, 2011. 
 
Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. “Taliban Attack Exploited Security Cutbacks.” The Washington Post,  
 April 20, 2013. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/taliban-attack- 
 exploi ted-security-cutbacks/2013/04/20/b22a0c18-a796-11e2-8302-3c7e0ea97057_  
 story.htm l?nore direct=on&utm_term=.1b15ba2711e4. 
 
Coates, A. J. The Ethics of War. New York: Manchester University Press, 1997. 
 
Davis, Sasha. Empires’ Edge: Militarization Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the  
 Pacific. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2015. 
 
Fitch, Nathan, Brian Chang and Fivel Rothberg. Island Soldier. Passion River Films, 2017. 
 
Fonua, Pesi. “Tonga Defence Services Renamed ‘His Majesty’s Armed Forces.” Pacific Islands  






Fournier, Dennis. “Nevada National Guard Joins Forces with Tonga in State Partnership  




Fraenkel, Jon, Joni Madraiwiwi and Henry Okole. The RAMSI Decade: A Review of the Regional  
 Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 2003-­‐‑2013. East-West Center, 2014.   




Fusitu’a, Esta Fulivai. “King George Tupou II and the Government of Tonga.” Master’s Thesis,  
 Australian National University, 1976. 
 
Grainger, Gareth.“Tonga and Australia Since World War II,” in Echoes of Pacific War,  
 edited by Deryck Scarr, Niel Gunson, and Jennifer Terrell. 64-75. Canberra: Target  
 Oceania, 1998. 
 
Gifford, Edward Winslow. Tongan Society. Honolulu: Bernice P. Bishop Museum, 1929. 
 
Gillespie, Oliver A and New Zealand Army Division. Story of the 34th; the Unofficial History of  
 a New Zealand Infantry Battalion with the Third Division in the Pacific. Wellington:  
 A.H. and A.W. Reed, 3rd. Histories Committee, 1947. 
 
Glenn, Russell W. Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional  
 Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Santa Monica: RAND, 2007. 
 
Gonzales, Vernadette. “Touring Military Masculinities.” In Militarized Currents:  
 Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific, edited by Setsu Shigematsu and 
Keith L. Camacho, 33-62. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010. 
 




The Guardian. “State of Emergency After Tongan Riots.” 17 November, 2006.  
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/nov/17/1. 
 
Hallenberg, Jan, Heidi Karlsson, Håkan Karlsson, and Yamis Papadopoulos. The Iraq War.  
 Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2005. 
  
Hamilton, Scott. The Stolen Island: Searching for Ata, Auckland: Bridget Williams Books, 2016. 
 
Hanlon, David L. Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory,  
 1944-1982. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998. 
 
 113 
Hau’ofa, Epeli. “Our Sea of Islands.” The Contemporary Pacific 6, no.1 (1994):148-161. 
 
 
Helu, Futa. “Changing Values and Changed Psychology.” In Echoes of Pacific War, edited by   
 Deryck Scarr, Niel Gunson, and Jennifer Terrell. 26-37. Canberra: Target Oceania, 1998. 
 
Hornabrook, Judith S. “New Zealand and the Tonga Defence Force.” Master’s Thesis, Victoria  
 University of Wellington, 1951. 
 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. “Australian Foreign Policy and the Ramsi Intervention in the Solomon  
 Islands.” The Contemporary Pacific 17, no. 2 (2005): 283-308. 
 
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. “Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis in  
 Solomon Islands.” State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper 01/1,  
 Canberra: ANU Department of Pacific Affairs, 2001. 
 
Koorey, Stephanie. "Australia and Solomon Islands: What next after 14 Years of Regional  
 Assistance?" Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 198 (2015): 49-57. 
 
Kwai, Anna Annie. Solomon Islanders in World War II: An Indigenous Perspective.  
Canberra: Australia National University Press, 2017. 
 
Langa‘oi, Palentina. “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the Kingdom of Tonga.” In China in  
Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific, edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A.  
Porter, 164-179. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010. 
 
Larsen, Colin R. Pacific Commandos: New Zealanders and Fijians in Action - A History of  
 Southern Independent Commando and First Commandos Fiji Guerillas. Wellington:  
 Reed, 1946. 
 
Latu, Kalino. “Tongans Remember Volunteers from the Islands Who Served in First World  
 War.” Kaniva Tonga News, March 23, 2018. https://kanivatonga.nz/2018/04/t  
 ongans-remember- volunteers-from-the-islands-who-served-in-first-world-war/ 
 
Latu, Viliami. “Tongan Post-Riot Emergency Powers Lifted After 50 Months.” Matangi Tonga,  
 February 17, 2011. https://matangitonga.to/2011/02/07/tongan-emergency-powers-lifted. 
 
Lātūkefu, Sione. Church and State in Tonga: The Wesleyan Methodist Missionaries and Political  
 Development, 1822-1875.  Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1974. 
 
Lavaka, Penelope A. “The Limits of Advice: Britain the and Kingdom of Tonga, 1900-1970.”  
 Doctoral Thesis, Australia National University, 1981. 
 
Liava‘a, Christine. Koe Kau Toʻa Naʻanau Poletau Valiant Volunteers: Soldiers from Tonga in  
 the Great War. Auckland: Polygraphia, 2011. 
 
 114 
Lipset, David. “Review of Island Soldier.” The Contemporary Pacific 31, no. 1 (2019):  
 248-261. 
 
Martin, John. Tonga Islands: William Mariner’s Account. Nukualofa: Vava‘u Press, 1991. 
 
Matangi Tonga. “Tongan Post-Riot Emergency Powers Lifted After 50 Months.” February 17,  
 2011.  
 
Moroney, Jennifer, Celeste Gventer, Stephanie Pezard, and Laurence Smallman. Lessons from  
 U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of Australia,  
 France, and the United Kingdom. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2011. 
 
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. “Rebuilding Tonga’s Military Bases.”  
 Accessed April 8, 2018. https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-  
 abroad/tonga/ rebuilding-tongas-military-bases/. 
 
 Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. “Allegations of Torture and Mistreatment.”  
 Accessed April 5, 2018. https://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad  
 /tonga/allegations-of-torture-and-mistreatment/.  
 
New Zealand Defense Force Te Ope Katua O Aotearoa. “Tongan Riots.” Accessed April 14,  
 2018. http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/previous-operations/tonga/default.htm.  
 
New Zealand Herald. “Tonga Sends 44 Troops to Help U.S. in Iraq.” 16 June, 2004.  
 https://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=3572680. 
 
New Zealand High Commission Tonga. “NZ Chief of Navy Visits Tonga.” Ministry of  
 Information and Communications, July 11, 2016. http://www.mic.gov.to/news-today/  
 press-releases/6145-nz-chief-of-navy-visits-tonga. 
 
NZ Army Ngati Tumatauenga. “Solomon Islands: 2003-2013.” Last modified March 18, 2015.  
 http://www.army.mil.nz/about-us/what-we-do/deployments/previous-deployments/  
 solomon+ islands/default.htm.  
 
Osorio, John Kamakawiwo‘ole. “Memorializing Pu’uloa and Remembering Pearl Harbor.” In 
Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific, edited by  
Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho, 3-14. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
Press, 2010. 
 
Priday, H. E. L. The War from Coconut Square; the Story of the Defence of the Island Bases of  
 the South Pacific. Wellington: A.H. & A.W. Reed, 1945. 
 





Radio New Zealand. “Tongans Voice Opposition to Military Deployment to Iraq.” 18 June,  
 2004. https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/149186/Tongans-voice-  
 opposition-to-military-deployment-to-iraq. 
 
Radio New Zealand. “Tongan Soldiers in Alleged Brawl with Drunk Solomon Islands Youths.”  
 1 November, 2017. https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/173665/  
 tongan-soldiers-in-alleged-brawl-with-drunk-solomon-islands-youths. 
 
Rottman, Gordon L. World War II Pacific Island Guide. Westport: Greenwood Publishing  
 Group, Incorporated, 2001. ProQuest Ebook Central. 
 
 
Rutherford, Noel. Friendly Islands: A History of Tonga. New York: Oxford, University Press,  
 1977. 
 
Rutherford, Noel. Shirley Baker and The King of Tonga. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press,  
 1996. 
 
Rutherford, Noel. "Tonga Ma'a Tonga Kautaha: A Proto-Co-operative in Tonga." The Journal of  
 Pacific History 16, no. 1 (1981): 20-41. 
  
Samson, Jane. Imperial Benevolence: Making British Authority in the Pacific Islands. Honolulu:  
 University of Hawai'i Press, 1998. 
 
Scarr, Deryck. Fragments of Empire: A History of the Western Pacific High Commission  
 1877-1914, Canberra: ANU Press, 1967. 
 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Creation Schemes to Improve the Human Condition  
 have Failed. Connecticut: New Haven, 1998. 
  
Spurway, John. “Ma’afu’s World is in the Hills’: The Role of Tui Lau in the Cession of Fiji.”  
 The Journal of Pacific History 39, no.1 (2004): 3-21. 
 
Solomon Times Online. “Tonga’s PM Comments on Soldiers.”  2 September, 2010.  
 http://www.solomontimes.com/news/tongas-pm-comments-on-soldiers/5509. 
 
Stevens, David. "The Naval Campaigns for New Guinea." Journal of the Australian War  
 Memorial, no. 34 (2001).  
 
Teaiwa, Teresia. “Militarism, Tourism, and the Native: Articulations in Oceania.” PhD  
 Dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz, 2001. 
 
Teaiwa, Teresia. "The Articulated Limb: Theorizing Indigenous Pacific Participation in the  
 Military Industrial Complex." Pacific Dynamics: Journal of Interdisciplinary Research 1,  
 no.1 (2017): 1-20. 
 
 116 
Thomson, Basil C. Savage Island: An Account of Sojourn in Niué and Tonga. London:  
 unknown publisher, 1902. 
   
Tucker-Jones, Anthony. The Afghan War Operation Enduring Freedom 2001-2014. Havertown:  
Pen and Sword, 2014.  
 
U.S. Department of State. U.S. Relations with Tonga. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,  
 Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of State, 2016. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm. 
 
Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965. 
 
 
Weeks, Charles J. "The United States Occupation of Tonga, 1942-1945: The Social and  
 Economic Impact." Pacific Historical Review 56, no. 3 (1987): 399-426. 
 
Wendt, Alexander, and Michael Barnett. "Dependent State Formation and Third World  
 Militarization." Review of International Studies 19, no. 4 (1993): 321-47.  
 
Wiseman, Don. “Tonga’s Afghanistan Deployment Completed - What’s Next?” Radio New  
 Zealand, May 12, 2014. https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/  
 datelinepacific/audio/2595385/tonga's-afghanistan-deployment-completed-what's-next. 
 
Wolfe, Patrick. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” Journal of Genocide  
 Research 8, no. 4 (2006): 387-409. 
 
Wood-Ellem, Elizabeth. “Behind the Battle Lines: Tonga in World War II,” in Echoes of Pacific  
 War, edited by Deryck Scarr, Niel Gunson, and Jennifer Terrell, 1-25. Canberra: Target  
 Oceania, 1998. 
 
Wood-Ellem, Elizabeth. Queen Sālote of Tonga: The Story of an Era. 1900-1965. Auckland:  
 Auckland University Press, 1999.  
  
 
 
 
